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ABSTRACT 
An Appraisal of the Nexus Between Citizen Participation and Democratic 
Development Policies: A Case Study of the  National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (Naads) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda 
 
Mwesigye Edgar Kateshumbwa 
November 2011 
PhD Thesis, School of Government, University of the Western Cape 
 
While the term participation is widely used by development agencies and 
government alike, its meaning is still widely contested. An emerging consensus on 
citizens' participation is the active involvement of the people in the planning process, 
the communication of their preferences, demands, interests, needs, and collective 
problems and aspirations in relation to those in charge of democratic development 
policies. For many, particularly in the rural areas, citizen participation has proved 
problematic as it is often tied up to the implementation of development projects 
conceptualized and spearheaded by outsiders. Participatory approaches provide few 
insights as to how to go about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that 
participation unveils when introduced into systems with long histories of top-down 
approaches to decision-making. In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) government introduced a participatory development programme of National 
Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) which entails contracting Agricultural 
Extension Services (AES). This was done to boost participation, expand coverage and 
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improve agricultural performance in rural areas. The objective of this dissertation 
was to analyse elites and grassroots understandings of democracy and citizen 
participation using the case study of NAADS programme. To achieve this objective, 
a variety of research assessment criteria – qualitative and quantitative interviews 
with elites and grassroots – were employed.  
 
The results demonstrate that Uganda has made strides towards encouraging 
inclusive and meaningful participation through NAADS in Bushenyi district. Yet the 
research also illustrates that there are salient mismatches in terms of perceptions that 
exist between elites and grassroots conceptualisations of citizen participation in 
NAADS. The majority of elites interviewed were concerned with getting NAADS 
programme right as required by the legislative frameworks, rather than creating ties 
with grassroots with a view to promoting participatory development and 
empowering grassroots communities. The grassroots communities exhibited 
willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, although the research findings 
illustrate that it has been implemented in a top-down fashion. There is also proof to 
show that NAADS participants were barely consulted in making decisions and no 
effective mechanisms are in place to handle complaints inclusively. Although there 
is evidence to show participation in the NAADS programme improves the socio-
economic reality of farmers elsewhere in Uganda, this has not been consistently the 
case in Bushenyi. The dissertation concludes by underlining the benefits of 
democracy and citizen participation, but cautions that the findings show that the 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
discourse on democracy and citizen participation, like any other discourse, contains 
many practical limits.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION, ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Introduction  
Over the last decade, there has been an increase in studies on democracy and citizen 
participation in some developing countries of the South. Such studies have provided 
deeply grounded insights into the meanings of inclusive citizenship (Gaventa, cited 
in Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). The studies have also pointed out that citizen 
mobilisation for democracy is an active process of ongoing engagement and action 
(Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scoones & Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 
2006; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010; Coelho & Von Lieres, 
2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010). The studies have also 
demonstrated evidence of bottom-up forms of citizen engagement aimed at realising 
democratic ideals (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). In addition, the literature suggests 
that citizen participation produces tangible benefits by meeting not only the need for 
citizen ‘voice’, but also the need for citizen agency and influence (Cornwall & 
Gaventa, 2001; Mahmud, 2004). All these aspects have contributed towards the 
understanding of the distances between states and their citizens (Common Wealth 
Foundation & CIVICUS, 1999).  
 
The assumption is that when citizen participation takes the shape of collective 
action, it becomes a mechanism for claiming rights based on equal and full 
citizenship in the modern state, replacing traditional claims based on ‘norms, 
charity, benevolence and patronage’ (Gaventa, cited in Coelho & Von Lieres, 
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2010;Kabeer, 2002). Democracy proposes that participation allows citizens to 
communicate their preferences, demands, interests and collective problems, thereby 
improving governance (Mwesige, 2004; Cornwall & Coelho, 2006; Chibita & Fourie, 
2007; UNDP, 2003). But entrenching a form of government in which supreme power 
is vested in the people, and exercised directly by them or their elected agents under a 
free electoral system, has remained a major challenge in emerging democracies,1 
especially in Africa.  
 
While the notion of democracy is well accepted in both the North and the South 
(Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 1990; Gaventa, 2006; Cohen & Sabel, 1997; Pateman, 1990; 
Young, 1990a; Cohen & Fung, 2004; Mouffe, 1992), there is no template for a perfect 
democracy which has only to be accurately reproduced in order for democracy to 
flourish (Nyerere, cited in Museveni, 1992). Rather, forms of truly democratic 
organisation differ from one country to another. Cohen and Fung (2004) and Dahl 
(1956:4) have observed that rationalising democracy frequently requires 
compromise, and the various perceptions of the concept of democracy are filled with 
                                                            
1 The use of the term ‘emerging democracy’ in this dissertation is chiefly to differentiate between 
newly-formed democracies such as Uganda and Western democracies such as the United States. For 
too long, research on democracy has been dominated by experiences of older, Western democracies, 
and by scholars based in those countries (Gaventa, cited in Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). In addition, 
there is also a big difference between the forms and machinery of democracy now operative in 
countries of Europe and North America, and those of the young states in Africa and other continents 
of the South. The former have evolved and been developed over many centuries, while the political 
systems of the latter were destroyed, regardless of whether they were providing dignity and decent 
living conditions to the people concerned or not (Nyerere, cited in Museveni, 1992). 
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clashing ideologies. Moreover, emerging democracies typically have weak state 
institutions. 
 
In the emerging democracy of Uganda, the existing patterns of democracy and 
citizen participation have been unique in several respects, and the product of a 
combination of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial governments. According to 
Mamdani (1997), before independence Uganda was run by decentralised despotism; 
officials were barely accountable to the population, whom they classified as mere 
subjects. Even the attainment of political independence in 1962 did not significantly 
alter the status quo; the first post-independence government ruled by a pact between 
the colonialists and the Ugandan elites. In the immediate post-independence period, 
Uganda was wracked by authoritarianism and political instabilities, which 
encouraged the centralisation of power as a means of suppressing dissent. 
Successive governments neither allowed citizen participation nor encouraged 
democracy to flourish. When the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government seized power in 1986 in a coup d’état, it inherited a situation in which the 
practices of democracy and citizen participation in state affairs were perilous for the 
majority of Ugandans.  
 
The NRM sought to democratise political life in rural Uganda by introducing all-
inclusive government, through elected councils and through embracing neo-liberal 
political and economic reforms that were inspired by the Washington consensus, 
driven by the Western super-powers, and promoted by multinational financial 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
institutions – chiefly the World Bank and the IMF. This, it was hoped, would 
undermine despotism and promote accountability at the lowest levels of local 
government. While some of the reforms are ongoing, it is important to analyse 
whether citizens are familiar with newer reforms that have emerged at grassroots 
level.2 Moreover, given that these reforms have been carried out simultaneously 
with democratisation (and indeed as part of the process), it is pertinent that an 
analysis be made of this phase of the Ugandan reform process.  
 
In an effort to research citizenship in action more deeply, this study made use of an 
Agricultural Extension Services (AES) programme – the National Agriculture 
Advisory Services programme (NAADS)3 – as a concrete example of how liberal 
democratic reforms have been not only idealised but also implemented in a 
participatory fashion at the grassroots level. Hence, the research questions seek to 
analyse (at the level of both the elite and the grassroots) the understandings of 
democracy and citizen participation in a grassroots development mechanism 
prescribed by many multinational development organisations as part of a 
democratic development style of governance.4 Grassroots as a term has been 
                                                            
2 The word ‘grassroots’ is used because this dissertation relates to people and society at the local level. 
3 In Uganda, the agriculture sector employs over 77% of the population, with 75% of Uganda’s 4-5 
million households engaged in agriculture, while 68% derive their livelihoods directly from the 
agriculture sector (Rwakabamba, 2011).  
4 It is important to note that the discussion in this dissertation is based on the first phase of the 
NAADS programme implementation in Bushenyi. The second phase of implementation started in 
June 2010, after the field study for this dissertation had been carried out. This second phase, 
implemented under the Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS) 
framework, is scheduled to run for five years. In this phase, efforts are directed at consolidating 
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commonly used to address different non-profit and non-governmental movements 
and organizations acting at the level of ordinary-people (Mitlin, 2004; Castells 1997: 
187-188). According to Takada (1985:178), the word grassroots is used to identify 
ordinary citizens and refers to activities in abroad range of areas, from locality to 
family, and from county to neighborhood (see Haruno, 2011). The concept has also 
been linked to development. Grassroots development refers to bottom-up 
approaches to development. The implication is that control, direction, knowledge 
and legitimacy are gained from individuals and the communities in which they live 
and operate (Abdelnour, et al, 2011; Kaufman, & Alfonso, 1997). Kavuja (2007) 
observes that grassroots refers to the totality of non-state actors at this level. She 
further points out that both the concepts of community and grassroots, in turn, are 
equated with the notion of agency, referring particularly to ordinary-people capable 
of taking actions as members of different social networks (Giddens, 1984:9). In this 
dissertation, grassroots is understood as the ability ordinary people to act have an 
impact, which in turn, reflects their communities ’positions in collective social 
systems.  
 
In the neo-liberal development rhetoric, there is a sense of an urgent (even 
desperate) attempt to stabilise democratic development and bring order out of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
increases in productivity, with emphasis on (i) the provision of market-oriented advisory services and 
value chain development, (ii) creating a foundation for commercialisation through increasing farm 
household food security, (iii) enhancing commercialisation through supporting various farmer 
categories at sub-county level, and through nucleus and out-grower schemes; and increasing farm 
incomes through increased productivity, and the integration of production, agro-processing and 
marketing.  
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ambiguity (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, 2003; Crush, 1995; Mills, 2010; Sen, 1999; 
Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). This merely confirms that development is an elusive 
concept, which Sach (1992:1-5) suggests that no attempt should be made to define. In 
this study, no exact definition of development or the theory of development is 
provided. The dissertation draws on the writings of Booth (1985), Binder (1986), 
Crush (1995), Edwards (1989), Hunt (1989), Mathur (1989) Sutton (1989), Corbridge 
(1990), Hettne (1990), Slater (1990), Manzo (1991), Kay (1993), and Schuurman (1993), 
among others. Much has been written on the theme of what development is, what it 
does, and how it can be better implemented (Toye, 1987; Kothari, 1988; Norgaard, 
1992; Alvares, 1992; Pottier, 1992; Hobart 1993; Moser, 1993). Rather than asking 
what development is (or is not), or how it can be more accurately defined, better 
theorised, or substantially practised, this dissertation is focused on a different kind 
of question; namely, how do the elites and grassroots in emerging democracies 
understand certain neo-liberal democratic mechanisms – inspired by the Washington 
consensus, driven by the Western super-powers and promoted by multinational 
financial institutions – 
 
For example, the AES NAADS programme was established by the Government of 
Uganda (GoU) to boost participation. Such participation was aimed at increasing 
agricultural productivity and profitability, and shifting production from low-value 
staples to higher-valued commodities,5 so as to liberate the rural citizens from the 
shackles of poverty. The programme is participatory in nature; it embraces liberal 
                                                            
5  See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the NAADS programme.  
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democratic ideals such as citizen participation. The programme is a micro-level 
development strategy, and its use in this dissertation is that it may be examined as 
an experiment on the part of government to demonstrate the effects of controlled 
participation aimed at development at a practical level. At the same time, analysis of 
the NAADS programme assists in generating new knowledge about elites’ and 
grassroots’ conceptions of participation, in relation to their rights and their actual, 
daily-lived experiences in spaces of engagement aimed at development.6 This helps 
to link the debate on democratisation in the South to democratic development (or the 
possibility thereof). This dissertation thus links democratic principles such as citizen 
participation to the NAADS development programme. Such an analysis has not been 
carried out before in the Bushenyi District of Uganda.  
 
Bushenyi District was created in 1974, out of what was then Ankole District. 
Between 1991 and 2002, the counties of Rushenyi and Kajara were carved out of 
Bushenyi District to form Ntungamo District. During the course of the research for 
this dissertation, Bushenyi District underwent tremendous change.7 During 2010, 
four more districts (Sheema, Ruhinda, Buhweju and Rubirizi) were excised from 
Bushenyi. The district has a total population of 246 400, with an anticipated 
population of 251 400 by 2012 (see Appendix C). Like the rest of Uganda, Bushenyi 
has not escaped the burden of poverty (see Appendix E). In the 2002/3 financial 
                                                            
6 The study was based on interviews using semi-structured and open-ended questions with elites, 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In all, 360 participants contributed to the findings. 
7 Bushenyi is located in the south-western part of Uganda. District headquarters are 317km by road 
from Kampala (the capital of Uganda). 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
year, Bushenyi introduced the NAADS programme to the citizenry, with the aim of 
extending agricultural services so as to greatly boost participation and increase 
agricultural productivity.  
 
The major reason Bushenyi district was selected for this case study is that agriculture 
is the main economic activity, and there are many small-scale producers engaged in 
a wide range of crop production, with the aim of increasing household income and 
food security, thereby promoting socio-economic development. Bushenyi district is 
relatively successful,8 and the researcher is familiar with most of areas where the 
NAADS programme is being implemented. In addition, the present model of 
development at local government level in Uganda is premised on the primacy of 
local citizen participation, defined as the organised effort to increase control over 
resources and regulative institutions by communities; by Ugandan standards, 
Bushenyi is considered to employ ‘best practice’ in this regard. This chapter states 
the justification for this study, and then sets out the objectives that inform the 
dissertation. It goes on to outline the methodology used, followed by the layout of 
the dissertation, and finally a summary of the dissertation’s structure.  
 
1.2 Justification for the dissertation  
The rationale for undertaking this dissertation is informed by four considerations. 
Firstly, in Uganda, all-inclusive participatory democracy emerged post-1986, when 
                                                            
8 See the 2000 Participatory Poverty Assessment Process Bushenyi District Report, Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development. 
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the current government took over. Yet despite the ‘emergency’ participatory 
democracy, engagement with the state and some of the programmes it has initiated 
is still hardly noticeable. In fact, in some rural communities (such as in Bushenyi), 
aside from voting9 and very rare protest action,10 all-inclusive citizen participation in 
development programmes remains undetectable.11  
Secondly, citizen participation has proved problematic, more so when inspired by 
the Washington Consensus policies, as stated previously (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). 
For example, contracting out agricultural extension services (for example, the 
NAADS programme) was a participatory strategy promoted by the GoU to expand 
agriculture coverage and improve its performance in rural Uganda. To that end, 
Uganda replaced its public extension service delivery with contract extension 
                                                            
9 The results released by the Electoral Commission for the 2011 presidential elections indicate that of 
the 13 954 129 registered voters, only 8 272 760 voted, representing 59.28%. A total of 5.6 million 
registered voters (40%) didn’t turn up to vote. 
10 It should be noted that protest as a form of participation has been witnessed recently, mainly in 
Kampala and a few other urban areas; for example, the Walk to Work Protests in April and May 2011, 
because of the increase in the prices of consumer commodities and fuel. The culture of protest is 
completely non-existent in the rural areas of Uganda. 
11 Some of the leading newspapers, such as The Daily Monitor and The New Vision, have consistently 
demonstrated the difference in the nature of participation between urban and rural dwellers in 
Uganda. For example, in urban centres it is the unemployed – mainly the youth, and a few civil 
society activists – that would be involved in protests against escalating food and fuel prices as a form 
of participation, while the elites working in offices remain instinctively trapped by the fear that 
participation in such protests would cause them to lose their privileges. On the other hand, 
participation in rural areas relates to popularity coupled with material possessions. Those with 
financial resources have bought their way to offices of power; the financially challenged have 
remained subordinates and objects of administration manipulation. Their participation is restricted 
mainly to voting and (in rare cases) attending community meetings as a form of participation, as 
opposed to urban centres where there is an emerging trend towards protest. 
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services under the NAADS programme (Oleru et al, 2005). However, citizen 
participation in this agricultural extension through NAADS remains barely visible12 
in relation to the programme objectives.13 In fact, Rwakakamba (2011) points out that 
in Uganda, the agriculture sector employs over 77% of the population, with 75% of 
Uganda’s 4-5 million households engaged in agriculture, while 68% derive their 
livelihoods directly from the agriculture sector (see also UBOS, 2003). However, 
given the huge sums of money pumped into the NAADS programme, all-inclusive 
participation is still sorely lacking (Rwakakamba, 2011).14 
 
                                                            
12 It was envisaged that NAADS would establish six families whose farms would act as 
demonstration centres, for the other citizens in the same parish to emulate their farming techniques. 
Assuming that six families are selected from each of the 64 parishes, the implication is that in the end, 
participation in the programme would be carried out by 384 families; statistically, this equates to 
0.001% of the entire projected population of Bushenyi District. Such statistical representation suggests 
that all-inclusive participation is still a far-fetched hope. In fact, informal consultations before 
empirical data collection demonstrated dissatisfaction among some individuals, who pointed out that 
the programme favoured those with large land holdings. 
13 See The Daily Monitor, 8 March 2011. The National Agricultural Advisory Services rewards a few 
high-performing farmers, but its reputation has been badly damaged by the fact that the NRM used it 
in what was widely seen as an exercise in electoral bribery. See also The Daily Monitor, 25 May 2011: 
Redesign NAADS-Luweero LC5 boss. In this news paper article, Abdul Naduli (LC5 boss) points out 
that the NAADS project has failed to meet the people’s demands at grassroots level, due to poor 
design which only benefits the elites who work as co-ordinators and end up mismanaging and 
abusing the entire project. He also called for the project to be redesigned to have services brought 
directly to the farmers, bypassing the middle-men and the few elite who have positioned themselves 
to profit from poor farmers and the youth. He observes: “I will not entertain a situation where a few 
elite continue abusing the NAADS project under the guise of guidelines... these people use these 
guidelines to suffocate the local farmers who need the services.” 
14 Participation in the programme has been marred by the low levels of education of the beneficiaries; 
corruption at sub-county level; embezzlement of funds; provision of substandard agricultural inputs; 
and lastly, a programme seemingly more top-down than bottom-up.  
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Understandably, agricultural extension services around the world do continuously 
undergo major transformations in both structural set-up and approach (Oleru et al, 
2005). This has been attributed to the criticism that public extension systems are not 
delivering and are not relevant (Bukenya, 2010; Rivera & Gustafson, 1991). This 
pressure to improve performance and deliver results has given rise to calls for 
changes to traditional public extension delivery systems, which are seen as top-
down, inflexible and subject to bureaucratic inefficiency (Rivera et al, 2000). As a 
result, Uganda proposed to transform its public agricultural extension service 
delivery alongside its other socio-economic policies. Essentially, public sector 
extension delivery was replaced by private sector advisory services operated on a 
contract basis; farmers’ institutions were to contract the extension service providers 
to do specific assignments, and NAADS was to co-ordinate service provision to 
farmers under this contract approach (Oleru et al, 2005). According to Oleru et al 
(2005), NAADS was to develop demand-driven, client-oriented and farmer-led 
service delivery, particularly targeting the poor.15 However, little was known about 
the contract extension system in the developing world, and in Uganda in particular. 
Instead, NAADS was to build on its experience and lessons learnt as it spread across 
the country (Oleru et al, 2005). Yet Hagmann et al (1999) remind us that before any 
actual work is started, extension workers need to work with communities to identify 
their needs and find ways to address them.  
                                                            
15 The NAADS strategic framework and the Constitution of Uganda state clearly that the people 
should be the driving force of national programmes, and decentralisation should be the mechanism 
through which citizen engagement is achieved.  
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Thirdly, though the term ‘participation’ has become part of the everyday language of 
many development agencies, it is not clear exactly what they mean by it (Pretty et al, 
1995; Sachs, 1992). Contrary to what is considered normal practice in rural 
development, people’s participation is not limited to stakeholders attending 
meetings, or contributing their labour to the implementation of projects designed by 
officials (Oleru et al, 2005; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). Genuine participation entails 
the active involvement of the people in the planning process, enhanced by their 
interaction with experts through educational methods that increase the influence 
that participants can exert upon the programme planning process (Douglah & 
Sicilian, 1997; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Oleru et al, 2005). Hence, privatised 
extension can only offer improved services if it is able to deliver according to the 
participants’ diverse requirements (Oleru et al, 2005; Chapman & Tripp, 2003). In 
fact, the degree to which extension provision in contract farming responds to 
farmers’ priorities is a function of the distribution of power (Oleru et al, 2005). 
 
Farmer involvement in priority-setting helps to generate needed support in 
improving efficiency and quality of service provision (Scarborough et al, 1997). 
Client-based and client-controlled approaches are better positioned to serve the 
needs of specific target groups, notably those of disadvantaged groups (Scmidit, et 
al, 1998). In fact, for an innovation to be accepted and adopted, it ought to be 
relevant to the peoples’ need, conform to the existing system, and potentially 
capable of enhancing people’s income status (Erbaugh et al, 2001; Addo et al, 2001). 
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Yet this seems not to be the case with the NAADS programme. Worse still, the 
advocates of participatory extension approaches provide few insights into how to go 
about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that participation throws up when 
introduced into a system with rigid structures and a long history of top-down 
approaches to decision-making (Douglah & Sicilian, 1997; Kakumba & Nsingo, 
2008).  
 
Fourthly, the Ugandan government claims to use the ‘best practice’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa on local government issues, respecting democratic principles; in practice, 
undemocratic tendencies abound (Riruako, 2007) – for instance, inadequate citizen 
participation in programmes; officials unconstrained by accountability; elite capture 
of the decentralisation process; and lack of information available to constituents, due 
to the absence of proper local institutions.16 This raises concerns about how the 
whole notion of citizen participation has been assimilated and put into practice.  
 
There has been an upsurge in advocacy for all-inclusiveness in development in 
countries of the South, without the necessary interrogation as to whether the rural 
recipients of such development prescriptions understand and are able to 
meaningfully utilise the prescribed mechanisms for their betterment. Hence the need 
for an analysis of the perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in 
development programmes – in this case, NAADS. This dissertation, being 
                                                            
16 Some of the findings from the case study allude to the differences between claims and reality 
described, especially concerning the elite capture of decentralisation processes and the lack of 
accountability. See for example the challenges to participation in Uganda described in Chapter 3. 
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exploratory in nature, provides insight into the extent to which elites and grassroots 
understand participation in relation to development mechanisms prescribed by 
development agencies, using the prototype of the NAADS programme.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the dissertation 
The major objective of this dissertation is to analyse elites and grassroots 
understandings of citizen participation within prescribed democratic development 
mechanisms – such as the agricultural extension service prototype, which formed 
part of the NAADS programme in Uganda. In order to achieve this objective, the 
dissertation: 
 
1. Develops an analytical framework using selected discussions on the 
liberal perspectives of democracy and citizen participation as these are 
incorporated into development strategies designed by governments;  
 
2. Analyses the literature on democracy and citizen participation in 
Uganda as an emerging democracy;  
 
3. Introduces an agricultural extension service prototype of NAADS as a 
national programme born in an emerging democracy where citizen 
participation is ostensibly a key priority; and  
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
4. Analyses and draws conclusions on the perceptions of both elites and 
grassroots regarding democracy and citizen participation in 
purportedly democratic development initiatives, drawing on the case 
study findings. 
 
1.4 Methodology of the dissertation  
A variety of research assessment criteria were employed in this dissertation to 
overcome the weaknesses arising from the use of a single method, and also to ensure 
accuracy and objectivity. The justification for the use of various methodologies is 
that research in social sciences is very broad, and encompasses different processes, 
approaches, principles, strategies, assumptions and techniques to arrive at a 
conclusion. In fact, a host of authors has pointed out that the use of various 
methodologies in research increases the credibility and validity of the results (Cohen 
& Manion, 1986; Altrichter et al, 1996; Denzin, 1978; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; Bless & 
Higson-Smith, 2000; Davids et al, 2005; Mouton, 2001; Wood, 2001b). Both 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies have been combined - in this 
case, not merely to validate findings, but also to achieve innovation of conceptual 
frameworks (Flick, 2004). It is argued that this strategy often leads to multi-
perspective meta-interpretations (Olsen, 2004).  
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In summary, I applied a literature review, the case study methodology, and 
interviews.17 Qualitatively, the analytical framework was developed using the 
concepts of democracy and citizen participation based on a review of the relevant 
literature on both. Thereafter, I carried out qualitative interviews with individuals 
categorised as elites. In addition, a quantitative analysis was conducted with 
randomly-selected grassroots communities, using a survey instrument that was 
deployed in five selected sub-counties of Bushenyi in order to analyse the 
democratic development mechanisms they employed in using the NAADS 
programme. The analysis was done using the Statistical Programme for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). The following section discusses the methodological design in detail. 
 
1.4.1 Construction of analytical framework  
As previously alluded to, studies on democracy and citizen participation have been 
performed in many developing countries of the South (Ake, 2000; Estrella & Iszatt, 
2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). However, these studies barely 
capture whether the recipients of such liberal democratic ideals understand the 
contestation inherent in such discussions juxtaposed to their relevance to 
development, especially those in the rural communities of the developing countries 
of the South. Many authors point that developmental state is the apparatus which 
embodies such developmental ideology (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Ashton et al, 
                                                            
17 Johnson and Reynolds (2005) suggest that interviewing is an excellent form of data collection when 
dealing with individuals who are deeply involved in the political process. They further claim that “it 
often provides a more comprehensive and complicated understanding of political phenomena than 
other forms of data collection, and it provides researchers with a rich variety of perspectives”. 
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1999; Wade, 1990; Masaki 2006; Castells, 1992; Chang, 1999 2010; Thompson, 1996; 
Marwala, 2006; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The concept of development state was 
popularized by Johnson (1982) in his analysis of the rise of Japan and its critical role 
in strategically guiding the nation’s economic growth, at least between 1955 and 
1985. Johnson (1982) argues that in a developmental state, the political elites aim at 
rapid economic development and give power and authority to bureaucracy to plan 
and implement efficient industrial policies (see also, Masaki, 2006; Ashton, et al 1999; 
Marwala, 2006 and Onis, 1991). He further points out that those state-driven 
industrial policies are developed and implemented with cooperation between the 
government and private enterprises (Johnson, 1982). 
 
The above observations are concretized by Chang (1999: 183) who underlines that 
‘economic development requires a state which can create and regulate the economic 
and political relationships that can support sustained industrialization – or in short, 
a developmental state’. Castells (1992:56) in the same vein, points out that a state is 
developmental “when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to 
promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination 
of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive 
system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy” 
However, Castells (2000:284) clarifies that for developmental state, economic 
development is not a goal but a means because to become competitive in the world 
economy is the way of surviving as a state and thereafter, economic development 
becomes only a way of asserting national interests in the world.  
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In the light of the above, Woo-Cumings (1999: 2) points out that a developmental 
state is often conceptually positioned between a free market capitalist economic 
system and centrally planned economic system, and called a plan-rational capitalist 
system, ‘conjoining private ownership with state guidance’ However, according to 
Bolesta, (2007), positioning the theory of developmental state between a liberal open 
economy model and a centrally planned model suggests its being neither capitalist 
nor socialist in texture. Loriaux, (1999:24) reminds us that the developmental state is 
an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of 
the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of 
national economy’. The notion of the developmental state, in the African context has 
been linked to certain practical policy framings that will be explored in this thesis. 
For example, the NAADs programme itself is a form of increasing the commercial 
ability of poor rural farmers through subcontracting agricultural extension services. 
The vision of the developmental state’s role is one of multi-tasking, undertaking 
effective participatory planning while leaving sufficient space for private and civil 
society actors to engage freely in the developmental process. At the same time, the 
developmental state in the African context will need a firm grasp of the socio-
politico-economic and cultural situation of its citizens to make adequate 
development strategies while taking into account the internationally agreed 
development agenda. The practical realisation of the “developmental state”, in 
encouraging all-inclusive socio-politico-economic and cultural development, forms 
part of the discussion in this dissertation. 
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As part of the analytical framework of this study, both international and national 
discussions on democracy and citizen participation are reviewed, so as to establish 
whether there is a relationship between the theory and what the elites and grassroots 
understand by such discussions. This dissertation traces the intellectual progression 
of the concepts of both democracy and citizen participation, to inform the reader 
about the most relevant discussions concerning both disciplines in light of the major 
research objective. In constructing the analytical framework, I focus on two areas. 
The first deals with the debates around democracy, with emphasis on deliberative or 
discursive democracy; participation and participatory governance; empowered 
participatory governance; an examination of the emergence of democracy in Africa; 
an assessment of democratising development in Africa; and lastly, scrutiny of the 
dialectical relationship between democracy and good governance, with an emphasis 
on Africa. The second part examines citizen participation in terms of the 
development discourse, with emphasis on the necessity for greater citizen 
participation; invited and invented spaces in institutions of government; and 
critiques of participatory development strategies. This analysis of the concepts of 
democracy and citizen participation was chiefly to establish how both concepts have 
been conceptualised and understood at international level, mainly in the context of 
emerging democracies. All the discussions above are presented in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation.  
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1.4.2 Case study methodology  
Heng-Yu et al (2008) point out that the case study has a long history in the field of 
research. In this study, the case study method was employed mainly because it is 
best suited to developing a reasonably detailed description of a ‘subject’, in this case 
citizen participation in the NAADS programme in Bushenyi district. The particular 
need for a case study arose from a need to comprehend complex social, economic 
and political activities; and also the need to examine such activities on a more 
practical level, as suggested by Creswell (1998; 1994), Merriam (1998), and Yin 
(2003). Case studies consist of in-depth interviews (Seidman, 1998) and repeated 
focus/support groups (Krueger & Casey, 2000; Morgan, 1993; 2002). These 
interviews help to establish contemporary phenomena within a real life context, and 
expose the boundaries between phenomenon and context that in many cases are 
barely visible (Yin, 1994). 
 
Indeed, many publications on research methodology suggest that case studies are 
directed at understanding the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a particular 
phenomenon in all its complexity (Gall, Borg & Gall, 1996; Johnson, 1992; Stake, 
1994; 1995). For example, Merriam (1998) states that case studies are appropriate 
when one wants a rich, descriptive understanding of in-depth experiences. In 
addition, Lahman and D’Amato (2006) observe that case studies convince the reader 
and make clear the complexity of the case. Heng-Yu et al (2008) also contribute to the 
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discussion by mentioning that if one wants the reader to understand how life is for 
the participants, then the case study offers a compelling story.  
 
Moreover, case study research involves the detailed study of a unit, which is 
naturally bounded by the people, place, or experience involved, and may be 
bounded by time (Stake, 1995; 2005). Similarly, Bushenyi consists of one group of 
people, living in the same place and bound together by time and experience. 
However, it should be noted that this dissertation is not a positivist attempt to isolate 
and reduce the number of variables that can be identified as determinants of citizen 
engagement in an emerging democracy; instead, it uses a social-political perspective 
to analyse popular perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme.  
 
Therefore, a broader understanding of the specific context is important in order to go 
beyond mere universalised socio-economic generalisations. Indeed, using the case 
study methodology provides an analysis and explains the interrelations among 
politics, institutions and choices at societal level. In fact, there exists a dialectic or 
reciprocal relationship between institutions that structure political and economic 
activity, and the synchronised attempts of society to influence these institutions to 
serve their interests. Therefore, I opted for case study methodology chiefly because it 
lends itself to dealing with a wide variety of evidence – documents, interviews and 
observations – and relies on different types of variables that make it possible to 
triangulate data. The following section details my methods of data collection. 
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1.4.3 Interviews  
Four categories of interview were prepared, as shown in Figure 1 below. The first 
three categories of semi-structured interviews were aimed at recording the 
perceptions of individuals categorised as elites in this dissertation – namely, (i) 
government officials (Members of Parliament, Ministry of Agriculture Animal 
Industry and Fisheries and NAADS secretariat officials), (ii) political party leaders 
(Forum for Democratic Change and National Resistance Movement),18 and lastly (iii) 
Bushenyi District leaders (district councillors, sub-county representatives, district 
technocrats) – on their perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS 
programme. The reason for this categorisation is that the NAADS programme was 
developed at national level and executed through a decentralised framework, and 
the selected elites had contributed to the planning and eventual implementation of 
the programme. The other side of the coin is category (iv): structured interviews 
using a questionnaire that was given to 311 selected grassroots respondents, whether 
participating in the NAADS programme or not. Figure 1 below summarises the 
structure of the interviews in terms of category, type of respondents and number of 
participants. Their responses are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 Political party representatives were incorporated mainly because of conflicting perspectives, 
especially on the current governments’ development programmes, which in many cases have been 
politicised. 
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Figure 1 Structure of interviews 
 
 
1.4.3.1 Elite interviews (Semi-structured interviews)19  
Elite interviewing, in this case, involved interviewing respondents in an 
individualised manner, as suggested by Johnson and Reynolds (2005) using face-to-
face questioning of the respondents. This kind of data collection method was chosen 
because of inadequate research material available on local rural conditions. Bearing 
this constraint in mind, I scheduled several interviews with authoritative informants. 
The interviews were carried out with government officials, representatives of 
selected political parties, and Bushenyi district leaders. The purpose was to examine 
their perceptions of their participation in the programme, so as to gain first-hand 
information on various aspects of participatory forms of engagement. Although the 
interviews were flexible, they still addressed the pre-formulated themes of the 
                                                            
19 In this case, elite interviews were preferred, because the researcher in the first case did not have 
sufficient understanding of events to be able to design an effective, structured survey instrument in 
the form of a schedule of questions suitable for elite respondents. I was more interested in the 
interviewees’ own interpretation of events or issues, and did not want to lose the valuable 
information that elites possess by unduly constraining their responses.  
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dissertation. Rubin and Babbie (1997:387-389) claim that consultation with 
authoritative sources of information is an important research tool for exploratory 
studies.  
 
I took note of the strengths and limitations in the application of the principles of 
democracy and citizen participation in programmes, thereby deriving a concrete 
guide to the construction of the measuring instrument. This was informed by Berg’s 
(1998:25) attestation that operational definitions concretise the intended meaning of a 
concept in relation to a particular study, and provide some criteria for measuring the 
empirical existence of the concept. In this way an agreement is reached on what the 
different concepts mean, and how they relate to each other – and how they are 
applied in practice. The study (being exploratory in nature) also employed 
quantitative forms, using a survey instrument developed and deployed among 
grassroots in the five sub-counties, as described in the following section. 
 
1.4.3.2 Grassroots interviews (Structured interviews)20  
In this case, a questionnaire was developed and issued to participants who were 
requested to offer their perceptions on the NAADS programme. Half the grassroots 
participants were participants in the NAADS programme, and the other half were 
not. The questionnaire comprised a mixture of open- and closed-ended questions. 
This method was employed as a data-gathering tool because of Babbie’s (1998:264) 
                                                            
20 The detailed methodology of grassroots interviews is discussed in after the introduction of Chapter 
6  
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claims that in order to capture the insider’s perspective, the most appropriate 
strategy is that which is less formally structured and flexible enough to align with 
the interests of the respondents. Bailey (1996:174) supports this argument, and notes 
that questionnaires are more flexible and can probe for specific responses, resulting 
in increased response rates. In addition, the interviewer is present to observe non-
verbal behaviour and to assess the validity of the respondent’s answers; there is 
better control over the environment, including aspects such as noise and privacy; the 
question order can be maintained; the responses are spontaneous; only the 
respondents can answer questions; and a questionnaire ensures that all questions are 
answered. More importantly, as Bailey (1996:174) points out, the complex questions 
can be probed further in an interview situation by a skilled, experienced and well-
trained interviewer. 
 
Nonetheless, even with a structured interview schedule one cannot claim with 
certainty that all the responses obtained are valid. Gochros (1988:269-273) and Bailey 
(1996:175) identify certain weaknesses inherent in such an interview technique. They 
hold the view that by standardising interview schedules, the results achieved often 
represent the lowest common denominator in the assessment of people’s attitudes, 
orientations, circumstances and experiences. By designing questions that will be at 
least minimally appropriate to all respondents, one may lose what is most 
appropriate to some respondents. Another objection is that interviews cannot 
guarantee anonymity. Respondents may potentially feel threatened, particularly if 
the information sought is incriminating, embarrassing or otherwise sensitive in 
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nature (Bailey, 1996:175). However, participants in this dissertation were assured of 
the strict confidentiality of the information they volunteered to the research 
assistants. As a result, there was a significant response rate to all the questions 
relating to their conceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme.  
 
1.4.4 Data analysis and presentation  
For the semi-structured interviews with elites, their responses are narrated, and in 
some instances quoted verbatim; the dates when such observations were made are 
explicitly noted. The analysis of these interviews appears in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. The structured interviews contained a range of quantitative responses, 
grouped into thematic categories. All the data from questionnaires was coded, 
processed, and analysed using SPSS® for Windows 2007. Descriptive statistical 
analyses of data were carried out to obtain information regarding the frequency 
distribution of biographic information (occupations, age, and educational level); 
perceptions of economic conditions; and details of participation in the NAADs 
programme.  
 
Descriptive statistics and frequencies were categorised in groups and summarised in 
the form of tables and graphs. In some cases, cross tabulations were made to assess 
the degree of correlation between variables. However, according to Clare (2003), 
presenting data in critical social sciences research poses particular issues. She argues 
that unlike interpretive or analytic research, critical research requires that data is not 
just presented as individual interpretation, but must demonstrate the discursive 
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relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Clare, 2003). Furthermore, she 
states that the data must also demonstrate outcomes such as potential for actual 
social change (Clare, 2003). In a nutshell, data must demonstrate dialogic 
relationships between the insights into some of the variables under investigation.  
 
1.5 Dissertation overview  
The dissertation is composed of two parts. Part I is based on an extensive literature 
review, in which the theoretical approaches to democracy, citizen participation and 
the NAADS programme are analysed. This takes up Chapters 1 to 4. Part II of the 
dissertation builds on the conceptualisation developed in Part I, and develops an 
empirical study for the Bushenyi District illustrating elites and grassroots 
understanding of democracy and citizen participation as development mechanisms 
prescribed from the development perspective. Part II consists of Chapters 5 to 7. The 
individual chapters are described in more detail below.  
 
Chapter 1: provides an overall context for the dissertation and the topic researched. 
The first part sets the background and lists the objectives of the dissertation. The 
second part outlines the methodology developed and deployed to achieve the 
objectives of the study. 
 
Chapter 2: forms part of the analytical framework of the dissertation. The chapter is 
split into two. The first part is a discussion on democracy, while the second tackles 
citizen participation from the development perspective. On the understanding of 
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democracy, the chapter points out that it is a political concept, concerning the 
collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or 
society that are consensually deliberated. The chapter further shows that decision-
making is actually under the control of all members collectively, considered as 
equals and embracing principles of popular control and political equality that form 
the guiding thread of democratic audit in a world of free, congenial political 
interactions.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, the discussion on citizen participation is limited to 
the development perspective point of view. It makes evident the need for greater 
citizen participation in community activities and in development programmes or 
projects. For instance, in emerging democracies, new mechanisms of promoting 
more active citizen engagement in the processes of governance have been 
established through the creation of new, decentralised institutions, so as to harness a 
variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy 
deliberations. There has also been increasing emphasis on using such mechanisms to 
support the inclusion of the poorest social groups – those who do not usually have 
sufficient resources to influence the outcomes of traditional policy processes. The 
questions of how citizens (especially the poor) express voice with influence, and how 
institutional responsiveness can be ensured, has been taken into account. 
The chapter also discusses some of the criticisms levelled against participatory 
development strategies. It demonstrates how the dominance of multinational 
agencies and funders is to be found just beneath the rhetoric and practices of 
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participation, which casts doubt on the enduring decision-making control held by 
agencies and funders – there is an emphasis on ‘participatory’ practices which 
obscures the many limitations and manipulations that suppress local power. The 
discussion also reveals that entering poor countries from rich ones and working with 
locals to ‘develop’ their country economically, politically, and socially is inherently 
fraught with complexity. For example, allowing public participation in decision-
making processes appears to fix multiple problematic elements of such processes – 
for a time; perhaps partly because participatory development projects have to be 
sold to donors and institutions, where overstatements of the utility of participatory 
process are routinely made. 
 
Chapter 3: gives an account of the trajectory of democracy and citizen participation 
in Uganda, dating back from pre-colonial times to after independence. The 
discussion links the impact of colonialism to the existing citizen participation 
patterns, and lists the major political, economic and cultural forces in Uganda’s 
history that influenced the capacity of Ugandans to participate in their own 
governance through public debate. It demonstrates how nebulous colonial policies 
constrained participation in pre- and post-independence Uganda, coupled with 
structural factors such as poverty, an illiterate majority of people in rural 
communities, and language barriers. The chapter also notes how the formation of a 
public sphere with a national character has been obstructed; first by the nature and 
philosophy of indirect rule, and later by the factionalism and chaos that 
characterised post-independence governments.  
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Chapter 3 also demonstrates how participatory politics in Uganda were popularised 
by the NRM government after they reinstated constitutionalism in 1986. Citizen 
participation gained significance in the constitution and other legislative documents, 
and was placed at the very heart of the system of local government. The Constitution 
of Uganda (1995) emphasises democratic principles (as seen in Section II). The 
chapter also shows how development agencies (mainly the World Bank and the 
IMF) have played an instrumental role in advocating citizen participation, and have 
embraced methods of citizen participation in the implementation of their policies; for 
example, making citizen participation a condition for reporting formats. But there 
are certain elements that continue to impede citizen participation; notably, the 
militarisation of politics, and the resultant fear generated; political patronage and 
impunity from consequences; corruption and electoral commission misconduct; elite 
capture; insufficient pecuniary aptitude; lack of accountability and transparency; 
and lastly, repetitive local government disagreements.  
 
Chapter 4: provides an entry point to the National Agriculture Advisory Services 
(NAADS), as a programme born in an emerging democracy. The chapter commences 
by historicizing the development of Agriculture Extension Services (AES) as a nexus 
for citizen participation in Uganda, as part of ongoing development reforms. 
Thereafter the chapter introduces the NAADS programme, which was adopted by 
the government of Uganda in 2001/2002 and subsequently established in various 
districts. Through the focus on the NAADS programme, the chapter accounts for 
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principles relevant to the thesis, the programme’s organisation and co-ordination; 
and lastly, relevant components and activities. The intention of the discussion on the 
NAADS prototype is not to judge the performance of the programme as a success or 
failure in terms of achieving development; but rather, to assess popular conceptions 
of democracy and citizen participation in the programme. This chapter acts as a 
preface to Chapter 5, which focuses on analysing the elite’s conceptions of citizen 
participation in the NAADS programme, considering its assumed participatory 
nature. 
 
Chapter 5: reports on experiential information obtained from the interviews carried 
out with respondents categorised as elites. The majority of the elites interviewed 
acknowledged that there was sufficient citizen participation in the NAADS 
programme. They point out that the participation experienced denoted elevated 
levels of ownership among the participants, and also yielded development. The 
elites also believe that the NAADS programme was positioned within the 
democratic arena, and that the ideals of citizen participation were deeply rooted in 
it. However, their belief seems to be sieved through a range of predefined 
ideological categories, under the guise of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. 
They seemed to be more concerned with getting the NAADS programme right, as 
required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised in the NAADS Report (2000), 
rather than with creating ties with the grassroots or promoting participatory 
development and empowering grassroots communities.  
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Chapter 6: assesses the conceptions of grassroots respondents (311 in total), of whom 
half (155) were NAADS participants (NPs) and the other half (156) were Non-
NAADS Participants. The chapter uses quantitative data from a questionnaire that 
was distributed to participants in the five sub-counties of the Bushenyi district. The 
picture that emerges from the discussion is of a rural population that shares a similar 
basic pattern of understanding of citizenship attitudes. It shows evidence of 
willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, but also reluctance. This 
reluctance is based on the fact that the programme has been top-down, though 
disguised as bottom-up; and the elites have failed to extend and popularize the 
programme, and involve a greater proportion of farmers.  
 
The chapter show that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, and there are 
no substantive official mechanisms or processes for handling the complaints of 
participating farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to participatory 
development. Although there is evidence of improvement in the material reality of 
farmers after participating in the NAADs programme elsewhere, based on the data 
of Benin et al (2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly in 
attitudinal terms. The NPs’ belief in NAADS efficacy in Bushenyi was low. In fact, 
the majority of the NPs believed that NAADS officials were only “fairly qualified” 
and “very unqualified” in terms of their competency and efficacy. Yet, despite this 
doubtfulness, the NPs participated in anticipation of the programme improving their 
material reality. The chapter concludes by stating that participatory development as 
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officially described by NAADS remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has 
been implemented in Bushenyi. 
 
Chapter 7: revisits some of the major arguments of the dissertation. In summary, the 
chapter states that citizen participation in an emerging democracy reinforces the 
notion that struggles for human rights are fundamental to development. It notes that 
the dictatorship, corruption, structural inequality, injustice, marginalisation and 
exclusion often evident in emerging democracies (Uganda being no exception) are 
conducive to the emergence of democracy, which seeks to employ the instrument of 
rights in the struggle to eliminate injustices. The literature cited in the analytical 
framework resonates profoundly with the need for citizen participation at grassroots 
level, though it is recognized that much more is required to be done to achieve an 
understanding of broader trends of participation. From a theoretical perspective, it is 
notable that Uganda has taken strides in embracing participation in its development 
agenda. 
 
The chapter also acknowledges that participatory politics and representative 
democracy have become popularised at both national and international level, 
making way for more inclusive and deliberative forms of engagement between 
citizens and the state. It demonstrates how emerging democracies have endeavoured 
to encourage inclusive and meaningful participation in national programmes such as 
NAADS, especially in poor, rural communities such as those of the Bushenyi district. 
Yet these developments have not necessarily resulted in meaningful participation by 
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the indigent. Exclusionary tendencies linked to political party affiliation, the elites’ 
failure to sensitise the rural communities about development programmes, poverty, 
insufficient knowledge of constitutional entitlements, fear emanating from a long 
history of dictatorship, and corruption at institutional level have proved detrimental 
to democracy and citizen participation.   
 
The chapter states that the majority who occupy rural areas are in many cases not 
active participants; rather they are mere recipients of government’s pre-designed 
programmes, and their presence in some cases is for symbolic purposes. Borrowing 
from Friedman (2006:3), the chapter points out that citizen participation in 
government is not when governments create formal mechanisms to ensure it, but 
when they develop attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen action. Friedman 
(2006:14) further observes that the lack of participation of the poor in formal 
structures is not due to the inability of the poor to represent themselves on these 
platforms; in fact, inability to participate lies in the capacities expected of 
participants in structured participation exercises. Their inability to engage with 
technical issues makes the forums in which the voices of the poor are to be heard 
even more difficult, even if their issues do get to the table. Friedman (2006:14) points 
out that if policy is to reflect grassroots preferences, their voices need to be heard, in 
conversation with each other, in open, democratic processes with those who 
command power and wealth. The chapter in conclusion states that democracy and 
citizen participation have been acclaimed for bringing participatory development 
policies to an end. However, just as other bold claims have been discounted in the 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
past, so too it must be realised that democratic development and citizen 
participation, like many other discourses, contain within them their own limits. 
 
1.6 Conclusion  
This chapter summarised the character and focus of the dissertation. Existing 
patterns of democracy and participation in Uganda are unique in several respects, 
and are also a product of both colonial and post-colonial governments that were 
barely accountable to the population, and rife with authoritarianism and political 
instabilities, which encouraged centralisation of power as a means of suppressing 
dissent. Accordingly, participatory democracy in Uganda emerged only after 1986, 
when the NRM government seized power through a coup d’état. The chapter notes 
that citizen participation has proved problematic; more so when inspired by 
Washington Consensus policies and spearheaded by international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.  
 
For example, citizen participation in the agriculture extension programme NAADS 
remains barely visible. The chapter notes that there has been an upsurge in advocacy 
for all-inclusiveness in development in countries of the South without necessarily an 
interrogation into whether the rural recipients of such development prescriptions 
understand and can use the prescribed mechanisms meaningfully for their 
betterment. While the term ‘participation’ has become part of the standard 
vocabulary of many development agencies, its definition is not clear (Pretty et al, 
1995; Sachs, 1992). Contrary to general practice in rural development, people’s 
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participation is not limited to stakeholders attending meetings or contributing their 
labour to the implementation of projects designed by officials (Oleru et al, 2005; 
Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). Democratic participation entails the active involvement 
of the people in the planning process. As a result, participants can exert upon the 
programme planning process (Douglah & Sicilian, 1997; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; 
Oleru et al, 2005).  
 
On one hand, democracy grafted onto liberalism provides the procedural and 
institutional guidelines by which individuals may determine their social affairs – 
based, of course, on the ideal of freedom for the individual (Kymlicka, 1989). 
Freedom rights are located at the individual level of analysis rather than the 
collective (Hughes, 2005). However, democratic institutions alone are not sufficient 
to guarantee the freedom of the individual, when it is recognised that democracies 
can behave illiberally if the majority of individuals chooses to do so (Lynn-Jones, 
1996: xxxii; Owen, 1994:153). On the other hand, participation has a long history; and 
over the decades, its philosophy and methods of citizen involvement have been well 
documented (Ziegenfuss, 2000; Filipovitch, 1999; Nisbet, 1999; Sennett, 1991; Kotler, 
1969; Morris & Hess, 1975).  
 
Indeed, citizen participation has been discussed in reference to justice, education, 
policy development, city planning, environment and telecommunications 
(Rosenstraub, 1987; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Zotti, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Donecq, 
1998). There is even more attention paid to the few fields of participation that are as 
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yet unexplored; and in each field, there are underlying assumptions about common 
processes and benefits (Thomas, 1995; Box, 1998). Many administrators and 
politicians are interested in increasing public participation in public decisions 
(Ziegenfuss, 2000). Yet there is considerable evidence to suggest that their efforts are 
ineffective (Crosby et al, 1986; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987). 
Sometimes this is due to poor planning or execution. Other efforts may not work 
because administrative systems that are based upon expertise and professionalism 
leave little room for participatory processes (Parsons, 1990; De Leon, 1992; Fischer, 
1993; White & McSwain, 1993; King et al, 1998).  
 
Nonetheless, these efforts towards public participation have filtered into major 
development institutions and governments’ development policy documents, and 
have led many authors to refer to a shift in the development paradigm. And while 
some argue that a ‘second generation’ of reforms should be implemented, for others, 
the fundamental problems associated with the ‘Washington Consensus’-inspired 
policies are not being solved by new generations of reforms. Such problems result 
from a tendency to subordinate social policies to economic policies, and to disregard 
the notion that it is citizens who should choose what economic and social 
institutions they prefer (Ocampo, 2004:3).  
 
For some, this implies the recognition by major multinational development agencies 
(particularly the World Bank and the IMF) of past failures, and is seen as a positive 
shift away from both market-led and traditional top-down and centralised 
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approaches, and towards an ‘alternative’ or emergent approach. For others, 
however, this incorporation implies the loss of the radical perspective, in particular 
the so-called alternative approaches (Cammack, 2002; Gardner & Lewis, 2000; 
Kothari & Minogue, 2002). As Ocampo asks, is this so-called ‘new consensus’ an 
indication that the development agenda is in fact changing (Ocampo, 2001)? The 
issue of the depth of the new democracy and citizen participation consensus is 
complex, and by no means uncontested Therefore, in Chapter 2 an effort is made 
towards clarifying what is meant by these catchwords and the expectations that they 
raise. A careful analysis of democracy and the citizen participation rhetoric 
incorporated into the mainstream development dictionary illustrates the diverse 
meanings associated with these concepts. Hence, Chapter 2 fleshes out the meanings 
and conceptual understanding of the concepts as part of the analytical framework. 
The chapter also reviews their definitions, stated advantages and objectives, and 
critically assesses them as operational and policy tools. It also assesses the extent to 
which such practices are being implemented, the challenges faced during their 
implementation, and the promises associated with them. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 OVERVIEW OF ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY AND 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
2.1 Introduction  
Over time, different liberal perspectives on democracy and citizen participation have 
proliferated, and have subsequently been linked to development. For this reason, 
this chapter does not aim to present a chronological overview of democracy and 
citizen participation discourses; but to highlight how (and to what extent) 
contemporary debates are conditioned by certain theoretical assumptions that have a 
long and uneven history. Some scholars have pointed out that democracy is a result 
of citizen participation, while others have observed that citizen participation 
promotes democracy (Saul, 1994; Dahl 1956; 1989; Beetham, 1994; Houtzager et al, 
2007; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).21 The relationship between democracy, citizen 
participation and more inclusive models of development is not straightforward and 
remains uncertain (Robino, 2009; Kymlicka, 1989; Hughes, 2005; Lynn-Jones, 1996: 
xxxii; Owen, 1994).22  
 
Some scholars have noted that both democracy and authoritarianism lead to 
development. However, in this chapter I argue that democracy and citizen 
                                                            
21 However, it is also important to understand the factors affecting the environment and the macro 
context in which democracy and citizen participation is intended to occur.  
22 Roodt (2001) is concerned with the way in which certain groups and individuals monopolise power 
and development resources at local level, excluding other groups and individuals from participating. 
See also Fox and Aranda (1996), Leach et al (1999), McEwan (2005), Molyneux (2002), Pozzoni and 
Kumar (2005) and Schönwälder (1997) for similar observations.  
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participation are synonymous, and that they resonate profoundly with issues of 
governance and accountability.23 Furthermore, the concepts of democracy and 
citizen participation can only be gathered from experiences borrowed from 
elsewhere; and there is no template for a perfect prototype of democracy that can be 
accurately reproduced in order for democracy to flourish (Museveni, 1992). In fact, 
democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader issues of political 
economy that contextualize the potential of participatory development to be 
transformative (Robino, 2009).24 On exploring the literature, one finds that 
democracy, citizen participation, and good governance (now incorporated into the 
mainstream development lexicon) have very diverse meanings associated with 
different visions of development (Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000; 
Schönwälder, 1997; Robino, 2009). Thus, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of 
the concepts of democracy and participation by reviewing their definitions, stated 
advantages and objectives; and by critically assessing their utility as operational and 
                                                            
23 The researcher is aware that the mechanisms of democracy are not the meaning of democracy: they 
are merely a means to an end. The researcher is convinced that people must be able to choose those 
who govern them freely, and the government must be responsive to freely-expressed views through a 
political machinery which people can understand and use when it makes sense in terms of their own 
cultures, and which is accessible within the framework of their own income and educational levels.  
24 For democracy and citizen participation to transform formal democratic institutions, 
institutionalising a more inclusive model of development, it must be stressed that such political 
agency and processes are reliant on conjunctural conditions that must be investigated (see for 
example Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000; Schönwälder, 1997). The ‘consensus’ 
established regarding democracy and citizen participation is thus deep and complex, and by no 
means uncontested. It is clear that for change to materialise, democratic theory and practice must go 
well beyond the mere prevalence of this new terminology (see also, Robino, 2009). 
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policy tools. The chapter also assesses the extent to which such participatory 
developmental practices are being implemented, and the challenges faced during 
their implementation.  
 
The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part interrogates the various 
conceptions of democracy, with emphasis on deliberative/discursive democracy, 
participation and participatory governance, and empowered participatory 
governance. It also examines the emergence of democracy in Africa, and then links 
democracy to governance and development debates. The second part examines 
citizen participation from the development perspective. It illustrates the necessity for 
greater citizen engagement, then discusses participation within invited and created 
spaces in institutions of government; and lastly, it critiques participatory 
development strategies.  
 
The intention behind analysing the concepts of both democracy and citizen 
participation is to assess the extent to which such practices are being implemented, 
the problems and challenges faced during their implementation, and the promises 
associated – mainly in the context of emerging democracies. It is also imperative to 
point out at the onset that the chapter will not provide a more exact definition of 
democracy and citizen participation, or a theory which attempts to verbally model 
the real-world process of democratisation and its recurring crises and bottlenecks; 
rather, it highlights some of the liberal democratic understandings on democracy 
and citizen participation, to demonstrate their assumed relationship to development. 
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2.2 Interrogating the myth of democracy25  
 
Democracy is not intended to be efficient, linear, logical, cheap, the 
source of absolute truth, manned by angels, saints or virgins, 
profitable, the justification for any particular economic system, a 
simple matter of majority rule or for that matter a simple matter of 
majorities. Nor is it an administrative procedure, patriotic, a reflection 
of tribalism, a passive servant of either law or regulation, elegant or 
particularly charming… the key to its secret is the involvement of the 
citizen. (Saul, 1994) 
 
This quotation from Saul (1994) epitomises what is often meant by the contemporary 
conceptualisation of democracy as used in this chapter. To begin with, democracy in 
its early conception was generally linked to the ancient city-states of Greece 
(McQuido-Mason et al, 1994:16; Catt, 1999:5). Recently, some authors have discussed 
democracy with reference to justice, education, policy development, city planning, 
environment, neoliberal market forces, political parties, and social movements 
(Rosenstraub, 1987; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Zotti, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Donecq, 
1998). The ancient Greek word demokratia may be broken down into demos, meaning 
‘the people’, and kratos, meaning ‘authority’ or ‘rule’ (McQuido-Mason et al, 1994:16; 
Catt, 1999:5). Demokratia in ancient Athens advocated equality, but what remained 
                                                            
25 The origin of democracy is a ‘false story’ or sacred narrative explaining how various nations in the 
world came to be in their present form. However, the definition offered is unequivocally incongruous 
to its practicability in the real world – even in Greece, to where the origins of the concept are traced. 
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ambiguous was the type of equality; especially where pressing matters requiring 
collective action met conflict from different parties and identities (Warren, 1999). The 
literature on democracy suggests that the Athenians had realised certain aspects of 
equality as desirable characteristics for their political system; that is, the right of all 
citizens to speak in the governing assembly (isegoria), and equality before the law 
(isonomia) (Dahl, 1989:14).  
 
These high-flown ideals cherished by Athenians were often considered to be 
characteristics of democracy during the first half of the fifth century, when the 
people (demos) steadily gained acceptance as the sole legitimate authority in making 
rulings. ‘Democracy’, or ‘rule by the people’ also gained ground as the most 
appropriate term for the new system (Dahl, 1989:14), though the new term did not 
pass smoothly into the public domain. It attracted a range of mild adversaries, such 
as Aristotle, who disliked the idea and argued that the expansion of democracy 
necessarily gave power to the poor, and Plato, an outright opponent who 
condemned democracy as rule by the unfit, advocating instead the perennially 
appealing system of government by the best qualified (Dahl, 1989:14). Even after the 
15th century, various commentators continued to offer various interpretations of 
democracy. 
 
During later times, other trends came and went while the world tried to define and 
rationalize democracy (Catt, 1999; Dahl, 1956; Id21, 2007:1). For example, the 
collapse of communism resulted in our current contextualised understandings of 
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democracy, meaning equality of representation and recognition of opposition 
politics – although this understanding contains many conceptual deficiencies 
(Shapiro & Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 1999; Tobin, 1999). As Storm (2008:215) 
observes, “with hundreds of different definitions of democracy in use, it has almost 
become impossible to gauge what is meant by the term when applied in the 
academic literature, unless the author specifies exactly what democracy denotes in 
the publication in question”. While agreeing with Storm’s observations, Dahl (in his 
book, A Preface to Democratic Theory) points out that “it is anomalous, perhaps, that 
after so many centuries of political speculation, democratic theory should continue 
to be – if I am right in my basic assumption – rather unsatisfactory, whether the 
theory be regarded as essentially ethical in character or essentially an attempt to 
describe the actual world” (1956:1). Indeed, understanding the concept of democracy 
since the cold war, while trying at the same time to realise it, has proved problematic 
– especially in communities considered to be emerging democracies. 
 
Some observers suggest that the concept of democracy is still in its ambiguous state. 
But prominent scholars such as Beetham (1994), Dahl, (1956), Storm (2008), Koelble 
and Lipuma (2008), Houtzager et al (2007), and Collier and Levitsky (1997) have 
conclusively stated that democracy is a situation in which there are free and fair 
elections; in which basic civil liberties are respected and protected; and in which the 
cabinet has effective power to govern. For instance, Beetham (1994) suggests that 
democracy is a political concept concerning the collectively binding decisions made 
about the rules and policies of a group, association or society. He further points out 
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that such decision-making is actually subject to the control of all the members of the 
collective, who are considered equals; that is to say, democracy embraces related 
principles of popular political control and political equality which form the guiding 
thread of democratic audit.  
 
Beetham (1994:30) separated the process of popular control over government into 
four distinct (though overlapping) dimensions. The first and most basic of the four 
dimensions is the election of parliament or legislature and the head of government. 
He shows that the degree or extent of popular control is there to be assessed by such 
criteria as: its inclusiveness; its fairness between parties, candidates and voters, and 
the range of effective choice it offers; and lastly, its independence from the 
government of the day and so on (Beetham, 1994:30).  
 
The second dimension of analysis concerns what he refers to as open and 
accountable government. He points out that besides popular elections, continuous 
accountability of government directly to the electorate – through public justification 
for its policies, or indirectly, to agents acting on people’s behalf – is essential.  
 
The third dimension is of guaranteed civil and political rights, or liberties. Here, 
Beetham states that the freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement, 
the right to legal process, and so on, are not something specific to a particular form 
of democracy called ‘liberal democracy’; they are essential to democracy, since 
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without them no effective popular control over government is possible (Beetham, 
1994).  
 
The fourth and last dimension is civil society. Beetham (1994) points out that the 
nexus of associations through which people organise independently to manage their 
own affairs, can act as a channel of influence upon government and a check on its 
powers. However, he acknowledges that this is a contestable dimension of 
democracy – not only because the criteria for its assessment are much less well 
formed than for the other three areas, but also because there is room for 
disagreement as to whether it should be seen as a necessary condition for 
democracy, or even as an essential part of it (Beetham, 1994:29). While Beetham’s 
four dimensions are insightful, they can only be realised in an environment where 
they can unreservedly be interpreted without looking at them as mere democratic 
ingredients, to be added or left out on a whim. Instead, they ought to be considered 
an inviolable recipe for social, political and economic transformation. 
 
Though Beetham’s dimensions still hold currency in their abstract form, Collier and 
Levitsky (1997) offer another form of analysis which separates democracy into six 
categories, namely: non-democratic, electoralist (ED), procedural minimum (PM), 
expanded procedural minimum (EPM), prototypical conception of established 
industrial democracy (PCEID), and maximalist. From these categories, Collier and 
Levitsky (1997) develop four significant, underlying conceptual benchmarks from 
which democracy can further be contextualised: RCE, or Reasonably Competitive 
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Elections – devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage; BCL, or Basic Civil 
Liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association; EP: Elected 
governments have Power to govern; and lastly, AF: Additional political, economic, 
and social Features associated with industrial democracy (Collier & Levitsky, cited 
in Storm (2008:217)). 
 
The forms of democracy suggested by Beetham and Collier and Levitsky and 
explained above, and those suggested by other scholars such as Storm (2008), 
Koelble and Lipuma (2008), and Houtzager et al (2007), are universally 
acknowledged. In addition, a host of authors have acknowledged that democracy 
takes various forms which favour deeper forms of engagement by citizenry, and 
contain important but often implicit assumptions about strategies and political 
choices (Dahl, 1956; Dryzek, 1990; Elster, 1998; Gaventa, 2006). For instance, Dahl 
(1956:1) points out that ‘there is no democratic theory – there are democratic 
theories’, and states that democratic theory is concerned with the processes by which 
ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders. Dahl (1956:3) 
candidly admits that such a minimal definition can easily be translated into a variety 
of equivalent statements to interpret its relevance. This dissertation selectively 
utilises the conceptual frames of (i) deliberative/ discursive democracy; (ii) 
participation and participatory governance; and (iii) empowered participatory 
governance. These conceptual framings are linked to the liberal notions of 
democracy that encompass ways on how to organize the political and economic life 
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of the state (Catt, 1990). The following section discusses the various framings, and 
links these to liberal democratic theory.  
 
2.2.1 Discursive / deliberative democracy  
With reference to a book titled Deliberative Democracy, edited by Elster (1998:1), the 
idea of deliberative democracy (or decision-making by discussion between free and 
equal citizens), as well as its practical implementation, is old as democracy itself. For 
instance, during the 5th century, Pericles (in his eulogy to Athens) said, “…our public 
men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary 
citizens, though occupied with pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public 
matters; for unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who takes no part in these 
duties not as unambitious but as useless…” (Thucydides, II.40, cited by Elster, 
1998:1). Such observations of Athenian democracy were viewed by Elster (1998) as 
the start of a tendency to debunk discussion through sophistry or demagoguery. 
Democracy by deliberation was viewed both positively and negatively; some people 
argued that it would improve decision-making (Elster, 1998), while others have said 
that it would lead to bad decisions (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 1999; 
Tobin, 1999). The notion of deliberative democracy is largely influenced by the 
philosophical works of Jurgen Habermas and was later propounded by theorists 
such as Dryzek (1990; 2000), Gaventa (2006) and Cohen and Sabel (1997), among 
many others; their ideas suggest that democracy revolves around the transformation 
of preferences, rather than simply their aggregation.  
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Dryzek, in his book Discursive Democracy: Politics policy and political science, describes 
how discursive democracy looks forward to a world of free, congenial, political 
interaction, where politics – properly understood – is returned to its Aristotelian 
primacy in the order of things (1990:ix). In addition, “…more immediately, 
discursive democracy charts escapes from some contemporary impasses in political 
arrangements… which are currently beholden to instrumental and objectivist 
notions about rationality and human affairs” (Dryzek, 1990:ix). While such claims 
still feature prominently, Cohen and Sabel (1997) and Dryzek (2000), cited in 
Gaventa (2006:17) point out that discursive democracy encompasses scenarios in 
which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to 
solve them. They observe that the ambitious aim of deliberative democracy, in short, 
is to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and power, to the common reason of 
equal citizens as the dominant force in democratic life. Elster’s voice on the same 
subject cannot be ignored; she states that the notion of deliberative democracy 
involves collective decision-making, with the participation of all who will be affected 
by the decisions of their representatives (1998:8). However, more recently, Gaventa 
(2006:17) suggests that deliberative democracy emphasises the nature and quality of 
deliberation that occurs when people come together for discussion and debate in 
public spheres. 
 
2.2.2 Participation and participatory governance  
The agitators for deliberative democracy call for collective decision-making, whereas 
those for participation and participatory governance, in the same vein, call for equal 
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engagement with citizens in the process of governance with the state, so as to deepen 
democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15). Scholars such as Ackerman (2004:447) have pointed 
out that “…the best way to tap into the energy of society is through ‘co-governance’, 
which involves inviting social actors to participate in the core activities of the state... 
to exit solutions based in market theories, or to ‘voice’ solutions grounded in ‘co-
production’ social protest or consultation”. These claims have been substantiated by 
Cohen and Fung (2004), who indicate say that “…citizens should have direct roles in 
public choices or at least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be 
assured that officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgment”. There has 
been criticism of this oversimplification of the whole notion of participation as part 
of governance (Crosby et al, 1986; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 
1987). For instance, participatory governance may be subject to abuse and easily 
captured by elites, and thus less meaningful (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & 
Speer, 2006; Williams, 2005; Hickey & Giles, 2004). Houtzager (2003) suggests that 
proponents of participation have a naive view of power, and that participation has 
failed to deal with the hard politics of party building and mobilisation of demands, 
thus enabling weaker forms of participation to be easily captured and co-opted by 
neoliberal agendas. 
 
These criticisms of participation and participatory governance have been countered 
by recent research done by Estrella and Iszatt (2004) in their book Beyond Good 
Governance: Participatory democracy in the Philippines, as cited by Gaventa (2006:17). 
Estrella and Iszatt analysed how citizens combined and used a number of different 
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participatory strategies to engage in and occupy an emerging democracy in a small, 
imitative project known as the ‘BATMAN’, which later grew into a movement of 
NGOs, people’s organisations, social movements and progressive local officials, 
loosely known as the Barangay-Bayan Governance Consortium (BBGC). According 
to Gaventa (2006:17), this is one of the largest organised consortia working on 
participatory local governance anywhere in the world. The BBGC argued for ‘dual 
power’ within local governments through strategies of collaboration and 
partnership, while also maintaining strong community-organising strategies at 
grassroots level (Gaventa, 2006:17). These reports suggest that participatory 
democracy can work in legal frameworks, and facilitate the operation of a 
community and its elected representatives in decision-making. 
 
2.2.3 Empowered participatory governance (EPG) 
The third related but equally important approach to deepening democracy focuses 
on the citizen empowerment/participatory governance nexus. Following this 
approach, Fung and Wright (2003:5) state that empowered participatory governance 
(EPG) relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens to make 
sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation, as cited by Gaventa (2006). 
Furthermore, Fung and Wright (2003:5) point out that “[a]n empowered 
participatory governance orientation is based on principles of bottom-up 
participation, starting with a pragmatic orientation to solve concrete problems while 
at the same time, seeking to foster deliberation in which participants listen to each 
other’s position and generate group choices after due consideration”. To substantiate 
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their observations, Fung and Wright (2003) developed a set of properties for 
empowered participatory governance that incorporate (i) a focus on devolution; (ii) 
co-ordination and supervision by a strong central body, to ensure quality and diffuse 
learning; and (iii) an attempt to harness state power, and a realisation of the 
importance of countervailing forms of power which help to open public spaces and 
ensure they are not captured by existing power holders (Gaventa, 2006:19). 
 
As the democratic dimensions offered by Beetham (1994) did not escape criticism, 
Fung and Wright (2003:33), in turn, offer some criticisms of their own model; among 
other aspects, (i) the risk of elite domination or capture; (ii) the scope for decision-
making being limited by external actors and conditions; (iii) newly-empowered 
institutions falling prey to rent-seeking behaviours; (iv) the risk that devolution may 
balkanise the polity; (v) the chance that participation may demand unrealistically 
high levels of popular commitment; and lastly, (vi) the difficulty in sustaining such 
experiments over a long period. Not surprisingly, many writers who have examined 
the emergence of new forms of governance have not been wholly convinced of the 
capacity of those forms to deliver outcomes that challenge current trajectories, or to 
provide for a sustainable future (Lawrence, 2004).  
 
Therefore, while one might question the ability of rural citizens to become engaged 
participants in the new arrangements from a position of social disadvantage (Gray & 
Lawrence, 2001; 2004; Cheshire & Lawrence, 2004), one in which many in rural and 
regional areas experience social isolation, exclusion and deprivation, and where 
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environmental problems remain largely unsolved, others have embraced this change 
as representing a genuine attempt to give them a voice and to achieve action in 
development matters (Lawrence, 2004; AFFA, 1999). In summary, the three models 
of liberal democracy discussed (discursive/deliberative, participatory governance, 
and empowered participatory governance) are among many ‘discussions’ that 
concretise our theoretical understanding of democracy and how it has been 
conceptualised at a more practical level. The same discussions form a benchmark for 
gauging how the elites and grassroots understand democracy and citizen 
participation, especially in emerging democracies. It is important to point out that 
theoretically, the analysis of democracy as a concept (and in its practical application) 
is an exhaustive field, and not all the debates can be covered in this chapter. 
However, the same liberal democratic models described above serve as a foundation 
for understanding how some theorists have constructed and conceptualised 
democracy.  
  
2.3 The emergence of democracy in Africa  
Since the drive to democratise Africa is ongoing, it is essential for this dissertation to 
briefly touch on that phase of Africa’s transition. The search for the meaning of 
democracy in Africa has been relatively short in terms of written analysis. Some 
scholars have seen democracy as a trophy handed to certain Africans after attaining 
their independence in the 1960s, while others have openly stated that the 
conceptualisation of democracy has not properly entered popular discourse in 
Africa, especially where languages do not contain direct a semantic equivalent (Ake, 
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2000; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998). To authenticate their 
observations, Rose et al (1998) note that in some cultural interpretations the word 
changes its meaning in translation, sometimes even signifying consensual constructs 
like community or unity. However, Bratton and Mattes (2001) argue that contrary to 
the theory of cultural interpretations, the standard liberal ideas of civil and political 
rights lie at the core of current African understandings of democracy.  
 
In a study carried out by Bratton and Mattes (2001) from 1999 to 2000, in six selected 
countries of Africa (Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Namibia and Zambia), the 
authors report how the various Africans understood the meaning of democracy, in 
their own words. Firstly, with few exceptions, their survey respondents attached a 
positive value to democracy. For example, more than nine out of ten (92%) believed 
that democracy was a public ‘good’ that would make conditions ‘better’ in some 
way; fewer than 1% saw democracy as ‘bad’ in any way. This small minority thought 
that democratic reforms brought elite corruption, conflict among social interests, or 
‘confusion’ in political life. The remainder (8%) saw democracy in neutral terms, 
usually as a ‘change of government’ or as ‘civilian politics’, without implying that a 
new regime would be any better or worse than its predecessor (Bratton & Mattes, 
2001:109).  
 
Secondly, their findings indicate that the respondents understood democracy in 
procedural as well as substantive terms. They point out that such findings run counter 
to much of the scholarly literature, which paints democratisation in Africa as a quest 
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for equal social and economic outcomes (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109). They also 
noted that such portrayals are often accompanied by criticism, for instance that 
procedures such as constitutional reform and multiparty elections are mere 
formalities. Yet in defining democracy, their findings also illustrate that almost seven 
out of ten of our survey respondents (69%) refer to political procedures such as the 
protection of human rights, participation in decision-making, and voting in 
elections; while fewer than one in five (17%) refer to substantive outcomes like peace 
and unity, social and economic development, and equality and justice (Bratton & 
Mattes, 2001:109). Thus, when not prompted, the majority of Africans interviewed 
saw democratisation as a limited political process rather than as an expansive 
socioeconomic transformation (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109). In addition, their 
findings indicated that more respondents associated democracy with political goods 
(such as peace, order, unity, equality, justice, and national independence, which 
together account for 11% of responses) than with economic goods (social and 
economic development, which accounts for just 5%). The ‘peace or unity’ responses 
are particularly interesting, since none of the countries in the sample (with the 
possible exception of Namibia) had employed democratic elections to implement a 
peace agreement (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:110).  
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Figure 2: The meaning of democracy in selected African countries  
 
Source: Bratton and Mattes (2001) 
 
Thirdly, their findings suggest that popular African conceptions of democracy are – 
perhaps unexpectedly – quite liberal. For instance, they point out that when open-
ended responses were analysed, respondents had cited civil liberties and personal 
freedoms more frequently than any other meanings (34%) (Bratton and Mattes, 
2001:110). They argue that this represents a conception of democracy based on 
individual rights, in marked contrast to the one-in-a-thousand respondents (0.1%) 
who made reference to group rights. They concluded that: “Africans do not perceive 
democracy and associated rights differently to people elsewhere... and to the extent 
that they claim such rights as a means of resisting repression at the hands of an 
authoritarian ruler, Africans are beginning to think more like citizens of a 
constitutional state than clients of a personal patron” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:111). 
To wrap up their findings on the understanding of democracy, Bratton and Mattes 
observe that Africans speak of political freedoms in very general terms, referring to 
‘freedom as a birthright’, ‘the right to everything’, and ‘control over one’s own life’ 
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(Bratton & Mattes, 2001:111). This vague language – used by more than half (56%) of 
those who define democracy in terms of civil liberties – suggests that the popular 
conception of human rights remains highly undifferentiated (Bratton & Mattes, 
2001:111). These findings may or may not be typical of other countries in Africa.  
Notwithstanding Bratton and Mattes’ (2001) study on Africans’ understanding of 
democracy, the discussion on Africa’s democratisation process is usually premised 
on four issues, namely (i) the relative roles of internal and external factors; (ii) 
historical and contemporary dynamics; (iii) structural and contingent factors; and 
(iv) economic and political dimensions.26 These issues are discussed in the pages that 
follow, though not in the order shown here. Those who support the primacy of 
internal factors behind democratic transitions tend to stress the strength of domestic 
political protests and pro-democracy movements energised by the failures of 
development, the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, and the disintegration of 
the postcolonial state's legitimacy and capacity (Ake, 2000; Sorenson, 1993).Those 
who emphasise external forces point to the decisive impact of the end of the Cold 
War, the effects-by-example of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and 
the imposition of structural adjustment programs and political conditions by 
Western bilateral and multilateral financial institutions; some have questioned the 
West's commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa, arguing that it is more 
rhetorical than real, and is motivated by donor interests rather than recipient needs 
(Mohamed Salih, 2005).  
                                                            
26http://science.jrank.org/pages/8962/Democracy-Africa-Explanations-Africa-s-
Democratization.html [Accessed on 19/04/2011]  
 
 
 
 
58 
 
In their article ‘Former presidents in African politics’, Southall, Simutanyi and 
Daniel (2006) not only illustrated that the colonial state itself has embedded 
traditions of political authoritarianism, but also exposed how African countries have 
limited cultural and national homogeneity, low levels of literacy and economic 
development, and lack a substantial middle class. These factors were considered to 
have conspired against the expansion of democracy. Some authors have gone 
further, suggesting that in the colonial era, political discourse excluded not only 
democracy, but even the idea of democracy (Museveni, 1992; Ake, 1993; 1996; 2000; 
Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose et al, 1998). For instance, Museveni (1992) points out 
that after political independence, many African nationalist leaders continued the 
colonial legacy by turning against democracy; instead of transforming their 
countries in accordance with popular nationalist aspirations, they found themselves 
on a collision course with their people. 
 
Given the overwhelming demand for structural transformation of the colonial 
system wherever it was found, the colonialists generally insisted that it was 
necessary to pursue development first, and that this would be better achieved by 
giving unquestioning support to leadership. However, Southall and Melber (2006) 
argue that some independence regimes made heroic and innovative efforts to 
promote both development and democracy, though the authors accept that via 
socialism and participatory one-partyism, the overwhelming majority were rapidly 
to fall victim to political and military authoritarianism. The same authors also point 
out that such ideals were driven by competition between (ethnic or ethnicising) elites 
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for control of the state machinery that deployed the major economic resources in 
society. In a way, their arguments are similar to those of Markowitz (1977) and 
Mohamed Salih (2001). While Africa's democratisation was influenced by 
developments elsewhere in the world, it was primarily rooted in the continent's long 
history of struggle against slavery, colonialism, and post-colonial misrule.  
 
On the other hand, Mohamed Salih (2001) talks of Africa's own ‘waves of 
democratization’ (colonial, early independence, post-independence, and the 1990s). 
At the very least, the 1980s and 1990s (the era of democratisation) represented a 
period of struggle for the ‘second independence’ (the ‘first independence’ having 
been fought for in the 1950s and 1960s, the era of decolonisation) (Salih, 2001). Thus, 
African democratic struggles are linked to the rich reservoirs of earlier struggles 
against exploitation and oppression, both structurally and symbolically. Ake (2000) 
points out that Africa’s former colonial masters, anxious for influence with new 
holders of power, gave tolerant support to criminalising political opposition. 
Bending to the necessities of the Cold War, the great powers ignored human rights 
violations and sought allies wherever they could. In summary, these factors helped 
to crystallise a climate of opinion in the West that was hostile to democracy in Africa, 
as recorded by Ake (1993; 1996; 2000) and Rose et al (1998).27  
 
                                                            
27 For instance, though human rights abuses in Africa became an issue in the United States during the 
Carter administration, democracy was hardly discussed. 
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Structural theorists, on the other hand, dwell on the conditions that have forestalled 
and facilitated (and might sustain or frustrate) democratisation. These include 
colonial legacies, levels of economic development and education, size of the middle 
classes, the nature and vibrancy of civil society, and impediments imposed by the 
global system (Soreson, 1993; Mohamed Salih, 2001; Lipset, 1963; Museveni, 1992). 
Predictions of the prospects for the democratic project in different countries and 
across the continent, whether positive or negative, are often based on how these 
‘democratic preconditions’ were evaluated. To many commentators, from Western 
cynics and beleaguered African leaders to pessimistic intellectuals, the prospects of 
democracy in Africa are undermined by the enduring realities or legacies of 
underdevelopment (Museveni, 1992; Ake, 1993; 1996; Mazrui, 2001).  
 
Thus, Ake (2000; 1993; 1996) shows how the aggressive emptiness of the Cold War 
was replaced by the mission of African democratisation. Democracy became an 
important item on the colonial agenda, and would later assist colonialists in 
establishing a hegemony in Africa. As a result this colonial change in attitude, 
coupled with the long struggle for democracy by the colonised, began to show 
results too striking and too prevalent to be ignored (Ake, 1993; 1996; 2000; Rose et al, 
1998). Thereafter, popular opposition to military rule in some countries (for instance 
in Nigeria, Liberia, Benin Republic, Somalia and Mali) and the demise of apartheid 
in South Africa (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996) accelerated the process. Noteworthy results 
elsewhere on the continent included modest gains for pluralism and multi-partyism 
in Niger, Togo, Madagascar, Gabon, Ivory Coast, New Guinea, Mozambique, 
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Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Congo; less welcome were the deepening 
crises of democratisation in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Cameroon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
Ethiopia and Zimbabwe (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996; Rose et al, 1998).  
 
In the aftermath of these events, the colonialists’ attitude towards democracy in 
Africa drew additional impetus from Africa’s economic and strategic 
marginalisation. It is well known that the world economy reduced production of 
goods and services and shifted from material-intensive to knowledge-intensive 
industries, a trend which reduced the economic importance of economic producers 
(Ake, 2000). At the same time, advances in science and technology yielded an 
increasing number of synthetic products that were more flexible and more versatile 
than those traditionally exported by Africans (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996). Such changes 
made Africa’s primary economies far less relevant to the current economic needs of 
industrialised countries. In order to sustain their influence, the colonial powers 
adopted an attitude of calculated indifference to issues relating to human rights and 
democracy in Africa, in order to avoid jeopardising their economic and strategic 
interests and facilitate their quest for allies against communism (Ake, 2000; 1993; 
1996). As geo-strategic concerns diminished, the West became more inclined to bring 
its African policies closer to its democratic and human rights commitments (Ake, 
2000).  
 
There is also considerable debate as to whether Africa's democratisation is 
attributable to economic or political factors. Those who take the economic approach 
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examine the role played by post-colonial development policy failures, and 
particularly the economic crises during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. This approach 
states that policy failures were exacerbated by structural adjustment programmes 
imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and that these 
generated widespread opposition from various social groups, especially the 
pauperised middle and working classes, who spearheaded the democratic reform 
movements (see for example Mills, 2010; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 
1999; Tobin, 1999; Boaventura, 2005). The political approach concentrates on the 
many political crises of the various postcolonial states, particularly their inability to 
forge nationhood specifically those embodied in ethnicity questions. 
 
As Berman et al (2004) argue, that disenchantment with the performance of the 
postcolonial state was not only expressed in the growing number of demeaning 
epithets to describe the African state; it spawned the rapid growth of ‘civil society’ as 
the master concept around which the dynamics of politics were increasingly debated 
and the possibilities of African renewal were invested. The struggles for democracy 
in the 1980s and 1990s represented the latest instances of accelerated change in a 
long history of struggles for freedom – though exceptionally complex instances, 
often driven by unpredictable events and new social movements and visions, all 
anchored in the specific histories of the countries involved (Berman et al, 2004). In 
each country, social structures and national, regional and international forces 
converged unevenly and inconsistently, and economic and political crises reinforced 
each other, altering the terrain of state-civil society relationships (Berman et al, 2004). 
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Such structures of governance and claims of citizenship were oriented and geared 
towards the development of Africa.  
 
However, there is a crucial question that has persisted: is Africa underdeveloped 
primarily because it is undemocratic? Or is Africa undemocratic primarily because it 
is underdeveloped? To get to grips with this question one needs to explore how 
development is understood, both as an endpoint and with regard to the policies and 
practices put in place to achieve it. Still, development as a concept remains elusive, 
and this chapter only briefly outlines some of the commonly-held beliefs about it 
(see for example Sachs, 1992; Sen, 1999; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992).28 Some scholars 
naturally focus on issues such as resource flows, levels of economic diversification, 
domestic mobilisation of savings and investment, national productivity and per 
capita income as major indicators of development (Sen, 1999; Sachs, 1992; Mills, 
2010; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Toye, 1987; Kothari, 1988; Norgaard, 1992; Alvares, 
1992; Pottier, 1992; Hobart 1993; Moser, 1993). 
 
Yet high levels of performance in those areas are achieved only after other aspects of 
development have already taken place. In his recent book, Why Africa is poor and what 
                                                            
28 The term ‘development’ is multi-dimensional, with numerous meanings and definitions (see for 
example Coetzee, 2001; Pieterse, 2001; Cypher & Diethz, 1997). Generally, the concept encompasses 
values such as empowerment, capacity-building, and an expanded role for women; as well as 
transparency, equity and sustainability, irrespective of class, race, colour and gender. According to 
Coetzee (2001), development infers a form of social change that will lead to progress, the process of 
enlarging people’s choices, acquiring knowledge and having access to resources for a decent standard 
of living, and the process of moving from worse to better conditions. 
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Africans can do about it, Mills (2010) states that Africa is not poor because the world 
has denied the continent the market and financial means to compete. Nor is Africa’s 
poverty solely a consequence of poor infrastructure or limited trade access, or 
because the necessary development and technical expertise in unavailable 
internationally. Controversially, Mills claims that the main reason Africans are poor 
is that their leaders have made that choice (Mills, 2010). To substantiate his claim, he 
demonstrates that countries can grow their economies and develop faster if leaders 
make sound decisions in the national interest (Mills, 2010:1).  
 
Given the background to different conceptions and understandings of development 
described above, this dissertation borrows the notion of and contextualises 
development as proposed by Amartya Sen. In his book, Development as freedom, Sen 
(1999:3) proposes that development is the process of expanding the real freedom that 
people enjoy. He supports his argument by pointing that out that the removal of 
major sources of ‘unfreedom’ – such as poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as 
well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states – will negatively affect 
development (Sen, 1999:3; see also Sen 1990; 1992; 1999; 2000; Comim et al, 2008). Sen 
(1992) in his book, Inequality re-examined, further illustrates the capability approach, 
and its link to development, by pointing out the central concepts: capability and 
functioning (Comim et al, 2008). Sen defines ‘functionings’ as the various things a 
person may value being or doing such as being adequately nourished and in good 
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health, avoiding escapable morbidity, being happy, having self-respect, and taking 
part in the life of a community (Sen, 1992:39). 
 
However, Sen hastens to point out that there is no definitive list of basic 
functionings, because different sets will be relevant to different groups and be found 
in distinct settings (Sen, 2005:157-160). He defines a person’s capability as the 
various combinations of functionings that the person can achieve (Sen, 1992:40). 
Therefore, a person’s capability reflects his or her freedom to take real opportunities 
(Comim et al, 2008). Indeed, the capabilities and functionings of the individual can 
be very important as a means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by members of 
society (Sen, 1999:3). These (alongside some other determinants, such as social and 
economic arrangements – for example, facilities for education and health care), as 
well as political and civil rights (such as the liberty to participate in public discussion 
and scrutiny) are the basic ingredients for development.  
 
Therefore, ‘democratic development’ in this dissertation refers to the gradual 
unfolding process by which collectively-mandated choices are made by free 
individuals to harness socio-economic change. However, democracy and 
development in Africa do not come naturally, and a lot of effort is required to 
achieve them. Hence, the democratisation project should bestow freedoms on 
citizens, and a louder voice in debates over socio-economic development strategies. 
In summary, if democracy is to be both socially relevant and responsive in Africa, it 
should encourage socio-economic development; and such development ought to lay 
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down a structural configuration of power and distribution of resources that is 
conducive to sustainable democracy. The following section links the discussions on 
democracy, governance and development in Africa.  
 
2.4 Linking democracy to governance and development debates in Africa  
The previous section contextualised the conception of democracy in Africa from its 
earliest forms, and described a historical phase towards democratising development 
in Africa. This section examines the relationship between democracy and 
governance rhetoric, with an emphasis on Africa. Democracy in Africa has often 
been measured on standards of good governance, or the extent of citizen 
engagement in ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces (Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall & Coelho, 
2004; Grugel, 2008; Holston, 1995; Millstein, 2008; 2011; Miraftab & Shana, 2005; 
Miraftab, 2004). The World Bank and the IMF have played an instrumental role in 
strengthening advocacy for good governance in developing countries, especially in 
Africa (Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; Hyden, 1992; Stoker, 1998:34; Philips, 1991; 1996). 
The notion of governance contains aspects of decision-making, who should be 
involved in decision-making, and in what capacity (Graham & Plumptree, 2003). In 
the same vein, Hyden (1992) points out that governance is the conscious 
management of regime structures, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the 
public realm. Hyden (1992:5) also mentions that the concept of governance gained 
particular significance in African development literature in the late 1980s because of 
an increasing number of governance crises on the continent. These were the result of 
extensive personalisation of power, the denial of fundamental human rights, 
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widespread corruption and the prevalence of non-elected and unaccountable 
governments (Narayan et al, 2000:172).  
 
It is worth reminding ourselves that the conventional use of the concept of 
‘governance’ defines it as a synonym for ‘government’. However, Stoker (1998:34) 
asserts that ‘governance’ signifies a change in the meaning of ‘government’, “a new 
process of governing or a changed condition of ordered rule or the new method by 
which society is governed”, in contrast to “the formal institutional structure and 
location of authoritative decision making in the modern state”. While these claims 
hold currency, Stoker (1998) points out that governance relates to the distribution of 
power, both internal and external to the state, the interdependence of governmental 
and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges, and 
collective action to solve tensions associated with shifts in the pattern of governing. 
In this view of governance, the emphasis is on the emerging system of self-
governing networks with civil society, instead of old forms of managerial control, 
which were bureaucratic, top-down and centralised.  
 
Scholars such as Pratchett and Wilson (1996) and Hyden (1992) have stated that 
governance symbolizes democracy, and enables the participation of people in 
decision-making; that is, through the sharing of power to the lowest level of 
government. The World Bank has commented on issues of governance by echoing its 
relevancy on development trajectory. For instance, at beginning of the year 2000, 
they supported good governance as a foundation for local economic development 
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(World Bank, 2000a). Following this precept, local governments are expected to 
market themselves for investment, and finance local projects through public-private 
partnerships. 
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that ‘governance’ is a highly contested 
concept; and indeed, its definition and application are not without problems 
(Alcantara, 1998). Since its appropriation into the development discourse in the late 
1980s, ‘governance’ has become associated not only with its normative partner, 
‘good’; it is also highly politicised. Good governance has come to be associated with 
a set of technocratic variables pertaining to the functioning of a government (see for 
example Kaufmann et al, 2007; Eyasu, 2006; Huntington, 1997; Balogun, 1998; Chabal 
& Jean-Pascal, 1999; Dunn, 1986; Mohidden, 1997; Luyt, 2008; Rotberg, 2004a; 2004b; 
2007). African governments have expressed their concern about the politicisation of 
governance, and the urgent need to define governance in a less prescriptive and 
technocratic manner. This dissertation looks at governance in terms of state-society 
relations and internal structures and processes within government as a principal 
organ of the state. Governance is instrumental in the improvement of socio-economic 
performance and outcomes. Currently there is urgent advocacy for the inclusion of 
local governments in governance (see Luyt, 2008; Eyasu, 2006; Balogun, 1998; Dunn, 
1986).  
 
The World Bank views local governments (cities and towns) as the frontline for 
development, and urbanisation as an opportunity to improve the lives of people 
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(World Bank 2000b:43-52). In this view, local government would remain the 
everyday face of the public sector, where essential public services are delivered to 
households and businesses, and where policy meets the people (World Bank, 
2000b:43-52). In order to achieve these goals, the World Bank suggests four 
propositions: (i) the poor must be allowed to share public resources, have a decent 
quality of life (which ought to be provided through education, employment, and 
safety nets) – and the informal sector must also be assisted; (ii) local governments or 
cities must create opportunities for growth in employment, incomes and investment, 
so as to foster productive and competitive businesses of all sizes; (iii) good 
governance and management must prevail to lay the groundwork for inclusiveness, 
accountability, integrity and transparency; and (iv) the country must exhibit 
‘bankability’, which calls for financial soundness in the treatment of revenues and 
expenditures in order to gain creditworthiness and permit access to markets (World 
Bank 2000b:63-67).  
 
These propositions have been marketed by the World Bank as a model for good local 
governance, and presented to developing countries as ‘world-class’, to facilitate the 
demands of globalisation. Essentially, local communities or cities would become 
repositories for international economic and financial transactions (World Bank, 
2000b:64). At the same time, local governments ought to be potential wealth-
generating communities for the private sector through privatisation, infrastructural 
development and basic service provision The World Bank (2000b:108) is of the view 
that governance promotes democracy. Hence, any sector promising democracy 
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should direct its efforts at establishing institutional mechanisms that would 
accelerate governance; such as through public participation, or inclusivity (see also 
Blair, 2000; UNDP, 2003; Makumbe, 1998; Mawhood, 1983:18; Kasfir, 1983:25; Smith, 
1985; Work, 2002:5).  
 
Bueek and Smith (2000), cited in Williams (2007:30), point out that public 
participation in institutions of local governance allows for the possibility of 
revitalising democracy. Such public participation, in Lister’s (1997b) view (quoted by 
Williams, 2007:30) imparts to the individual participant a sense of agency and the 
conscious capacity to perform one’s duty as a citizen, and also serves to instantiate 
the individual as an integral member of a specific community and society at large 
(Williams, 2007). This is similar to Sen’s approach to capacitation and capability-
building. Similarly, in ‘The Social Contract’ Rousseau emphasises that individual 
freedom relates to ‘being one’s own master’ in a community where the individual is 
integrated into the community (Pateman, 1970:24). Note that Bueek and Smith’s 
(2000) judgment on public participation in institutions of local governance does not 
entirely resonate with key aspects of taking governments closer to the people; but 
rather acts as a crucial tool for service delivery. In reality, local governments are 
there to fulfil service delivery (Robinson, 1998). Thompson (2007:97) reminds us that 
the success of public participation depends very much on the actual basis of the 
participatory process in question. The following section looks at citizen participation 
as a tool to accelerate development.  
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2.5 Citizen participation from a development perspective  
The history of citizen participation can be traced from major sources, firstly in 
classical works of democratic theory such as Rousseau’s The Social Contract, Mill’s 
Representative Government, and The Pluralist Theory of the State, by Dahl. The 
participatory nature of democracy has been discussed by eminent scholars such as 
Dahl (1989), Rousseau (1964), Parry and Moyser (1994), Pateman (1970), Held (1990; 
1993), Thompson (1976), Winch (1972), and many others (Nabulsi, 2003). Secondly, 
citizen participation can also be marked in the works of feminist theorists such as 
Young (1990a; 1990b), Phillips (1991), Mouffe (1993) and Lister (2003); and in the 
development discourse, for example in Thompson (2007), Kothari (2005), Roodt 
(2001), Cornwall and Coelho (2004), Castells (1996; 1997; 1998; 2001), Kabeer (2000), 
Lister (1997a), Fung and Wright (2003), Gaventa (2001), and IDS (2004). It is 
important to note the diversity of literature linked to citizen participation. However, 
the discussion in this chapter is chiefly limited to the assessment of citizen 
participatory processes in relation to the development discourse (see for example 
Hemson, 2007; Nyalunga, 2006; Piper & Deacon, 2008; Putu, 2006; Sithole et al, 2006; 
Smith, 2004). Different development discourses have proliferated since the since the 
term ‘development’ was first coined (Robino, 2009). Over time, some discourses 
prevail over others and become the ‘mainstream’ model of insight or, in Kuhn’s 
(1962) words, the prevalent development ‘paradigm’.  
 
For instance, since the early 1990s more widespread discussions about development 
theory and practice have emerged. The demise of Soviet-style communism and the 
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shift away from more extreme neoliberal ideologies and enthusiasm for exclusively 
market-driven strategies has opened up a space for a more productive discussion 
(Robino, 2009). The current debate seems no longer to be centred on grand theories 
of social transformation, but on the degree and on more adequate forms of 
intervention (Allen & Thomas, 2000:7). Unfulfilled promises and dissatisfaction with 
previous development theories (modernisation, and dependency) have spurred a 
constructive debate that has enriched the development agenda (Booth, 1993).  
 
According to Robino (2009:60), development theorists and practitioners have 
engaged in discussion as to whether the free market system can remedy the 
problems associated with global capitalism, and provide the proper degree and 
forms of intervention required (see for example Birdsall & De la Torre, 2001; Collier 
& Dollar, 2002; Fine, 2006; Giddens, 1998; 2000; Gore, 2000; Hildyard, 1998; Ocampo, 
2004; Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; Wade, 1990).29 In fact, debates within and about 
development theories have moved away from grand narratives towards more local, 
empirical and inductive approaches. This shift has in turn been accompanied by a 
parallel move in development practice towards participation and empowerment 
                                                            
29 The 2008 financial crisis was a catalyst for the resurgence of a Keynesian approach to economic 
policy-making, and more radical variations; and policy recommendations shifting away from the 
neoliberal prescription of liberalisation and deregulation (see for example Robino, 2009). But as Wade 
(2008:3) warns, “there is a recurrent cycle of debate in the wake of financial crises, as an initial 
outpouring of radical proposals gives way to incremental muddling through, followed by resumption 
of normal business”. 
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(Robino, 2009:60).30 Areas such as institution building, citizen participation, social 
movements, gender, human people-centred development, good governance and 
democratisation, to mention a few, have been brought to the centre of the 
international debate (Gaventa, 2001; Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Thompson, 2007; 
Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scones & Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; 
Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010; Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010; 
Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010; Robino, 2009). 
 
The (re)incorporation of these mechanisms and categories into mainstream 
development is an apparent recognition of the failures of the ‘exclusively’ market-led 
development strategies that gained strength during the 1980s (Robino, 2009:60). 
Although views differ widely as to the nature of the concrete measures involved, a 
growing consensus has emerged: On one hand, it is recognised that long-term 
development requires a more comprehensive approach, and policies that go well 
beyond macro structural adjustment (for example Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; World Bank, 
1998); and on the other, there is acknowledgement of the importance of having a role 
for the state and other non-governmental development actors (for example Edigheji, 
1999; 2003; Le Roux & Graff, 2001; Martinussen, 1997). 
 
                                                            
30 Since the 1980s, citizen participation has become a buzzword associated with socio-political 
development, with varying, dynamic ideals that are essential to understanding the whole notion of 
participation. 
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During the 1990s,31 participation, people-centred development, good governance, 
decentralisation and local development emerged (or re-emerged, in many cases) as 
related concepts, and as ‘key words’ for the ‘development industry’ (Robino, 
2009:61).32 These key words have filtered into major development institutions and 
government development policy documents, leading many authors to refer to a shift 
in the development paradigm. And while some argue that a ‘second generation’ of 
reforms should be implemented, for others, the fundamental problems associated 
with the ‘Washington Consensus’-inspired policies are not being solved by new 
generations of reforms that leave the core fundamentals unchanged (Robino, 
2009:61). In addition, participation and development debates are constituted and 
reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, 
cultural and geopolitical. Therefore, to comprehend the real power of participation 
in development, one cannot ignore the immediate context (either institutional, or 
more broadly, historical and geographical) within which texts are produced. In 
understanding participation, one is able to ground the abstract relationship of 
citizenship and its relation to development.33 Here, I explore the different views on 
(and influencing factors for) citizen participation. 
                                                            
31 Issues of participation in development projects, decentralisation and local development can be 
traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, when these topics were already being discussed, and theoretical 
perspectives and practical approaches were developed.  
32 These words are part of the dictionary of conventional wisdom behind development discourses, 
and are being adopted as the key issues of the (at least rhetorically) revised development consensus.  
33 As a reminder, note that the discussion presented is part of the overall objective of the chapter, 
which is to establish the extent to which participation practices are being implemented, the challenges 
encountered in the process, and the promises associated, in the context of emerging democracies. 
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2.5.1 The necessity for greater citizen engagement  
There has been an increase in mobilisation and collective action in the developing 
states of the South (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). The concept of collective action has 
been linked to the active involvement of every able-bodied citizen in community 
activities, or in development projects or programmes (IDS, 2004; Gaventa, 2002; 2004; 
Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). In some emerging democracies, the advocacy for and 
mechanisms of promoting more active citizen engagement in the processes of 
governance have been established through the creation of new, decentralised 
institutions so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative processes in 
national and global policy deliberations (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; 
Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Kweit & Kweit, 
1981; 1987; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; 
Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991).  
 
Rhetorically, at least, there has been increasing emphasis on using such mechanisms 
to support the inclusion of the poorest social groups – those who do not usually have 
sufficient resources (economic, educational and political) to influence the outcome of 
traditional policy processes. Gaventa34 developed a set of propositions35 that help to 
further develop understanding of citizenship and participation. His propositions 
include (i) relating people and institutions; (ii) working on the same side of the 
equation; (iii) re-conceptualising citizenship and participation; (iv) learning about 
                                                            
34 See Gaventa, 2001. 
35 It is important to acknowledge that though the propositions referred to are outdated, they still hold 
currency, especially in explaining citizenship participation and democracy debates.  
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outcomes as we go along; (v) building conditions for success; and (vi) contesting the 
local in the era of globalisation (Gaventa, 2001).  
 
In light of Gaventa’s (2001) propositions, case studies from South Africa, Nigeria and 
India illustrate how some major infrastructural and extractive projects, undertaken 
in the name of the public good, can serve to adversely affect the rights and 
livelihoods of the poor and disadvantaged (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). For 
example, participatory approaches have been scaled up from projects to policies; 
they inevitably enter the arena of governance, and we find that participation can 
only become effective as it engages with issues of institutional change. In addition, 
as concerns about good governance and state responsiveness grow, questions about 
how citizens engage and make demands on the state also come to the fore. 
Traditional forms of representation have been re-examined, and new, more direct 
and deliberative democratic mechanisms have proposed to enable citizens to play a 
more active part in decisions which affect their lives. Similarly, in the context of 
globalisation, questions have emerged on how participatory methods can be used to 
hold international development actors accountable.  
 
Indeed, the questions of how citizens (especially the poor) can express voice with 
influence, and how institutional responsiveness can be ensured, have also become 
topical (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; 
Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987; Parsons, 1990; 
Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991). These 
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concerns have been raised and debated, especially in some emerging democracies. 
The same debates also seek to elaborate how global governance and citizenship can 
be accounted (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scones 
& Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Coelho & Von 
Lieres, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010; Robino, 2009).  
 
There have also been growing numbers of claims for universal global rights, such as 
those for women and children (Ahikire et al, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Sithole et al, 2007; 
Greenberg & Mathoho, 2010). Such claims may shape or conflict with 
understandings of local rights and citizenship. The irony is that local actors may use 
global forums as arenas for action, which may be more effective than appeals to 
institutions of local governance (Edwards & Gaventa, 2001; Sinwell, 2009; 2010; 
Holston, 1995; Bucuss et al, 2007; Cornwall, 2002; Friedman, 2006; Grugel, 2008; 
Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). The challenge that remains is not only how to build 
participatory governance at differing levels, but also how to promote democratic 
accountability. The following section offers a discussion on citizen participation 
within ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces as another dimension of participation in 
development discourse. 
 
2.5.2 ‘Invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces in the institutions of government  
As the mechanisms for increased citizen engagement continue to proliferate at 
different levels of government, there has been advancement of the idea of (and even 
urgent calls for) citizen engagement in ‘invited’ spaces of local governance, and 
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‘invented’ spaces of civil society organisation and protest (Sinwell, 2009; 2010; 
Holston, 1995; Piper, 2010; Cornwall, 2002). These mutually interacting concepts 
(‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces of participation) are social spaces created by 
government to induce participation by communities, and have also stimulated more 
inclusive policies (Sinwell, 2009; 2010; Holston, 1995). With inspiration from 
Cornwall (2002), Miraftab (2004) offers an analytical distinction between ‘invited’ 
and ‘invented’ spaces of citizen participation. Miraftab (2004) states that invited 
spaces are defined as those occupied by grassroots and allied non-governmental 
organisations that are legitimised by donors and government interventions. 
Invented spaces are also occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their collective 
action, but are directly confronting the authorities and the status quo. While the 
actions of the former are geared mostly towards providing the poor with coping 
mechanisms and propositions for supporting the survival of their informal 
membership, the grassroots activity of the latter challenges the status quo in the 
hope of larger societal change and growing resistance to the dominant power 
relations (see also Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Grugel, 2008; Holston, 
1995; Millstein, 2008; 2011; Miraftab & Shana, 2005; Miraftab, 2004; Piper & Deacon, 
2008; Piper & Nadvi, 2010; Piper & Von Lieres, 2011; Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011; 
Sinwell, 2009; 2010). 
 
The advancement of the idea and of the need for such spaces of participation is the 
result of renewed concern over rights, power and various opinions about 
participation in governance (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004). 
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In fact, even greater attention has been focused on the institutions that mediate 
between communities, service providers and policy-makers (Cornwall & Coelho, 
2004:1). The rationale has been to create greater opportunity for deliberative 
democracy, so that participation offers better decisions and better government. 
While there are countless examples of communities organising themselves in 
‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces, more recently, community-based protests have come 
to the fore as key examples of engaging the state outside of formal opportunities for 
public participation (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). By contrast, in some cases, the 
created spaces of participation have not stimulated inclusive participation. 
According to Friedman (2006), formal participation mechanisms created within the 
institution of the state do not engender participatory governance; partly because the 
participation processes do not allow for policy to be influenced in a qualitative 
manner, and partly because the voices of the poor (who would benefit most 
significantly from participating in government decision-making) are not heard. He 
goes on to note that ‘perhaps the most significant indictment of structured 
participatory governance mechanisms is that they have not enabled the authorities 
to understand the needs of the poor’ (Friedman 2006:11). He is supported by 
Millestein (2008 and 2011) who claim that invited spaces for participation are 
inadequate for channelling local grievances and complaints – and for including the 
voices of the urban poor in governance processes. 
 
In his article titled ‘Between the Community Hall and the City Hall: Five research 
questions on participation’, Ballard (2008:180) proposes that perhaps the most 
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serious problem with invited spaces of participation, paradoxically, is that they may 
demobilise rather than mobilise. He then provides insight into the South African 
context by suggesting that invited participatory spaces may be used by the ANC to 
suppress dissent and mobilisation against its policy choices (Ballard, 2008:182). 
While such unintended, exclusive participatory realities continue to exist, one needs 
to take cognisance of factors that impede the participation of marginalised groups in 
processes of participation. For example, in terms of the involvement of women in 
formal invited spaces of engagement, Sithole, Todes and Williamson (2007) argue 
that while women’s voices need to be heard and represented at all levels and in all 
types of development initiative, there are some considerations to note in terms of 
what influences their participation – for instance, in under-resourced communities 
the struggle for bread-and-butter issues can often take precedence over the need to 
have equitable representation of women in the relevant structures (Sithole et al, 
2007). Water, fuel and food shortages are sometimes the immediate concerns for 
poor women; participation and equal representation have lower priority, which is an 
impediment to equitable representation and responsive governance (Ramjee & Van 
Donk, 2011). 
 
These weaknesses in ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces of participation suggest that 
transformation is needed within structures of participation. However, Sinwell (2009; 
2010) reminds us that simply reforming the system will not lead to a qualitative or 
fundamental shift in the way these structures operate; and adds that reform is 
unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or transform the power 
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dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces. Similarly, Friedman 
(2006:3) argues that ‘citizen participation in government and in particular that of the 
poor is more likely, therefore, not when governments create formal mechanisms to 
ensure it but when they develop attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen 
action’. He further observes that lack of participation in formal structures by the 
poor is not due to their inability to represent themselves on these platforms. The 
problem lies with the capacities expected of participants in structured participation 
exercises: the ability to engage (usually in English) with technical issues, in settings 
where the degree of technical background expected, the ambience and the way in 
which meetings are run – these combine to make it very difficult for the poor to be 
heard, even if they happen to get to the table (Friedman, 2006:14). 
 
Importantly, it must be remembered that the poor speak with multiple voices 
(Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). Therefore, if policy is to reflect grassroots preferences, 
their voices need to be heard: in conversation with each other in open democratic 
processes, in prioritisation, negotiation, trade-offs and compromise with those who 
command power and wealth (Friedman, 2006:14). While there is some level of 
consensus about the need to transform state-provided spaces of engagement to 
ensure more meaningful and inclusive public participation, there is less agreement 
about what exactly needs to be changed, and how best to achieve that. Also, while 
the emphasis is largely on ‘fixing’ or strengthening existing spaces, such as the ward 
committee system, much less attention is given to the need to expand the repertoire 
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of invited spaces, through initiatives such as participatory budgeting citizen 
scorecards and community-based planning, for example (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, the debate about the weaknesses of the ‘invited’ 
spaces and ‘invented’ spaces of participation is largely silent on the critical points 
listed by Friedman (2006): prioritisation, negotiation, trade-offs and compromise; the 
temptation to remove or minimise these tricky and complex characteristics and 
sidestep contestation is perhaps understandable, but not particularly helpful if the 
intention is to facilitate the expression of voice, particularly for those who are 
marginalised (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). Contestation within participation 
discourse also has its opponents, who claim that contestation is a tool used by global 
elites to continue to extend their hegemonic influences to less developed countries of 
the South. The following section unpacks some of the criticisms levelled against 
participatory development strategies. 
 
2.6 Criticisms of participatory development strategies  
Some scholars have offered critical commentary on the discourse of participatory 
development strategies (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & Speer, 2006; Williams, 
2005; Hickey & Giles, 2004; Mosse, 2001). For example, Cooke and Kothari (2001) 
challenge the widespread belief that participation is unequivocally good, and 
provide a detailed fieldwork analysis of the reasons participation ought not to be 
seen as a holistic, universal remedy leading to democratisation and good 
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governance.36 They point out that the theoretical ideal of participation is often not to 
function as the tool for liberation and distribution of power that is sometimes 
rhetorically suggested (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:3; see also Mosse, 2001).37 Indeed, 
efforts towards embracing participation are described as largely maintaining existing 
power relationships, though masking this situation behind the rhetoric and 
techniques of participation. This masking is an example of what Cooke and Kothari 
(2001:3) call ‘the tyranny of participation’.  
 
Cooke and Kothari (2001:7-8) identify three types of tyranny. Firstly, the dominance 
of multinational agencies and funders exists just beneath the rhetoric and practices 
of participation. This demonstrates the enduring decision-making control tyranny 
                                                            
36 Their contributions were drawn from psychology, sociology and critical theory, and claim that in 
practice, participation is nowhere near as effective as is commonly believed. 
37 For example, Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) claim that at the local level, meanings and definitions of 
terms are assumed; yet these meanings and definitions are political in nature. Local participatory 
input is commonly reinterpreted by outside facilitators in light of project deliverables. As a result, 
elements of distortion are introduced by outsiders in the participatory processes. Not as obviously, 
locals are also implicated, especially when they collude in the distortions endemic in participatory 
processes. The authors further point out that local people learn about outside planning processes and 
learn how to manipulate planners for short-term, local gains. Such gains frequently come in the form 
of employment and financial compensation. Over time, the participatory process can be understood 
as a complex dialectic between outsiders and locals (or ‘staff’ and ‘villagers’) in which both negotiate 
to fit local payoffs that match external agendas (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). While on one level both gain 
from such a process, at another this dialectical negotiation obscures the way in which outsiders or 
participatory staff leverage and reinforce existing local power differentials and, essentially, use the 
resources at their disposal to feed a patronage system. As a result, participatory processes can work to 
reinforce the exclusion of women, the poor and the socially marginalised, rather than opening up 
channels for their voice (see also Christens & Speer, 2006). 
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held by agencies and funders. Secondly, the emphasis on participatory practices 
obscures many limitations and manipulations that suppress local power 
differentials; in fact, the authors point out that participatory practices sometimes 
contribute to the maintenance and exacerbation of local power differentials. This is a 
‘group level’ tyranny, and addresses the well-known social psychological dynamics 
of group functioning, which are largely ignored in the participation literature. 
Thirdly, the dominance of the participatory method is a tyranny in itself; the 
overwhelming acceptance of participation (particularly the goals and values 
expressed) has limited dialogue, and has even limited the consideration of other 
methods for cultivating development. 
 
Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) state further that participatory processes have been 
commingled with a constellation of terms (such as ‘empowerment’) that are 
uncritically accepted as always co-occurring with participation.38 The authors argue 
that empowerment is simply a feeling or individual psychological state, rather than 
a phenomenon which exists in a community (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:5). Their 
argument continues that participation and empowerment have been reframed in 
such a way as to achieve a normative value, denoting initiative, responsibility, good 
citizenship, and vibrant economic activity. This has entrenched participatory 
methods; alternatives, such as expertise or leadership models, are not even 
                                                            
38 Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) observe that the language of development work is cloaked in the 
rhetoric of empowerment, and participation has blended into this language to such a level that 
empowerment as systemic transformation does not exist. 
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contemplated. Such a dogmatic embrace of participation is yet another facet of 
tyranny (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).  
 
Christens and Speer (2006), reviewing Cooke and Kothari (2001), add their voice to 
the criticism levelled against participatory development strategies. They state that 
the task of entering poor countries from rich ones, and working with people to 
‘develop’ the country economically, politically, and socially, is inherently fraught 
with complexities (Christens & Speer, 2006:2). For example, they observe that many 
international agencies and funders justify participatory processes by touting the 
efficiency and productivity with which participatory methods advance; for instance, 
in saving ‘transaction costs’, in corporate parlance. Yet in doing so, top-down 
planning is maintained; this contradicts contemporary development rhetoric, which 
encourages the bottom-up approach (Christens & Speer, 2006:2). 
 
The paradox of historically top-down organisations willingly succumbing to 
transformation by bottom-up processes raises questions, such as: how can local 
knowledge transform bureaucratic organisations? Certainly, one could suggest that 
local knowledge be understood as a product of the social relationships which 
developed it, rather than as a fixed commodity to be extracted. Practically, the 
participation of local people appears to lend credibility to decisions that have 
already been made by agencies and organisations outside the community. As a 
result, strong embracement of participation by multinationals has served their 
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interests, since participation itself has become a commodity that these organisations 
use to advance their corporate image (Christens & Speer, 2006:3).39 
 
Using a South African case, Williams (2005) demonstrates how bureaucratic elites, 
officials and councillors at local government level impose their own ‘truncated’ 
version and understanding of community participation on particular communities. 
Williams (2005) warns of the danger of communities losing control over the 
development process through party-driven motives and through interventions by 
‘experts’. While this study is by no means an exhaustive exploration, it highlights the 
complexity of establishing a priori whether any given participatory intervention is 
likely to be successful. In any assessment it is important to consider the conditions of 
political economy that could favour or hinder democracy and participatory spaces in 
achieving their objectives.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview democracy and participation, evaluating 
these concepts by reviewing their definitions, stated advantages, and objectives; and 
by assessing their utility as operational and policy tools. Despite the sea of 
                                                            
39 See also Szell et al (2002), who argue that capital accumulation, while appearing ‘amazingly 
impressive’, in fact imposed a cruel and restless dynamism on society. They argue that society 
appears to have surrendered agency to globalisation through self-regulating financial and economic 
flows; while at the same time, seeking agency to curtail the impact of the very same forces. They are 
flummoxed by the question of whether society has the capacity to respond and shape the conditions 
of life in a system of global interactions, or whether society is in the process of ‘shaping’ what is out of 
its control. For example, could the participation discourse in reality be a takeover of local agendas?  
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conceptual uncertainty that engulfs both concepts, it is apparent that they have been 
embraced in legislature – and, to some extent, in practice – in the developing 
countries of the South. By definition, we have seen that democracy is a political 
concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of 
a group, association or society (Beetham, 1994). Democracy has also been 
characterised as relating to a situation in which there are free and fair elections, basic 
civil liberties are respected and protected, and the cabinet has effective power to 
govern (Dahl, 1956; Storm, 2008; Houtzager et al, 2007; Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The 
list of definitions goes on. 
 
While operationalising the concepts of democracy and participation, and assessing 
the extent to which such practices are being implemented, the challenges faced 
during their implementation and the promises associated therewith, emphasis was 
laid on deliberative/discursive democracy, participation and participatory 
governance, and empowered participatory governance, as the major strands within 
liberal notions of democracy. We have noted that deliberative democracy 
(encapsulating the idea of decision-making by discussion among free and equal 
citizens) and its practical implementation are as old as democracy itself (Elster, 
1998:1; Dryzek, 1990). Participation and participatory governance call for equal 
engagement with citizens in the state’s process of governance so as to deepen 
democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15; Ackerman 2004:447), while empowered participatory 
governance (EPG) relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens 
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to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation (Gaventa, 2006; Fung & 
Wright, 2003). 
 
After conceptualising the major selected liberal notions of democracy, the focus fell 
on democracy in Africa. Democracy is considered by some scholars to be a trophy 
handed to Africans after attaining their independence in the 1960s; while others state 
openly that the concept of democracy has not properly entered popular discourse in 
Africa (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998). In addition, Africa’s 
democratisation has been premised on (i) the relative roles of internal and external 
factors; (ii) historical and contemporary dynamics; (iii) structural and contingent 
factors; and (iv) economic and political dimensions. Beyond these factors, it is 
apparent that Africa's democratisation was influenced by developments elsewhere 
in the world, primarily rooted in the continent's long history of struggle against 
slavery, colonialism, and postcolonial misrule. 
 
Democracy in Africa has been weighed against standards of good governance 
promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF in developing countries, 
and especially in Africa (Hyden, 1992; Stoker 1998:34). Governance contains aspects 
of decision-making, who should be involved in decision-making, and in what 
capacity; in other words the conscious management of regime structures, with a 
view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm (Graham & Plumptree, 2003; 
Hyden, 1992). It was pointed out that any sector promising democracy should direct 
efforts at establishing institutional mechanisms that would accelerate governance, 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
such as through public participation or inclusivity (Blair, 2000; UNDP, 2003; 
Makumbe, 1998).  
 
In linking democratic participation to the development discourse, it was pointed out 
that during the 1990s, participation and people-centred development emerged (or re-
emerged, in many cases) as related concepts, and as ‘key words’ for the 
‘development industry’. The same key words subsequently filtered into the policy 
documents of major development institutions and governments. Debates on these 
key words are constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, 
activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical. Firstly, the necessity for 
greater citizen participation has been established through creation of new, 
decentralised institutions so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative 
processes in national and global policy deliberations (Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; 
Farrell, 2000; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 
1987; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991).  
 
Secondly, ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces in the institutions of government have been 
created as a result of renewed concern with rights, power and opinions about 
participation in governance (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004). 
These spaces have not created an environment of all-inclusive participation; 
particularly not for women. For example, Sithole, Todes and Williamson (2007) 
argue that while women’s voices need to be heard and represented at all levels and 
in all types of development initiatives, there are some considerations to take note of 
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in terms of what influences their participation. Therefore, simply reforming the 
system will not lead to a qualitative or fundamental shift in the way these structures 
operate. Reform is unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or 
transform the power dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces. 
 
We have also notid that contestation within the participation discourse has attracted 
more critics, who claim that participation is a tool used by global elites to continue 
extending their hegemonic influences to the less developed countries of the South 
(Cooke & Kothari (2001:7-8). Efforts at embracing participation are described as 
largely maintaining existing power relationships, while masking this power behind 
the rhetoric and techniques of participation. This masking allows what they call the 
tyranny of participation. Christens and Speer (2006) point out that the task of 
entering poor countries from rich ones and working with people to ‘develop’ their 
country economically, politically, and socially is inherently fraught with complexity. 
It must also be noted that many international agencies and funders justify 
participatory processes by pointing out the efficiency and productivity with which 
participatory methods advance, such as in saving ‘transaction costs’, in corporate 
parlance. Williams (2005) demonstrates how bureaucratic elites, officials and 
councillors at local government level impose their own ‘truncated’ version and 
understanding of community participation on particular communities. Establishing a 
priori whether any given participatory intervention is likely to be successful is a 
complex procedure.  
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From the issues discussed, it seems the relationship between democracy, 
participation and democratisation is not clear-cut. For some, democracy is regarded 
as a condition (necessary but insufficient) for local development and citizen 
participation. For others, some degree of participation is required for democracy to 
achieve its intended objectives of more efficient and responsive local government. 
Therefore, we can say that democracy and participation might have a ‘symbiotic 
relationship’, but the conception, definition and objectives of democracy are critical 
to this relationship. Widespread engagement with issues of participation and local 
governance creates enormous opportunities for re-defining and deepening the 
meanings of democracy, and for extending the rights of inclusive citizenship. At the 
same time, there are critical challenges in ensuring that the work promotes pro-poor 
and social justice outcomes. 
 
Importantly, democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader 
issues of political economy that contextualise the possibilities or the potential of 
participatory development to be transformative (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). The 
consequence is that any assessment of the relationship between democracy and 
citizen participation requires an examination of political economy dynamics. With 
greater recognition of civil society and increasing discussion on the issues of good 
governance, the concept of participation is shifting: from beneficiary participation in 
state-delivered programmes, to an understanding of participation as a means of 
holding the state accountable through new forms of governance that involve more 
direct state-civil society relations, under a partnership model. But as Pieterse (2002) 
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asks, what is the nature of this blend, what is gained and what is lost in this act of 
hybridisation? This approach allows us to understand the potential difficulties and 
opportunities that exist in the context of the new policy in Uganda. Clearly, 
Uganda’s transformation path is characterised by an innovative combination of both 
strands of democratic development thinking, in the wake of neo-liberalism’s demise 
as a hegemonic ideology. The paradigm of ‘inclusive neo-liberalism’ that currently 
characterises international development places particular emphasis on community-
based responses to the (often structural) problems of poverty and exclusion 
(Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). Such approaches have become increasingly 
controversial: celebrated by optimists as the most empowering way forward for 
marginalised citizens on one hand, and on the other, derided by sceptics as an 
abrogation of responsibility by development trustees (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 
2010). The next section of this dissertation deals with these issues. Chapter 3 turns to 
the emergence of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, and digs deeper 
into the intricacies of this democracy in the context of citizen participation. It also 
takes into account deterrents to democracy and citizen participation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: UGANDA 
UNDER NRM 
3.1 Introduction  
The demise of dictatorship in Uganda and the rebirth of participatory democracy 
brought about profound reforms. It is therefore crucial to examine the political 
context in which these democratic and citizen participation reforms emerged. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, there are critical questions that should be answered in 
any analysis of democratic practices: (i) what is the extent to which such practices are 
being implemented; (ii) what problems and challenges were faced during their 
implementation; and lastly (iii) what are the promises associated with the democracy 
and citizen participation project? To answer these, this dissertation examines the 
democratic trajectory of Uganda, from before independence through to post-
independence Uganda. Mamdani (1997) and Golooba-Mutebi (2008) state that the 
policies of both colonial and post-colonial governments weakened the prospects for 
Ugandans to engage democratically in activities that influenced their wellbeing.40 
Moreover, successive post-independence dictatorial governments neither allowed 
citizen participation nor encouraged democracy to flourish (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008). 
                                                            
40 Many studies on democracy and citizen participation, especially in emerging democracies of the 
South, tend not to capture historical aspects on participation; instead they shift the debate, focusing 
more on the post-Cold War period, failing to realise that each state has its unique history of how the 
culture of democracy and participation evolved, and also that events of the past continue to shape 
and influence the present. Therefore, the historical account of participation has deliberately been 
incorporated in this discussion, to demonstrate how the past continues to influence and shape 
democracy and participation in Uganda today.  
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Indeed, the political instabilities at the time encouraged centralisation of power as a 
means of suppressing dissent.41 So when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
took power, it inherited a situation from which liberal democratic ideals were 
absent. To substantiate these statements, this chapter explores elements of 
democracy and participation seen from pre- to post-independence Uganda.  
 
The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first is a history of participation in 
Uganda (1861-1986). It (i) examines colonialism and its impact on citizen 
participation; (ii) highlights the implications of the Berlin Conference on citizen 
participation; (iii) discusses how colonial policies such as indirect rule impacted on 
participation, alongside the politics of ethnic division; (iii) demonstrates how the 
language policy in Uganda impacted negatively on citizen participation; (v) 
discusses how socio-economic inequalities impacted significantly on participation in 
Uganda, (vi) describes participation at the dawn of independence and beyond, 
dictatorship in its earliest forms, and participation in a failed state. The second part 
of the chapter is an account of the rebirth of democracy and participation in Uganda 
(1986-2011). This section (i) focuses on legislative provisions for citizen participation 
in Uganda; (ii) discusses participation via local governments; and lastly (iii) accounts 
for World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies on democracy and 
citizen participation, before discussing the obstacles to democracy and participation 
                                                            
41 While colonialism bequeathed the country a negative legacy – including a weak state apparatus, 
ethnic division, skewed development, elite polarisation and a narrow economic base – on the whole, 
post-colonial leaders have exacerbated rather than reversed these trends (see Golooba-Mutebi, 
2008:1). 
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in Uganda. The history of participation in Uganda is included chiefly because the 
current state of affairs has largely been influenced by this historical trajectory (see for 
example Mamdani, 1997; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Davidson, 1969; Cyril, 1965).  
 
3.2 A history of democracy and participation in Uganda  
Discussions of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda feature prominently 
in the works of Karugire (A Political History of Uganda, 1980; Roots of Instability in 
Uganda, 1988); Mamdani (Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, 1976); Kabwegyere 
(The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda, 1995); and Ibingira (The 
Forging of an African Nation: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from 
Colonial Rule to Independence, 1894-1962, 1973), among many others. These political 
historians offer their accounts of citizen participation in pre- and post-independence 
Uganda. Some of their observations suggest that many societies in today’s Uganda 
had relatively simple political organisational structures before the advent of 
colonialism (Ingham, 1983; Jorgensen, 1981). The ruling culture was communal 
rather than individualistic, and even after the commencement of colonial rule, the 
clan continued to be the most effective unit of political and economic association 
(Apter, 1967; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Davidson, 1969; Cyril, 1965). 
 
The political history of pre-colonial Uganda reveals that most societies that were 
later brought together under colonial rule to constitute Uganda had limited political 
goals and relatively simple political structures (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Davidson, 
1969; Cyril, 1965; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Scholars such as Karugire (1980), 
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Kabwegyere (1995) and Mamdani (1997) record that the characterisation of political 
structures included personal relations being central, with diversity in social scale 
and organisation. Powerful kingdoms such as Buganda and Bunyoro had standing 
armies which were used for external expeditions and attacks on neighbouring 
communities (Dunbar, 1969). Such expeditions strengthened some kingdoms 
economically, while others were amalgamated to form Nkore, Busoga, and lastly 
Tooro, which seceded from Bunyoro Kingdom around 183042 (Dunbar, 1969; 
Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995).  
 
By the time colonialism had given way to present-day Uganda, Gertzel (1976) 
observes that Buganda Kingdom was seen by the colonialists as the largest and 
strongest kingdom of all its neighbours (see also Harlow & Chilver, 1965; Chibita & 
Fourie, 2007). The king of Buganda (the kabaka) was considered supreme, and was 
not elected but inherited the throne. Kabakaship (kingship) was characterised by the 
politics of patronage, a situation that not only made the kabaka not accountable to his 
subordinates, but also gave him absolute power to control the entire land and all the 
activities in the kingdom (Kiwanuka, 1971). The kabaka also had a free hand in 
appointing chiefs in some counties of the kingdom to whom he could then delegate 
duties (Kiwanuka, 1971; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). 
The whole governing process was completely undemocratic. 
 
                                                            
42 Such societies were organised in small, segmented communities, with people bound by the same 
beliefs and ideals. 
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Buganda Kingdom's major political rival, Bunyoro Kingdom, also had a centralised 
political organisation (Kiwanuka, 1971; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). Other 
kingdoms, such as Nkore, had looser systems of administration; while in Northern 
Uganda, power was vested in the elders (Atkinson, 1971; Karugire, 1980). Though 
the various political organisations in pre-colonial societies are relevant, it is also 
important to note that each community was bound by a common language, culture, 
kinship, and more importantly dialogue, which played a crucial role in the politics of 
the time (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). Most 
communities were self-sufficient and there was little interaction with others (Chibita 
& Fourie, 2007). Therefore, for most pre-colonial Ugandan societies, the system of 
governance and participation revolved around kings, elders and chiefs, and was 
essentially top-down in character, male-dominated and completely excluded the 
majority of the populace. The ordinary people had little say in their own governance; 
neither could they participate in the politics of the time. The chiefs were accountable 
to the kings, and the citizens were mere subjects (Mamdani, 1997).  
 
3.2.1 Colonialism and citizen participation (1861-1884) 
As in every other African country, the scrambling for and partition of Africa 
eventually reached inland Uganda, despite her central geographical position in the 
Great Lakes Region. When the dust settled, Uganda was declared a British 
protectorate (Low, 1965; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). 
The reasons for Britain's occupation of Uganda were more strategic than 
philanthropic, as the British needed access to the coast (and ultimately, to India) 
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from neighbouring Congo and the Sudan, where they had developed significant 
economic interests (Mamdani, 1997). British missionaries also wanted to spread 
Christianity, which the British later used to fulfil their strategic interest. During the 
same period, France had also sent a group of missionaries to Uganda. The presence 
of both Britain and France in Uganda created struggles for converts, which later 
resulted in religious wars (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; 
Mamdani, 1997; Low & Robert, 1960). Subsequently, the doings of colonial powers 
abroad started to influence local politics, as the French backed the Catholics while 
the British supported the Protestants, both with the intention of securing their place 
in key administrative posts (Ibingira, 1973; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). As a result, the 
missionaries laid strategies for influencing appointments to key political positions, to 
the exclusion of traditional leaders (Low & Robert, 1960; Karugire, 1980).  
 
After strengthening their base in Uganda, the missionaries set off on a campaign to 
promote indigenous languages, which they thought would be a crucial tool for them 
in communicating their message (Low, 1965; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). They also 
embarked on campaign to translate the Bible into the local languages, the better to 
reach the illiterate majority (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995). The 
missionaries’ conviction was that through religious conversion, it would be easier to 
secure the local people's political allegiance (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 
1995). They shunned Kiswahili, which was taking root as the lingua franca in Kenya 
and Tanzania because of its close links with the rival Islamic faith (Kabwegyere, 
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1995). As a result, religious wars43 in the 1880s and 1890s pitted Muslims against 
Christians (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980). But these wars were not only aimed at 
preserving one faith or the other, but also at gaining political control of Buganda 
(Kabwegyere, 1995).  
 
The wars led to the deportation of the king into exile, and the subsequent installation 
of puppet kings; a situation that weakened Buganda and rendered it vulnerable to 
manipulation by colonialists. The chiefs and citizens became endorsees (or what 
William (2008) refers to as ‘spectators’) of pre-designed colonial policies, and the few 
that participated did so merely for symbolic purposes, since they were advancing 
the colonial agenda. Such acts replaced the altruism that citizens felt towards their 
kingdoms and leaders previously, a situation that dented patriotism and bred 
opportunism in latter political organisations in Uganda. It is from this period that 
the rise of opportunism over principle in the management of public affairs in 
Uganda can be traced. 
 
 
 
                                                            
43 Wars resulted from religious differences between Catholics, Protestants and Muslims. Such wars 
were between those who were supporting the government of the time (led by Kabaka Mwanga and 
Omukama Kabalega) and those who were supporting the colonial forces. The Italian Roman Catholics 
and the English missionaries were against the existing order. These wars led to the execution of the so 
called ‘Uganda martyrs’.  
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3.2.2 Berlin Conference and citizen participation44 (1884-1885) 
With the ‘legal’ establishment of colonial rule in Uganda, and through a combination 
of economic manoeuvres via the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEACO) 
(Low, 1965), the British embarked on signing agreements with some leaders of 
Uganda using a variety of tactics, including negotiation, but also by propping up 
embattled leaders against local adversaries and then extracting concessions from 
them (in Tooro), and through protracted battles (in Bunyoro) (Karugire 1980; 
Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The ‘legal’ establishment of British rule had 
a far-reaching impact on the structure and functioning of Ugandan governance. For 
example, the French and British missionaries’ struggle for power and influence, 
particularly in Buganda, weakened Buganda's political leadership (Chibita & Fourie, 
2007; Mamdani, 1997).  
 
When the British achieved full control of Buganda, they signed flawed ‘agreements’ 
with Bugandan and other leaders to disenfranchise the locals, which later led to the 
weakening of the powers of local traditional leaders (Low, 1965; Karugire, 1980; 
Kabwegyere, 1995). Some of the agreements were not all-inclusive in terms of 
participation; that is, either the leaders or ordinary Ugandans were excluded 
(Karugire 1980; Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Ugandans merely endorsed 
                                                            
44 The Berlin Conference of 1884–5 regulated European colonisation and trade in Africa during the 
New Imperialism period, and coincided with Germany's sudden emergence as an imperial power. 
The conference ushered in a period of heightened colonial activity on the part of the European 
powers, while simultaneously eliminating most existing forms of African autonomy and self-
governance. 
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agreements drawn up by British agents, co-operatives and some local leaders. 
Therefore by the time the British concretised their control of Buganda, all religious 
converts belonged not just to a faith, but to an accompanying political conviction. 
However, at grassroots level the basis for political association remained the clan, and 
religion was just the ‘official excuse’ (Karugire, 1980). Though publicly the British 
downplayed the ethnic factor and sought to link political affiliation to religious 
affiliation, ethnicity remained prominent in the period before Uganda’s 
independence in 1962 (Karugire 1980; Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). On 
the other hand, Britain’s divide and rule policy prevented people from forming a 
national party; parties were ethnic-based, though religious doctrines were 
intrinsically embedded.  
 
3.2.3 Indirect rule and citizen participation (1899-1905) 
When the British consolidated power in Uganda, they devised a means for ruling the 
country. At that time, the standard way was to sign agreements of disguised power 
sharing. Pratt (1960) points out that the Buganda Agreement of 1900, signed between 
the British and Buganda's Kabaka Chwa, was the most noteworthy agreement in the 
history of pre-independence Uganda. However, its principles undermined aspects of 
democracy. The agreement reduced the powers of the kabaka, who was a hereditary 
appointee, and maximised the powers of the British (Karugire, 1980; Chibita & 
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Fourie, 2007). Strangely, the agreement was drawn up in both Luganda45 and 
English; however, the English version of the agreement became binding on both 
parties; though, as none of the Baganda signatories to the agreement had a strong 
command of English, they were rendered objects of administrative manipulation 
(Karugire 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). By using English as the 
common language in agreements such as the Buganda agreement of 1900 and the 
native Authority Ordinance of 1919, the British were able to concretise their ‘indirect 
rule’ system of administration, using local chiefs such as Semei Kakungulu.46  
 
Mamdani (1997) and Pratt (1960) point out that the appointment of Semei 
Kakungulu by the British was contrary to tradition, since chiefs were normally 
natives of the communities which they administered, and were appointed by local 
authorities. Kakungulu and his agents extended the centralised model of 
administration to some of the communities to which they were sent by British (Pratt, 
1960; Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960). The British also gave the local chiefs and 
colonial administrators wide-ranging powers in maintaining law and order, 
preventing crimes, arresting offenders, prohibiting the carrying of arms, and 
conscripting free labour for public projects (Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Chibita 
                                                            
45 Luganda is a local language spoken by the Baganda, the tribe or group of people that occupy the 
central region of Uganda, where the British established the administrative centre. At present, the 
region also doubles as the Kingdom of Buganda and the capital city of Uganda.  
46 For instance, they embarked (originally the role of the kabaka) on appointing Baganda chiefs to 
administer other parts of Uganda outside Buganda territory, largely under the supervision of Chief 
Semei Kakungulu. This not only disfranchised the citizens from electing their own leaders, but also 
caused resentment in communities where such leaders were installed (see Chibita & Fourie, 2007).  
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& Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). The chiefs ruled with an iron 
hand, a situation that created antipathy. The locals blamed the administrative system 
forced on them by the British-imposed chiefs wherever they were posted (Karugire, 
1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). Ultimately there was resistance from the populace, and a 
demand for greater participation in the political process.  
 
3.2.4 Ethnic division and its impact on citizen participation (1906-1913)  
The possibility of participation under British rule was problematic, considering 
Uganda's complex ethnic dynamics (Karugire, 1980; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Low, 
1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Mamdani, 1997; Pratt, 1960). By 1918 the Uganda 
protectorate had taken shape and by 1921 all communities of Uganda were indirectly 
under colonial administration, governed by chiefs appointed by the British 
government (Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Mamdani, 1997; Pratt, 1960). By 
defining territorial boundaries, the British exploited Uganda’s lack of ethnic 
homogeneity to establish an administrative system which encouraged competition 
rather than co-operation among the different regions and ethnic groups (Low, 1965; 
Low & Robert, 1960; Pratt, 1960). Because of the different ways in which the British 
had negotiated or forced their way into the different parts of Uganda, they failed to 
establish a common policy for administering the different districts they created as 
administrative units (Chibita & Fourie, 2007).  
 
Kabwegyere (1995) observes that this state of affairs gave rise to mutual suspicion, 
uneven development and a tendency for the different districts to defend a separate 
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autonomy. The emphasis was placed on each district's vertical relationship with the 
centre, rather than on horizontal relationships between the districts (Kabwegyere, 
1995). Scholars such as Kabwegyere (1995), Karugire (1980) and Mamdani (1976) 
have argued that the appointment of Baganda as agents of the British colonial 
administration enabled them to acquire wealth which they reinvested in Buganda. 
Social services and physical infrastructure in Buganda were (and are still) superior to 
those of all other regions (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Uganda’s failure to coalesce 
around a strong unit such as Buganda made the local rather than national level the 
legitimate forum for political expression and identity (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). 
Loyalty to the district (which often coincided with ethnic group) was enhanced by a 
number of other factors. For example, the localisation of social service provision 
(through decentralisation) intensified feelings of ‘them’ against ‘us’, a sentiment 
rooted in what Mamdani (1997) refers to as ‘politically enforced ethnic pluralism’, 
and which ensured that each ethnic group in the colony developed as a separate 
unit. The result was that the very foundation of these societies was uprooted, 
particularly by the establishment of a deliberative Lukiiko, a class of land-owners 
not dependent on the kabaka, and which also reduced the kabaka’s traditional powers. 
In fact, the promulgation of the Local Government Act of 1949 to contain dissent 
marked the beginning of tribally-based administration in Uganda (Mamdani, 1997).  
 
Among other results, the Local Government Act of 1949 empowered the British 
governor to establish a district council in any part of the colony. Efforts were made 
to draw boundaries so as to limit the population in each district to one tribe. This 
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was successful in most districts, except for West-Nile, Bukedi and Kigezi, which 
were already ethnically heterogeneous (Karugire (1980). District councils were also 
tribally based, and each district functioned independently – and, for the most part, 
oblivious of other units (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). This state of affairs was not wholly 
a happy accident on the part of the colonial administration; rather, efforts were made 
to stop district leaders from meeting with fellow district leaders from other 
communities, and leaders were regularly silenced (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; 
Mamdani, 1996). The British were the only duly constituted participants in the 
politics of the time; Ugandans were mere spectators.  
 
3.2.5 Language policy and citizen participation (1930-1940’s) 
As with ethnicity determining participation, the choice of what language to use was 
among the many controversies that surrounded the establishment of the East African 
Federation, which began as early as the 1930s. Chibita & Fourie (2007) points out that 
there was a move to promote Kiswahili47 as the East African lingua franca, for 
economic and administrative expediency. Similarly, Kabwegyere (1995) observes 
that a high premium was placed on knowledge of Kiswahili, which was linked to 
both appointment and promotion in the civil service. However, the British were 
suspicious of Kiswahili, not only because it was linked to Islam and therefore 
contrary to the Anglicisation project that they were working on, but also because it 
had the potential to aid the spread of the Mau-Mau rebellion, which was gaining 
                                                            
47 The Kiswahili language is spoken among various groups traditionally inhabiting the East African 
coastline. The language derives from centuries of contact between Arabic-speaking traders and the 
many different Bantu-speaking peoples of the area. 
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ground in neighbouring Kenya (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 
1980). So the British were against the idea of Uganda’s common language being 
Kiswahili, Luganda, or any of the vernaculars, and recognised only the English 
language. By making English the de facto national language, Chibita and Fourie 
(2007) point out, the British were able to proscribe national debate. English served to 
unify the emerging elite and the colonialists in addition to serving administrative 
purposes, but was inaccessible to the majority of Ugandans. Most Ugandans at 
grassroots level remained separated from government (and each other) by English, 
but there was intense Anglicisation at the elite level; all the vernacular languages 
were left to continue serving their respective ethnic communities. This arrangement 
contributed to the growth of insular nationalism (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). 
 
Indeed, insular nationalism in Uganda was a product of the colonial language policy 
and the general policy of separate development. Prior to Uganda's independence, 
each ethnic group deliberated individually and addressed its own, narrow needs 
(Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Karugire (1980) points out that communication flowed 
vertically, from the district councils to the colonial government, and to the Colonial 
Office in London. As a result, there was little chance for the formation of ethnically 
comprehensive political parties with a national character (Mutibwa, 1992). In fact, 
people in their separate ethnic groupings were content with this type of power 
arrangement at the district level. Therefore, the first political parties that were 
formed in the run-up to the first national elections in 1961, such as the Bataka Party 
(BP), the Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU), the Democratic Party (DP) and the 
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Kabaka Yekka (KY) were characterised by a parochial outlook based on ethnic 
origin, religion or a combination of these (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980).  
 
3.2.6 Socio-economic inequalities and participation (1940-1950’s)  
During British rule in Uganda, the distribution of socio-economic infrastructure and 
essential services (schools, hospitals, roads) was uneven. Chibita and Fourie (2007) 
assert that the British cultivated social inequalities between Uganda’s various ethnic 
groups through selective allocation of essential services such as transportation and 
education, and of other forms of infrastructure development. Karugire (1980) argues 
that the establishment of major industries in Buganda created the need for migrant 
wage labour from other parts of the country, such as Kigezi and West-Nile. This 
resulted in a highly multilingual Buganda, a situation that still prevails. Other 
scholars such as Kabwegyere (1995) and Mutibwa (1992) report that during the 
colonial period, Northern Uganda remained a source of wage labour and 
recruitment for the army. Karugire (1980) says that in Ankole (Western Uganda), the 
British favoured the Bahima (pastoralists) with education opportunities linked to 
employment and promotion in the much-coveted civil service. As a result, by the 
1940s the majority Bairu (agriculturalists) of Ankole constituted yet another 
disgruntled group (Karugire, 1980). 
 
Furthermore, Karugire (1980) and Kabwegyere (1995) assert that even as the 
opportunities to participate in governance arose in Uganda (particularly in the 
period leading up to the first elections in 1961), the majority of Ugandans, who did 
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not have a Western (formal) education, were relegated to the position of spectators 
rather than active participants. Socio-economic inequality was also disseminated, 
according to religious affiliation. For instance, Karugire (1980), Kabwegyere (1995) 
and Chibita and Fourie (2007) observe that education and training for leadership 
during colonial times was the preserve of Protestant and Catholic schools. As a 
result, Muslim children had limited opportunities to be enrolled in a school at the 
time. Not only was the education system lop-sided, it also largely determined who 
was most likely to be appointed to key positions in local government (Chibita & 
Fourie, 2007). The impact of this education policy was that many Muslims took up 
artisanship, for lack of alternatives. Chibita and Fourie (2007) claim that some of 
these inequalities left behind by the colonialists have not been fully redressed.  
 
The impact of Western cultural values on the participation introduced by British rule 
resulted in cultural changes that disturbed the political stability in the period leading 
up to Uganda's independence. For instance, formal education created a gap between 
those who were able to access it and those who were not (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). 
Leaders of political parties that were formed in the 1950s in preparation for the first 
national elections had the advantage of Western education (Karugire, 1980; 
Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). But some traditionalists were dissatisfied with 
how religions were luring young people away from their traditional beliefs and 
ways of life. Conversion often came with opportunities for formal Western 
education, which lent the converts the courage to challenge traditional authority 
(Karugire, 1980). Karugire (1980) also observes that a wide gap was created between 
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the ‘educated’ and the ‘uneducated’. Western education and values effectively 
disenfranchised those who did not get that education. The result was that the 
uneducated populace took little part in the events leading up to independence. 
According to Chabita and Fourie (2007), the discontent caused by the differences 
between educated and uneducated played itself out in repeated cases of civil 
disturbance between the 1940s and the 1960s.  
 
In pre-independence Uganda, Buganda remained a key influence in Uganda's 
politics (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). 
Buganda’s protest at the establishment of an East African Federation, which 
Buganda saw as a further loss of autonomy, led to the British exiling Kabaka Mutesa 
II in 1953 (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). In protest, Buganda 
refused to participate in any further plans for Uganda’s independence until Mutesa 
II was returned and its other conditions were met (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 
1995; Mamdani, 1976). Mutesa II was returned to Buganda in 1955; however, his 
powers were reduced on condition that the Lukiiko (Buganda’s parliament) be made 
more participatory (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). 
 
Nearer independence, in 1962, Buganda and the British were involved in a series of 
negotiations to make the Mengo administration (Buganda Kingdom Headquarters) 
more powerful and discourage the formation of any political party with a national 
character (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Karugire (1980) 
asserts that Bugandan leadership wanted to secure independence from the British 
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before the rest of Uganda was declared independent, and hence resorted to various 
subversive activities to this end. The colonial administration in turn abandoned 
dialogue and banned any political organisation which it considered disruptive of the 
‘public peace’ (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Eventually Buganda forced the 
British to make some concessions, thereby further consolidating Buganda’s already 
dominant position. As Karugire (1980) puts it, as Uganda approached independence 
in 1962, it was ‘a house divided against its normal self’ 
 
3.2.7 Participation at the dawn of independence and beyond (1962-1967) 
At independence, Uganda was polarised along political, ethnic, racial, religious and 
economic lines (Gooloba-Mutebi, 2008; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Some scholars 
(Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976) observe that such divisions 
were reflected in the nature of political parties and alliances that were formed, in 
recruitment to the civil service and the military, in the control of the economy and in 
unequal access to social services. For instance, Karugire (1988) claims that Uganda 
was an artificial country, the sections of which possessed nothing in common, since 
even their history throughout the colonial period did not appear to be a shared one; 
and Parliament (after independence) was no more than a gathering of local 
government delegations bargaining for their respective regions (see also Chibita & 
Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mutibwa, 1992; Mamdani, 1997). Between 1964 and 
1967, tensions in Uganda's national politics intensified; and not only did politics 
continue to be played along ethnic lines, but also the army, which increasingly 
became a key player in politics. Tensions between the national government and the 
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Mengo government came to a climax in 1966 in what was called the ‘Buganda crisis’ 
(Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mutibwa, 1992; 
Mamdani, 1997). During this crisis, the national army besieged the Buganda palace 
and took over the premises of key institutions of the Buganda government. Kabaka 
Mutesa II was sent into exile in London once again, and the Prime Minister (Milton 
Obote) was suspended; later, the constitution was abrogated (Karugire, 1980; 1988; 
Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani 1997). A new constitution was ushered in, with Milton 
Obote as president (replacing Kabaka Mutesa II, who had played only a ceremonial 
role as president since independence). Kingdoms were abolished, and Uganda was 
declared a republic (Karugire, 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976).  
 
During the same period, laws such as the Preventive Detention Act were used to 
silence opposition in Buganda, and later in the rest of the country (Karugire, 1980; 
Chibita & Fourie, 2007). This was justified as necessary for ‘national consolidation’. 
After the ‘Buganda crisis’ of 1966/67 there was a significant reduction in the power 
of the civil rights enshrined in the independence constitution of 1962 (Karugire, 1988; 
Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). The ‘state of emergency’ which was declared in 
Buganda in 1966 opened the way for arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without 
trial in the ‘national interest’ (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Obote declared Uganda a one-
party state, and the independence of key institutions such as the public service, the 
judiciary, the police and the army were systematically eroded (Karugire, 1988; 
Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Many experienced functionaries left the civil 
service because of the government's increasingly dictatorial stance, and the level of 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
participation in the political process that had characterised the pre-independence 
period diminished, as people began to fear for their safety. Karugire (1988) explains 
that the electoral system became ‘a meaningless pretence in which nobody had any 
confidence whatsoever, and it ceased to be the basis of selecting popular government 
at all levels’ as dictatorial tendencies became more overt. 
 
3.2.7.1 Dictatorship in its earliest form (1967-1970) 
According to Hansen and Michael (1988) there was barely hope of nurturing a 
culture of participation in public debate in Uganda between 1967 and 1970 (see also 
Kyemba, 1977; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). For historical reasons, the first 
parliament (which would have provided the forum for national dialogue about the 
future of Uganda) was weak. In fact, Karugire (1998) argues that the apart from a 
handful of secondary school teachers and (to a far lesser extent) a few professionals 
such as lawyers and doctors, Uganda's first parliament was full of people who were 
barely literate, and possessed little understanding of the management of complex 
public affairs. Meanwhile, the depoliticisation of civil society (particularly trade 
unions and co-operatives), that had begun in colonial times to contain opposition, 
continued; because post-independence leaders lacked the mandate needed to feel 
secure in their positions (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Bazaara, 2003; Okoth, 1996; 
Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999).  
 
Consequently, national leadership gradually became dominated by individuals who 
had little impact on solving post-colonial political problems. Uganda's politics 
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during that period were characterised by manipulation, opportunism, intrigue and 
infighting, which later intensified conflicts in local government (Mamdani, 1976; 
Bazaara 2003; Okoth 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999). 
These conflicts were often related to the fact that Government had tampered with 
the independence of appointment boards, while corruption and nepotism had 
become institutionalised (Mamdani, 1976). Consequently, the chiefs of areas were 
inept, and did not receive the respect that would have been derived from their 
traditional institutions (Karugire 1988; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004; Chibita & Fourie, 
2007). With political parties having been banned in 1967, and all other forms of 
association closely monitored, it became difficult for a strong civil society to develop 
(Okoth, 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999). In an effort to 
contain the opposition, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) enacted laws in line 
with the new, dictatorial stance taken following the abrogation of the constitution in 
1966 and the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill (1966 sec. 29), which had provision for a 
life sentence for incitement against chiefs appointed by the government (Okoth, 
1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999). 
 
The police and army became increasingly involved in administration, the executive 
interfered freely to secure support for itself at district level, and the urban authorities 
were no longer elected but appointed by the appropriate ministries (Mamdani, 1976; 
Okoth 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997). Public confidence in these institutions 
was greatly undermined and since the avenues of citizen engagement were closed, 
apathy set in, and most of the public bodies collapsed (Karugire, 1988; Mamdani, 
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1976). The military, dominated by people from one region (the North), and largely 
illiterate due to the inequitable distribution of education opportunities during the 
colonial era, became influential in the management of the state. The army was easy 
to manipulate, and was used to support an increasingly unpopular government, 
considering that the top leadership of the UPC came from Northern Uganda 
(Karugire, 1988; Mamdani, 1976). Hence, under Obote the military also became a key 
player in Ugandan politics. By 1971, there was no visible culture of ordinary 
Ugandans participating in debate relating to governance through any fora, as a 
result of domination by elites who were pro-UPC government (Chibita & Fourie, 
2007). With more army and police visible in public administration, the UPC 
government was eventually ousted by Idi Amin on 25 January 1971.  
 
3.2.7.2 Citizen participation in a collapsed state (1971-1986) 
This period was the reign of terror when Idi Amin was at the helm of leadership 
(Kyemba, 1977). During this time there was no pretence of democracy (Chibita & 
Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). The Suspension of Political 
Activities Act (1971) summarises the extent to which participation in any form of 
political debate was proscribed during Amin’s reign. The Act (among others) 
prohibited the organisation of, or participation in, any public meeting or procession 
for propagating or imparting political ideas or information; the formation of political 
parties; and wearing, uttering or displaying any party name, symbols or other 
paraphernalia (Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). While there were some ‘rules’ 
against engaging in public debate, these remained unwritten until 1972. However, 
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following an attempt to oust him by a military take-over, Amin abolished 
parliament, as well as district and urban councils, the two remaining spaces where 
ordinary Ugandans were still able to participate in their own governance, albeit 
through representatives. Henceforth, Amin made himself the executive, legislature 
and judiciary (Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). He reorganised local government 
and, at the regional level, appointed governors, who were mostly military men. 
Local chiefs were mostly chosen from military ranks (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). 
Amin’s reign came to an end in 1979 when he tried invading the neighbouring state 
of Tanzania, with the intention of annexing a part of Tanzanian territory to Uganda. 
 
By the end of the Amin’s dictatorship, his policies had devastated the economy, and 
the political instability that set in following his departure ensured that economic 
hardship would continue for some time. For instance, between 1979 and 1985, three 
governments came and went in quick succession (Karugire, 1980; 1988). At the time 
of Amin’s departure the government consisted of a military commission, an organ of 
the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), which apparently worked under a 
Presidential Commission of three eminent civilians. Accordingly, the Military 
Commission (headed by Paulo Muwanga) organised presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 1980, and engineered the return to power of Obote (Karugire, 1980; 
1988). Obote II was constrained by guerrilla movements that were dissatisfied with 
the political conditions of the time, and eventually started operating and mobilising 
around the capital city (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The Obote II government's response 
to increasing opposition was not dialogue, but violent suppression. It was 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
considered risky to engage in any political party activity (Karugire, 1980; 1988). The 
National Resistance Movement (political party) together with National Resistance 
Army became a major threat to the sitting governments between 1981 and 1986. 
 
As a result, there was intensified chaos, cruelty, looting, rape and murder as these 
armed groups sometimes victimised people to settle personal scores, or in order to 
loot their property (Karugire, 1980; 1888). This period, characterised by weakening 
central administrative control, the decimation of civil society, the weakening of the 
judiciary and the economy, and fears of spying and counter-spying, continued under 
the Obote II government (Karugire, 1980; 1888; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 
1995). During the same period, many Ugandans began to abandon their town jobs, 
homes and property for the safety of the rural communities (Karugire, 1985; 
Mutibwa, 1992). Obote, in an attempt to contain the chaotic situation, made a series 
of tactical blunders, most of which were prompted by the need to punish one ethnic 
group and appease another. Chibita and Fourie (2007) observe that this state of 
affairs culminated in a mutiny that saw Obote's overthrow in 1985. The military state 
of emergency led by General Tito Okello Lutwa (who took over from Obote) 
presided over a year of chaos, as numerous rebel groups terrorised the population in 
their attempt to seize power. This was the situation when Museveni’s NRA/NRM 
overthrew the government of Tito Okello through a coup d’état in January 1986.  
 
3.3 Rebirth of democracy and citizen participation (1986-2011)  
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When the NRM surreptitiously staged a guerrilla war against the dictatorial 
government in the early part of the 1980s, their strategy of action in case they 
assumed power was laid down in the Ten Point Programme (Karugire, 1888; Chibita 
& Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995). The first point of the Ten Point Programme 
advocated real democracy. Following their takeover, the NRA/NRM established a 
far-reaching transformation with regard to opportunities for citizens to participate in 
their own governance. Such provisions allowed all Ugandan adults – especially 
those that were previously marginalised, such as women, the youth and the disabled 
– to participate in governance (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Nsibambi, 1998; Mamdani, 
1997; 1989; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004). Under a form of ‘no-party democracy’ known as 
the Movement System, the NRM introduced popular participation as a key element 
of all its policies (Carbone, 2004; Mamdani, 1997; 1998; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004). The 
NRM further instituted a system of popularly-elected Local Councils (LCs), initially 
referred to Resistance Councils (RCs).48 The system consisted of five tiers (from RC1 
to RC5), which for the first time in Uganda's history gave communities at village 
level the  power not only to choose but also to recall their representative, if he or she 
did not perform to their satisfaction.  
 
The Resistance Councils, according to Mamdani (1997), had their limitations, as they 
did not take due cognisance of entrenched socio-economic differences in their 
organisation. Chibita and Fourie (2007) point out that eligibility for public office was 
                                                            
48 According to John and Putzel (2005), under the NRM regime, sustaining participatory democracy 
remained a key political and ideological goal, similar to other populist experiences, including Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. 
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based on ‘individual merit’ and residence, but not on differentiated working 
conditions. The RCs tended not to build capacity among those classes that were 
genuinely interested in reform, but rather provided opportunities for the socially 
well-placed to consolidate their positions through dominating these positions of 
leadership. Indeed, the system came to be dominated by the more prosperous 
members of rural communities (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1998). However, in 
order to conciliate the multiple political forces at play, at both grassroots and 
national levels, the NRM established a broad-based government at the national level 
comprised of groups of people who belonged to different political parties but were 
willing to embrace the new, ‘no-party democracy’ philosophy espoused by the NRM 
(Chibita and Fourie, 2007).  
 
The NRM, fearful of endangering their hold on power by allowing politicians at the 
national level to access potential voters at the village level, limited direct elections to 
the RC1 tier (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1989). All subsequent elections up to 
district level were by electoral  college. In a way, this diluted the participatory nature 
of the RC system. There was a push from the local and international communities to 
restore ‘real’ participation – a situation that contributed to the restoration of the 
traditional kingdoms, which Obote had abolished in 1967. However, part of the 
process of restoring the kingdoms was a pact made between cultural leaders and the 
government that the cultural leaders would not engage in partisan politics. This 
seemed meaningless to some traditional leaders (especially Kabaka Mutebi II), who 
would prefer full, unhindered influence over their territory in relation to local 
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governance. These differences between the central government and some of the 
kingdoms (especially in Buganda) remain an ongoing source of tension.49 
 
3.3.1 Legislative provisions for citizens’ participation 
In Uganda, the idea of democracy and real citizen participation was popularised by 
the current NRM government, after reinstating constitutionalism. Citizen 
participation attained significance in the constitution and other legislative 
documents, and it was placed at the very heart of the system of local government. 
Section II of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) highlights the democratic principles 
stipulated, which include:  
 
(i) the state shall be based on democratic principles which empower 
and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in 
their own governance; (ii) all the people of Uganda shall have access to 
leadership positions at all levels, subject to the Constitution; (iii) the 
state shall be guided by the principle of decentralisation and 
devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at 
appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own 
affairs; (iv) the composition of government shall be broadly 
                                                            
49 See The Daily Monitor, 12 September 2009 Kayunga Crisis: Uganda government stands accused of 
stoking tribal flames between the Baganda (the largest ethnic group in Uganda) and a tiny section of 
the Banyala, one of its sub-groups. This has led to running battles between the police and youth 
groups culminating in full blown riots on Thursday night that led to 10 people dying. The Baganda 
claim that the Uganda government’s strategy is to have complete political control over the land and 
minerals includes the weakening or usurpation of the claims made by native communities. 
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representative of the national character and social diversity of the 
country; (v) all political and civic associations aspiring to manage and 
direct public affairs shall conform to democratic principles in their 
internal organisations and practice; and (vi) civic organisations shall 
retain their autonomy in pursuit of their declared objectives 
(Constitution of Uganda, 1995).50 
 
Considering the huge emphasis placed on democratic principles as well as the role of 
citizen development, the constitution further stipulated mechanisms through which 
the democratic principles such as citizen participation in development would be 
realised. These were clearly illustrated in Article 176, as well as the Local 
Government Act of 1997. Article 176 Section 1 states that the local government 
system in Uganda shall be based on the district as a unit under which there shall be 
such lower local governments and administrative units as Parliament may provide 
by law. Article 176 Section 2 spells out the principle that will apply to the local 
government system:  
(i) the system shall be such as to ensure that functions, powers and 
responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the Government to 
local government units in a co-ordinated manner; (ii) decentralisation 
shall be a principle applying to all levels of local government, and in 
particular, from higher to lower local government units to ensure 
                                                            
50 See also Article 1 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 
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peoples’ participation and democratic control in decision making; (iii) 
the system shall be such as to ensure the full realisation of democratic 
governance at all local government levels; (iv) there shall be 
established for each local government unit a sound financial base with 
reliable sources of revenue; (v) appropriate measures shall be taken to 
enable local government units to plan, initiate and execute policies in 
respect of all matters affecting the people within their jurisdictions; (vi) 
persons in the service of local government shall be employed by the 
local governments; and lastly, (vii) the local governments shall oversee 
the performance of persons employed by the Government to provide 
services in their communities and to monitor the provision of 
Government services or the implementation of projects in their 
communities. 
 
Article 176 Section 3 further stipulates that the system of local government shall be 
based on democratically elected councils on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in 
accordance with Article 181 Section 4, which observes that the local government 
councils shall be elected every four years. Article 177 Section 1 lays down guidelines 
for local government which indicate that Uganda shall be divided into the districts. 
Article 177 Section 2 stipulates that the districts referred to in Clause 1 of Article 177 
shall be taken to have been divided into the lower local government units which 
existed immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution. Therefore, it is 
imperative to discuss how the government of Uganda has interpreted its 
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constitutional enactments to deepen and facilitate real citizen participation and bring 
people closer to the government after the rebirth of participation and the democratic 
dispensation (1986-present).  
 
3.3.2 Deepening democracy through local governments  
The enactment of the Local Government Act of 1997 brought with it various changes 
(Fumihiko, 1998). There was a transition from Resistance Councils (RCs)51 to Local 
Councils (LCs)52 which signified an end to the legacies of the guerrilla war. The 
legislature of the National Resistance Council (NRC) was renamed Parliament and 
the LC5 tier became the supreme political organ at the local government or district 
level (Anthony, 1995; 1998). The LC5 Chairperson, who is the political head of the 
Council, formed the executive wing together with the core members (councillors) of 
the local governments. The councillors acted as secretaries of sector committees, such 
as finance and administration, production and extension services, education and 
sports, health and environment, and works and technical services. The Council 
became a legislative forum where all elected councillors served as representatives of 
                                                            
51 Under the RC system, RC1 leaders were elected by universal suffrage of adults by lining up behind 
the candidates. This form of direct election did not apply to the upper level elections. As a result, as 
the Councils moved from grassroots to higher levels up the hierarchy, the degree of directly reflected 
public views was reduced. 
52 In the current LC system, the range for direct election has enlarged significantly (Anthony, 1995; 
1998; Fumihiko, 1998). In addition, the secret ballot is a more common method of voting – with the 
exception of the selection of women representatives, still achieved by lining up behind the candidates. 
Most important is that the election of LC5 Chairperson – equivalent to the governor in many other 
countries – is now a secret ballot of universal adult suffrage. 
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the people (Fumihiko, 1998). The technical staff are under the Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO), who heads the civil service and implements the policy decisions of 
the Council (Anthony, 1995; 1998; Fumihiko, 1998).  
 
Another important development that came with the LCs is that the representation of 
women improved significantly. While the minimum requirement for female 
representation in the RC system was only one out of nine councillors, with LCs it 
became at least one-third of the entire group of representatives (Fumihiko, 1998). In 
the RC system, councillors discharged their responsibilities totally voluntarily, 
without any official remuneration; the core members of the LC are now paid full 
salaries at LC1 and LC5 levels. This undoubtedly contributed significantly to the 
improvement of work incentives for councillors. In addition, the NRM, conscious of 
its historical mission, decided to establish a commission of enquiry to investigate 
how best decentralisation or local governments could effectively function. The 1987 
Uganda Commission of inquiry into local governance and the subsequent 1989 
Mamdani Commission suggested that the adoption of a decentralisation policy 
would (i) move public services closer to the people; (ii) reduce tedious 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures; (iii) make services suitable to local 
needs and conditions; (iv) improve accountability by implementing close local 
scrutiny; and (v) contribute to the process of capacity building of local institutions 
(Uganda, 1987; Mamdani, 1989; Fumihiko, 1998).53  
 
                                                            
53See World Bank, 1998; Gershberg, 1998  
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The commission of inquiry reports on the possible approaches to decentralisation 
ranged between two extremes. One end of the scale was deconcentration, by which 
administrative duties may be shifted from central government to local governments 
without necessarily transferring autonomy; the other was devolution, which would 
usually be accompanied by increased autonomy of local governments (Uganda, 
1987; Mamdani, 1989). After considering various options, the Uganda Commission 
(1987) recommended that the Resistance Councils (RCs) should not be states or NRM 
organs, but “democratic organs of the people” in order to establish “effective, viable 
and representative Local Authorities” (Uganda, 1987). This was a practical attempt 
to adopt a middle way between the two extremes of superficial deconcentration and 
full devolution (Fumihiko, 1998). Subsequently, an understanding was reached 
between these extremes; the first thirteen districts were decentralised in 1993. During 
the same period, the Local Government Statute of 1993 was passed. This statute 
provided a firm legal basis for the earlier practices of the RC system, and 
rationalised the complex line of authority caused by the five-tiered hierarchy 
(Fumihiko, 1998). It also made it clear that public servants were answerable to their 
respective RCs.  
 
The enactment of the Local Government Act of 1997 meant devolution of power, and 
autonomy over all development programmes and projects handed over to local 
governments. NAADS, for example, was to be implemented through 
decentralisation in order to achieve its intended target. Other government macro-
economic development policies such as the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), 
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spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF, were also to be implemented through 
decentralisation, by means of micro-economic programmes promoting more cost-
effective allocation of essential services, particularly health, education, agricultural 
production, feeder roads, and safe drinking water (PEAP, 1998; UNDP, 1997). In 
addition, in 1992 the government of Uganda established a Decentralisation 
Secretariat, the objectives of which (among others) were to vigorously advance 
decentralisation by providing resources and technical support to various parties.  
 
The Decentralisation Secretariat became a semi-autonomous organisation of the 
Ministry of Local Government, which provides training programmes to various 
stakeholders: civil servants, councillors and concerned citizens (Fumihiko, 1998). In 
addition, the Secretariat prepares and issues various manuals and guide books to 
enable councillors and administrators to manage various duties. With the support of 
donors, especially the United Nations Development Programme and the Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Secretariat has performed 
satisfactory work so far, despite a lack of financial resources and manpower 
(Decentralisation Secretariat, 1996; 1998; Fumihiko, 1998). This shortfall in finances 
has enabled the government of Uganda to embrace the liberal democratic reforms 
that were driven by western superpowers alongside the multinational development 
agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF. While such reforms are ongoing, it is 
important for this dissertation to discuss briefly how development agencies 
advocated democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, before the discussion on 
the major stumbling blocks to democracy and citizen participation. The next section 
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discusses the role of development agencies and their policies in Uganda’s transition 
towards development and democratisation.  
 
3.3.3 World Bank and IMF policies on democracy and citizen participation  
Since the late 1980s the Ugandan economy has enjoyed a period of high 
uninterrupted growth, broadly attributable to peace, reasonable taxes, tolerable 
administration of justice, and funding from development agencies such as the World 
Bank and the IMF (Collier and Reinikka, 2001; World Bank, 2000a; 1998; 2004). Of 
course, this can partly be attributed to economic reforms, but the lessening of armed 
conflict, the move towards democracy and better institutions have all played a role. 
The ratio of government spending to GDP in Uganda has been trending upwards 
since the late1980s, when the government adopted IMF- and World Bank-supported 
reform programs in earnest, and has shown signs of plateauing only since around 
2000 (World Bank, 2000a; 2000b; IMF, 2006). The World Bank (as the main financial 
supporter of development in emerging democracies54 of the South), among others, 
took on the obligation of finding remedies for poverty-stricken countries in the 
process of realising the Millennium Development goals.55 The World Bank has 
admitted that despite the huge sums of money being directed to developing 
countries, poverty and inequality are actually increasing.56 Besides this startling 
admission, the World Development Report 1999/2000 states that development is 
believed to have multiple goals and processes that go beyond economics to address 
                                                            
54See World Bank. Undated  
55 See IDA and IFC, 2000.  
56 See World Bank OED and IMF IEO 2004. 
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societal issues in a holistic fashion (World Bank, 2000a).57 The report also points out 
that given a stable macro-economy, there are some other elements required for 
successful development, including (among others) an emphasis on beneficiary 
participation; responsiveness to gender concerns; government ownership of projects; 
the role of social capital; and networks of trust and association (World Bank, 2000a).  
The World Bank claims that an improvement in participation gender-wise reinforces 
the development agenda, especially for the voiceless and for individuals with low 
levels of education. Furthermore, citizen participation has a trickle-down effect on 
poverty reduction, and contributes enormously to the quality of life of the 
population (World Bank, 2000a). The World Bank is also aware that discrimination 
against participation impairs development. Therefore, in order to offer equal 
opportunities for participation, the World Bank advocates allowing civil society to 
participate freely in shaping and implementing national anti-poverty strategies (see 
also IDS Bulletin, 2004).  
 
In Uganda, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)58 were considered for the 
new anti-poverty framework announced late in the 1990s; the processes for creating 
the PRSPs were to be all-inclusive (IDS, 2004; World Bank, 2000a). The World Bank’s 
focus on PRSPs was mainly to identify a participatory manner in which poverty 
reduction outcomes could be achieved for a country. At the same time, they would 
use key public actions – policy changes, institutional reforms, programmes, and 
                                                            
57 See World Bank OED 2004.  
58 .MoFPED 2000d 
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projects – which were needed to achieve the desired outcomes (World Bank, 2000a). 
In some respects, the PRSPs became an ‘achievement’ for some of the non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Uganda. However, these ‘achievements’ 
posed contentious questions: (i) While full participation by all stakeholders was 
encouraged in drafting the PRSPs, how would it be achieved at grassroots level, 
especially in communities where literacy levels are low? (ii) How would both parties 
(donor and beneficiary) reach a consensus (given the contradictions between 
demands and expectations of the PRSPs) that would result in better actual strategies 
being employed? For the PRSP strategy – with its ambitious objectives – to succeed 
in building effective participation, these questions needed to be given thorough 
consideration before the ratification of PRSPs by Uganda or other beneficiary 
countries. In the process, the World Bank developed a citizens’ participation course 
manual, for roll-out in member countries (World Bank, 2003).  
 
As the World Bank made PRSPs more participatory, the IMF introduced their Report 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) in Uganda. The ROSC data 
module contained, among other data, (i) national accounts; (ii) the consumer price 
index (CPI); (iii) government finance statistics (GFS); and (iv) the balance of 
payments (BOP). Within the available budget, the emerging democracy’s authorities 
could produce macroeconomic statistics, with a strong emphasis on co-ordination 
across statistics, aimed at removing possible differences (IMF Country Report, 2006). 
The critical users of ROSC included government officials, as well as economic 
analysts and statisticians (within and outside of government) who constituted the 
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actors who demonstrate the performance of economies and influence attitudes on 
investment. The ROSC system also enhanced performance budgeting through 
improved financial planning, management and monitoring of all government 
finances, and comparative performance of programmes; there was also increased 
accountability.  
 
The design features of ROSC support good governance, and have the downstream 
function of supporting service delivery. The introduction of ROSC had the potential 
to improve local governance in the following ways:  
 
(i)the budget would be linked to service delivery, thereby ensuring 
efficiency and performance; (ii) public administration in general would 
be transformed, both qualitatively and quantitatively; and (iii) the 
impact of public goods and services expenditures on the GDP of the 
country would be accurately measured. In implementing the ROSC 
initiatives the IMF envisaged that participation would be feasible for 
all citizens. Citizens’ participation was then assumed a function of 
efficiency, transparency and accountability.59  
 
However, the World Bank and the IMF have not escaped criticism, in Uganda and 
elsewhere in the world. For instance, Jones and Hardstaff (2005) demonstrate how 
the IMF and the World Bank have taken power away from people. Apparently their 
                                                            
59 IMF & IEO 2004.  
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PRSPs for HIPC are imported rather than home-grown, and are accepted under 
pressure as a means to obtain debt relief; and as a result, often they do not succeed, 
thus obstructing democracy and citizen engagement (see also G-24 Secretariat, 2003; 
Villaroman, 2009; Hardstaff, 2003; Buira, 2003; Vreeland, 2007; Levinsohn, 2003).60 
It’s from this point of view that the following section discusses some major 
deterrents to democracy and citizen participation in Uganda before the conclusion of 
the chapter.  
 
3.4 Deterrents to democracy and citizen participation  
The process of democratisation and citizenship in Uganda has encountered setbacks 
that have discouraged actual participation. Indeed, in some cases citizens have 
become what Williams (2008) calls ‘mere endorsees’ of pre-designed government 
programmes, and participation has been reduced to a useless but necessary 
appendage, required by the various laws and policies operating at both local and 
national government level. Informed discussions and rational debates on the merits 
and demerits of specific planning programmes are barely noticeable, yet 
participation features prominently as a key component of planning programmes, at 
national and local levels (Williams, 2008). This section discusses major deterrents to 
real citizen participation after the rebirth of participatory democracy.  
                                                            
60 See also Jones and Hardstaff’s (2005) analysis of 42 countries where PRSPs have been developed 
and implemented since 1999. They list six commonly occurring limitations on ‘country-ownership’ of 
PRSPs: (i) lack of input on economic policy; (ii) lack of parliamentary involvement; (iii) the speed of 
the process; (iv) the quality of citizen involvement; (v) donor imposition of the process; and (vi) donor 
imposition of policies. 
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3.4.1 The militarisation of politics61 and resultant fear62  
When Uganda was handed over by the colonialists at the dawn of independence in 
1962, the period that followed was characterised by a series of political instabilities. 
Indeed, instability was a constant until the late 1970s, when political anarchy was at 
its peak. Undeniably, authoritarianism, dictatorship and oppression of the masses, as 
well as violation of human rights, were key characteristics of Uganda at the time. 
Such a state of affairs instilled fear in the masses regarding engagement with the 
state. Participation was barely noticeable. Even with the rebirth of participatory 
politics ushered in by the NRM government, echoes of fear continued to be heard, 
and actual participation only become visible during the elections; and yet, during the 
same electoral exercise, those in support of the opposition were still threatened and 
constantly reminded of how the current government restored peace (Oleru et al, 
2005). 
 
                                                            
61 See The Independent, 5 May 2011. ‘How Besigye entered CMI’s kill zone’; see also The Independent, 10 
May 2011. ‘Opposition leaders arrested over a rally in Kampala’; and The Observer, 27 April 2011, in 
which Oloka-Onyango points out that Museveni’s victory lies in the highly-militarised context within 
which politics and governance in Uganda are executed. He further observes that “we know that after 
five years of civil war (1981 to 1986), and twenty-plus years of insurgency in the north of the country, 
Uganda has virtually never been free from conflict. Unsurprisingly, the idea of peace and security 
occupy a very significant position within the national psyche”. 
62 See The Observer, 27 April 2011. While Oloka-Onyango was making a presentation at the Inter-
Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU), post-election in 2011, he pointed out that “the Uganda Peoples 
Defence Force (UPDF) is not well known for exercising restraint when dealing with civilian 
insurrection or politically-motivated opposition...In fact, when the red berets and the green uniforms 
come out on the streets you know that there will be correspondingly higher casualties. That is why 
we should condemn the increased militarisation of the political context”  
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This situation has contributed to a reluctance among citizens to exercise their 
constitutionally enshrined liberties, thereby weakening their participation in 
democratic processes.63 In fact, the current government took advantage of the past to 
consolidate their stay in power, and some leaders in the higher echelons have often 
repeated how the NRM government restored democracy and ousted the dictatorial 
governments.64 Such messages not only remind the masses of the brutality of 
previous governments; they also concretise fear and discourage active political 
participation. In some cases, those who participate are linked to rebellious groups 
that pose a threat to national security. For instance, those in opposition have been 
subjected to humiliation, and others have been tortured during election campaigns.65 
 
3.4.2 Political Patronage and Impunity  
In Uganda, there has been general lack of political commitment on the side of the 
central government towards effective devolution of powers, which is evident in the 
continued influence and interference in the functioning of local government units. 
Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) point out that the growing political culture is one of 
                                                            
63 See The Daily Monitor, 9 May 2011, ‘Uganda must probe unarmed protestor deaths: Human Rights 
Watch’. See also The Daily Monitor, 9 May 2011, ‘Police block DP rally at Kololo, ask for State House 
clearance first’. See also The Independent, 29 April 2011, ‘The failures of Uganda’s democracy’.  
64 See The Observer, 27 April 2011, in which Oloka-Onyango claims that there is no democratic country 
in the world that relies on their military. He cites the notoriety of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the 
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), and paramilitary shadow militias such as the Black 
Mamba; and the PGB and the many generals who have invaded political life. He further points out 
that the UPDF should be removed from directly involving itself in politics, as is normally the case in a 
functioning multiparty system. 
65 This was also confirmed by the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda, February 
2011. 
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polarisation, where central government politicians not only interfere in local 
elections, but also frustrate local communities that do not subscribe to views of the 
ruling party (see also Olum, 2004:4). For example, during election campaigns, by law 
local leaders are required to be non-partisan and elected on individual merit; 
however, central government officials openly campaign for some candidates seen as 
sympathisers to the government (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). In addition, senior 
politicians continue, unchecked, to influence local government activities, such as by 
the controversial ‘tender-preneurship’ process (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Francis & 
James, 2003; Olum, 2004). Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) claim further that though the 
Constitution of Uganda, 1995, Article 180 Section 1 makes the district council the 
highest political authority in its area of jurisdiction, and the district council 
chairperson its political head, on many occasions the official from the President’s 
office rescinds district council decisions. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) cite a situation 
in 2004 and 2005 in which the payment of fees and levies to Kampala City Council 
(KCC) by motorists (popularly known as Boda-Boda) and market vendors was 
cancelled by presidential aides. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) also report that a major 
development plan passed by KCC to modernise Naguru estates was halted in 2003.  
 
Similarly, in 2002, the central government wanted four districts to dismiss their 
Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), allegedly for mismanaging funds entrusted to 
them to help run elections. The district councils refused, arguing that they could not 
interdict their CAOs concerning functions and funds that were outside their 
jurisdiction. As a result, there was a standoff between central government and the 
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local governments, and central government instructed the Department of Finance to 
withhold transfer of funds to those districts. Subsequently, the districts were forced 
to make the CAOs resign (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). In another case, in 2005, 
central government successfully pushed for several constitutional amendments to 
enable them to exercise more control over LGUs, among them the right to appoint 
CAOs, who were previously appointed by the district service commissions. The 
constitutional amendment Article 188 section 2 now requires that CAOs be 
appointed and dismissed by the Public Service Commission. Such cases of patronage 
are not only setbacks for citizen participation, but also weaken their independence 
and ability to make meaningful decisions, as expected by the electorate.  
 
3.4.3 Corruption and electoral commission misconduct  
As is the case elsewhere in the developing world, citizen participation in Uganda has 
been severely strained by electoral misconduct perpetuated by the government of 
the time.66 The latest non-Ugandan examples can be found in Kenya (KANU vs 
ODM), and in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF vs MDC). In Uganda, the presidential results of 
2006 were contested in court on the grounds that there were irregularities, including 
(among others) bribery of voters, harassment of opposition supporters, and the use 
of state machinery during the electoral campaign. Paradoxically, given such 
                                                            
66 Results released by the Electoral Commission for the 2011 presidential elections: of 13 954 129 
registered voters, only 8 272 760 voted, representing 59.28%. A total of 5.6m of registered voters (40%) 
didn’t turn up to vote. Political analysts have argued that voters who did not cast their ballot are 
largely those who are frustrated with the President but feel that their vote will not count. This is 
attributed to Museveni’s dogmatic rhetoric and the ever-dominating NRM propaganda that 
“Museveni can never be defeated through ballot” (see The Monitor, 7 July 2011). 
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alarming irregularities, the Uganda Electoral Commission was influenced by the 
NRM to declare it the winner.67 Such activities of treachery (influence and peddling) 
and interfering with the independence of the Electoral Commission only serve to 
suffocate local citizen participation, according to Kakumba and Nsingo (2008), as 
well as facilitating the alienation of the citizens from a sense of ownership of 
people’s power.68 This cannot be overemphasised; as Mamdani (1996, cited by 
Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008) argues, “in Africa, the patrimonial state continues to 
perpetuate the rule over subjects rather than a rule by citizens”. In a political 
environment where the local government system is characterised by devious and 
opportunistic leaders, it is certainly difficult for the grassroots to exercise their rights 
as enshrined in the constitution.69  
                                                            
67 See The Independent, 24 February 2011, ‘Why Museveni won and Besigye lost and what could be 
done’. Mweda argues that “we should have expected government to employ more violence, 
intimidation and outright vote rigging than in the past. Instead these ills have been less used. But 
money has played an important role: Museveni spent more than US$350m on this campaign using 
largely the public purse (through official government programmes conveniently deployed during the 
campaigns) but supplemented by private contributions. This figure is almost half the money Barack 
Obama spent to win elections in the US in 2008, in a country with a GDP of $14 trillion. Given that 
Uganda’s GDP is $15 billion i.e. 0.1 percent of US GDP, this is an unprecedented record”. 
68 See The Daily Monitor, 8 March 2011, ‘Why 5 million Ugandans stayed away from polls. 
69 See the preliminary findings by the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda, 
February 2011, which state that the Kampala-based Human Rights Network for Journalists has noted 
an increasing number of cases of harassment of journalists in the campaigns. On 7 February 2011, the 
owners of Radio Rhino and Voice of Lango, two Lira District-based radio stations, were summoned 
for interrogation by both the District Police Commander and the Resident District Commissioner, for 
having hosted civil society activists seeking to expose and condemn allegations of government 
corruption. On 9 February 2011 soldiers belonging to the Army's Special Forces Group (SFG) 
allegedly assaulted a Daily Monitor journalist in Sembabule District as he attempted to take pictures of 
them stopping Rwemiyaga County MP Theodore Sekikubo from erecting a campaign poster. On 10 
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3.4.4 Local government conflicts and elitism 
Ever since Uganda’s independence, local conflicts have become a common 
characteristic of some local governments. In recent times, such conflicts have to some 
extent propelled the formation of new districts.70 According to Kakumba and Nsingo 
(2008), conflicts between various levels of local administration have been identified. 
For instance, there is resentment from the villages and parishes, on one hand, against 
the sub-counties and districts, on the other, over the failure of the latter to include 
them in decision-making processes; and their failure to remit a portion of the 
revenues collected to the villages and parishes that are entitled to it (Francis & 
James, 2003). In addition, the interface between politicians and civil servants has 
exhibited conflicts of roles and interests, factionalism, confrontation, intimidation 
and power struggles (Sabiti, 1998; Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). 
 
Such conflict arises out of differences in policy approaches. Kakumba and Nsingo 
(2008) acknowledge that while politicians seek to please their constituents at all 
costs, to retain political support, technocrats (the civil servants) are concerned about 
adequacy of process and frugality of resource use; hence the danger of conflict 
between the role players. To authenticate these phenomena, there are reported cases 
of politicians harassing civil servants over their alleged frustration of the politicians’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
February 2011, a Masaka-based NTV correspondent was detained by the SFG for filming a scuffle 
involving Rwemiyaga area Member of Parliament Theodore Sekikubo, ahead of President Museveni’s 
campaign rally. 
70 Evidence of this is from a discussion with the current director of Local Government, who pointed 
out that the differences in some districts have made it difficult for effective services delivery in 
practice. He observed that in many cases the differences are ethnically driven.  
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development projects (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Kakumba, 2003). While such 
conflicts continue to occur, local government councillors and civil servants have 
become powerful by making decisions beneficial to them relating to planning, 
allocation of resources, and awarding of tenders and contracts for projects (Kakumba 
& Nsingo, 2008). It has become common for some members of the public to sponsor 
campaigns for local government representatives in anticipation of material favours, 
often in the form of preferential treatment. Olum (2004) points out that in rural 
communities, local councillors are increasingly being drawn from ‘well-to-do’ 
households, and give inducements to the poor in the form of household goods in 
order to be elected. This has created an elite segment whose interests preclude the 
majority poor. 
 
In fact, some of the elected representatives and officials at rural sub-county level and 
lower parish and village units perform only to the advantage of the local elite. 
Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) and Francis and James (2003) observe that district plans 
rarely incorporate the priorities of lower local councils; and when this is done, the 
plans are not necessarily adhered to, as the top politicians in their council 
committees at district level often create so-called ‘hot priorities’ and urgent projects 
which have to be financed from time to time. These authors state that performance is 
ritualised, with little citizen involvement, owing to a lack of resources, and 
monopolisation by local elites.  
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3.4.5 Insufficient pecuniary aptitude 
To some extent, misappropriation of resources has crippled local government’s 
ability to function. As a result, the weak financial position of most LGUs not only 
reduces their capacity to integrate the local community into development projects, 
but affects responsiveness to community needs (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). The 
situation is exacerbated by a low tax base, and the continuous control of sufficient 
sources of revenue by central government (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). Francis and 
James’ (2003) analysis of the budgets of several districts in 2002 revealed that they 
could only collect an average of 7% of their budgets locally. At the same time, 
division of existing districts and the creation of new districts continue to overburden 
central government resources, which are insufficient and come as conditional 
grants.71  
 
Such financial setbacks leave local governments as mere agents of advocacy for 
citizen participation, rather than being key players in accelerating broad-based 
citizen participation. The result is that the LGUs become representatives of higher-
level structures, and not of the local citizenry. For example, Kakumba and Nsingo 
(2008) make reference to central government and donors often being interested in 
establishing new facilities such as schools and health units, and officiating at 
opening ceremonies. Contrarily, Onyach-Olaa (2003) believes that it might be 
                                                            
71Conditional grants accounts for over 80% of central government transfers and support is earmarked 
for specific national programmes at local units. The unconditional grant is largely spent on general 
management and administration, and there is therefore little (if no) room for local governments to use 
these resources for their own development priorities. 
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suitable for a local government to improve on the quality of the existing facilities, 
given that a new school would require desks, textbooks and teachers’ salaries; and a 
new health unit would require drugs, staff salaries and hospital beds, all of which 
burden the recipient LGUs. Though the high level of central transfers to the districts 
may not necessarily mean lack of local autonomy, Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) 
argue that the conditions usually attached to these transfers can undermine genuine 
local decision making and citizen participation. 
 
3.4.6 Uneven social stratification and lack of accountability  
Uganda is characterised by uneven social classes. The poorest of the poor72 occupy 
the rural communities, and they comprise 80% of the entire population73 (Appleton 
2001; Jean-Yves et al, 2006; Di John & Putzel, 2005). The relatively wealthy occupy 
semi-urban centres, especially district trading centres. The wealthy, in the minority, 
stay mainly in the capital city of Kampala and the surrounding municipal areas. The 
weak socio-economic position of the rural people prevents them from enjoying 
meaningful participation. The poor, in many cases, are unemployed, with low levels 
of education. They are obstructed by poor infrastructure and lack of means of 
communication, which is a deterrent to their civic competence (Appleton 2001; Jean-
                                                            
72 This group of Ugandans relies heavily on subsistence farming and their agricultural produce raises 
little income and in many cases, they are exploited by middlemen (Kakumba and Nsingo, 2008 and 
Jean-Yves, et al, 2006). However, those that make attempts to take their produce to urban markets, 
face a number of prohibitive local farmer taxes from the district administration agents, who 
sometimes, use high-handed means. 
73 The discussions on poverty in Uganda shows that people are mainly poor because of their inability 
to satisfy a range of basic human needs that stems from powerlessness, social exclusion, ignorance 
and lack of knowledge, as well as shortage of material resources. 
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Yves et al, 2006; Di John & Putzel, 2005). In addition, Ngaka (2006) points out that 
literacy is a critical catalyst in unleashing people’s creativity and building the 
personal confidence and assertiveness necessary for effective participation in 
development initiatives. He points out that in a country like Uganda, where over 
80% of the people stay in rural areas and 30-40% of the adult population (most of 
them women) are illiterate, it is unlikely that the rural population will participate in 
development programmes, due to their limited literacy abilities (Ngaka, 2006). In 
fact, the rural poor have become vulnerable to the dubious NGOs present in almost 
every rural district. For instance, NGOs are increasingly being accused of collusion 
with local bureaucrats to represent elitist preferences. Their relationship with LGUs 
has been characterised by mistrust, conflicts, poor communication and information 
sharing, and lack of transparency (Rugambwa, 2004:43). While such absurd 
characteristics are easily visible, accountability – the key principle of good 
governance – remains ignored. Public functionaries (elected office bearers and 
appointed officials) are reluctant to give a satisfactory explanation to the public (tax 
payers) of the local government expenditure (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). While 
citizens regularly elect their own local leaders, these officials remain effectively 
detached from the electorate once they are in office.74 
                                                            
74 This has been attributed chiefly to failure by local authorities to mobilise the people, poor 
information flow and civic incompetence to interact. There are also reported cases of endemic 
corruption in LGUs arising from weak systems and values (see for example Nsibambi, 1998; 
Nsubuga, 2004; Kakumba, 2003; Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). This means that even the meagre 
resources at the disposal of LGUs are squandered, thereby posing a serious deterrent to service 
delivery and development. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed democracy and citizen participation in Uganda dating from 
pre-colonial to post-independence times. It described the impact of colonialism on 
democracy and citizen participation, as well as the major political, economic and 
cultural forces in Uganda’s history that have influenced the capacity of Ugandans to 
participate in their own governance through public debate. The chapter also 
presented a discussion on how nebulous colonial policies constrained democracy 
and citizen participation at the time of the pre- and post-independence governments, 
alongside structural factors such as poverty, an illiterate majority of people in rural 
Uganda, and language barriers (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2008). The chapter also 
acknowledges how the formation of a public sphere with a national character has 
been rendered difficult; first by the nature and philosophy of indirect rule, and later 
by the factionalism and chaos that characterised post-independence governments. 
Yet despite the rebirth of participatory politics and even after multiparty 
dispensation, certain elements continue to impede citizen participation; notably, 
trepidation left by past governments, political patronage and impunity, corruption 
and electoral commission misconduct, repetitive local government disagreements, 
elite capture, insufficient pecuniary aptitude, lack of accountability and 
transparency, and lastly, uneven social stratification, among others (see also 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010). In addition, the chapter also took note of the fact 
that the power and influence of Ugandans over their government improved under 
the NRM, but mechanisms for holding local leaders accountable remained [and 
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remain] weak, largely due to the current government’s efforts to cling to power, 
which tended to limit the impact of the process of democratisation. 
 
In précis, this chapter demonstrated how the democracy and citizen participation 
exercise in post-independence Uganda has remained deficient, a situation Williams 
(2008) refers to as ‘spectator politics’, “where ordinary people become mere 
endorsees of pre-designed government programmes and objects of administrative 
manipulation while state functionaries ensconce themselves as bureaucratic experts 
summoned to ensure a better life for all”. Examples are the egocentric elites who 
have weakened the central government budget reserves in the process of facilitating 
the creation of new districts; the conflicts within local governments between the 
politicians and the district administrators; the elites of the district who, without 
consulting stakeholders, advance their own agendas and neglect the actual 
participatory mechanisms that the decentralisation policy calls for; and lastly, 
political patronage resulting from multiparty politics, where local government put 
party issues above national cause, and divert resources meant for development to 
facilitating party activities in return for more support from the ruling party, thus 
impairing democracy and citizen participation. 
 
While the chapter acknowledges that colonial policies constrained democracy and 
citizen participation during Uganda’s pre- and post-independence period, the 
chapter also notes that with the rebirth of participatory politics and the multiparty 
dispensation, citizen participation has been encapsulated in legislative provisions 
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through local governments and is supported by multinational organisations such as 
the World Bank and the IMF. The chapter also shows that even with the embracing 
of liberal democratic ideals, certain elements continue to deter democracy and 
citizen participation. However, what is not clear is whether that embracing of ideals 
in Uganda, especially in the government-initiated programmes, matches the elite 
and grassroots understanding and conceptualisation of democracy and citizen 
participation as development mechanisms, prescribed from the development 
perspective. Therefore, such ambiguous status quo must be verified, and in this 
dissertation this is done utilising the prototype of the NAADS programme.  
 
As previously hinted at, the NAADS is an innovative public-private extension 
service delivery approach, with the goal of increasing market-oriented agricultural 
production by empowering farmers to demand and control agricultural advisory 
services. The NAADS programme was established by the Government of Uganda 
(GoU) to boost participation and increase agriculture productivity. The programme 
is participatory in nature, as it embraces liberal democratic ideals such as citizen 
participation. The utilization of the NAADS programme assists in generating new 
knowledge on elites and grassroots conceptions of participation, in relation to their 
rights and their actual daily-lived experiences in spaces of engagement aimed at 
development. This helps to link the debate on democratisation in the South to 
democratic development or the possibility thereof. The dissertation thus links 
democratic principles such as citizen participation to the NAADS programme. 
Chapter 4 introduces an agricultural extension service prototype NAADS, as an 
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example of a national development programme born in an emerging democracy in 
which citizen participation is ostensibly a key priority. Thereafter, Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively analyse both elites and grassroots perceptions of democracy and citizen 
participation, using their experiences with the NAADS as a development 
programme purporting to support democratic ideals.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NAADS PROTOTYPE: THE AGRICULTURE EXTENSION SERVICES 
(AES) NEXUS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter accounted for democracy and citizen participation in Uganda 
from a historical perspective. It presented the reasons that citizen participation has 
remained deficient, even though the legislative provisions of the government 
stipulates full citizen engagement in all development programmes through 
decentralisation. This chapter addresses the third objective of the dissertation by 
providing a view into the National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) 
programme, as an example of a national programme in an emerging democracy 
where citizen participation is a key priority. The NAADS programme is a sub-
component of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the key objective of 
which is to increase agricultural productivity and reduce the levels of rural poverty 
to a level below 28% by 2014. As a case study the NAADS programme helps to link 
participation to development, because of its ostensibly participatory nature. This 
chapter tackles the NAADS programme at national level.  
 
However, it should be explicitly noted that the NAADS prototype is used mainly to 
establish the NAADS programme’s official status as an example of a participatory 
development programme aimed at alleviating poverty; and also to assess the 
popular perceptions of elites and grassroots on NAADS in relation to participatory 
development. This chapter is a preface to Chapters 5 and 6, analysing and 
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illustrating findings from interviews carried out with elites and grassroots on their 
popular perceptions of democracy and citizen participation, particularly from their 
experiences with NAADS.75 The main reason Bushenyi district was selected as the 
site of the case study is that agriculture is the main economic activity, and there are 
many small-scale producers engaged in the production of a wide range of crops, 
with the aim of increasing household income and food security and thus enhancing 
socio-economic development. Other reasons are that Bushenyi district is 
comparatively more successful than other districts, and the researcher is familiar 
with most of areas where the programme has been implemented. In addition, the 
present model of development at local government level in Uganda is premised on 
the primacy of local citizen participation, defined as the organised effort by 
communities to increase control over resources and regulative institutions. Perhaps 
optimistically, development trustees and others consider the Bushenyi case to be 
‘best practice’ by Ugandan standards76 (see for example Brock et al, 2003). 
 
                                                            
75Bushenyi district has become one of the major participants in NAADS in Uganda, after joining the 
programme in the 2002/3 financial year. It should be noted that at the time Bushenyi joined the 
programme, it was geographically larger than it is currently, as the four (now independent) districts 
of Sheema, Ruhinda, Rubirizi and Buhweju have since been detached.  
76 In addition, Bushenyi provides a particularly interesting context in which to explore these debates, 
not least because it has become a standard-bearer for inclusive neo-liberalism; in fact, regional 
inequalities within Uganda have become increasingly apparent. For instance, Northern Uganda 
remains largely impoverished despite the huge sums of money pumped in through the World Bank-
funded Northern Uganda Social Action Fund. 
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The chapter commences by historicising the development of Agriculture Extension 
Services (AES) as a nexus of citizen participation in Uganda as part of ongoing 
development reforms. Thereafter, the chapter introduces the NAADS programme, 
which was adopted by the government of Uganda in 2001/2 and subsequently 
established in various districts. In the context of the NAADS programme, the 
chapter accounts for relatable principles, the programme’s organisation and 
coordination, and lastly, relevant components and activities. The overall aim of 
NAADS was to enhance rural livelihoods by increasing agricultural productivity 
and profitability, mainly through shifting from low-value staples to higher-valued 
commodities, with the overall objective of empowering farmers. As a reminder, it is 
imperative to point out that the NAADS programme case study sheds light on the 
current policy optimism encouraged by development practitioners and development 
agencies such as the World Bank and IMF – the notion that participation encourages 
citizens to communicate their preferences, demands, interests, needs, and collective 
problems and aspirations in relation to those in charge of public policy (Chambers, 
1983; 1992; 1994a; b; c; 1997; Guijt & Shah, 1998; World Bank, 1994). The 
accompanying assumption is that effective and democratic participation leads to 
better development practices, although this is contested by analysts such as Coelho 
and Favareto (2010). 
 
Another assumption is that citizen participation in programmes denotes elevated 
levels of ownership, which yield development and also promote good governance 
(Guijt, 1998; World Bank, 1994). Yet in Chapter 2, there is evidence from some 
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authors to show that participation is often not functioning as the tool for liberation 
and distribution of power (and better, more sustainable and egalitarian development 
policies) that its rhetoric suggests. Instead, participatory processes have been 
commingled with a constellation of terms (such as ‘empowerment’) that are 
uncritically accepted as co-occurring with participation (Cook & Kothari, 2001; 
Mosse, 2001; Christens & Speers, 2006). In light of such supportive, yet ambiguous 
views, the following sections focus on the Agricultural Extension Services (AES) 
juxtaposed with citizen participation in the NAADS programme.  
 
4.2 The history of AES in relation to citizen participation 
The history of financing of agriculture extension services in Uganda dates back to 
the early years of the 19th century, when the first African agricultural research 
stations were established and new cash crops introduced (Kidd, 2001; Semana, 
2002).77 During colonialism, the AES and research stations were mainly to serve the 
interests of the then-British Protectorate (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). From the 
early days of colonialism up until the mid-1950s, the national extension service 
focused on the promotion of export crops, and adopted a coercive approach, in 
which sanctions and punishments were enforced through local chiefs (Bukenya, 
2010). However, in the 1960s that approach was replaced by an emphasis on 
inducing progressive farmers to adopt commodity approaches (Bukenya, 2010). In 
this period, extension services concentrated on providing technical knowledge and 
                                                            
77 See also for example Bukenya (2010), who points out that in Uganda, Agricultural Extension 
Services have been organised, managed and provided to farmers through the public extension 
system. 
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advice, together with support in terms of inputs and credit, to selected larger-scale 
farmers. This effort, it was hoped, would have a demonstration and multiplier effect 
in the general farming population (Byekwaso et al, 2004).  
 
The government extension service of the 1960s is generally considered to have 
functioned well (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001; Opio-odongo, 1996). However, 
this progress could not be sustained, due to political turmoil and economic decline 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Brock et al, 2002). The near-collapse of the formal sector 
of the economy provided an early opportunity for Community-Based Organisation 
(CBO) and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) initiatives to encroach on 
territory traditionally controlled by conventional agricultural service delivery 
organisations (Di John & Putzel, 2005; Opio-odongo, 1996). This was also a period in 
which farmer organisations such as cooperatives broadened the scope of their 
services to members, including (among others) training and input supply (Opio-
odongo, 1996). Public research and extension systems only resumed in the early 
1990s (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Bukenya, 2010).  
 
During the 1990s, after nearly two decades of almost-collapsed formal research and 
extension systems, the government of Uganda (in partnership with the World Bank) 
initiated a process to rebuild formal sector research and extension services in the 
country (Bukenya, 2010). These two systems were to remain separate entities 
administratively (Hall & Yoganand, 2004). On the side of research, in 1992 this 
process saw the creation by an Act of Parliament of a public research agency; the 
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National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO), which has since spearheaded 
agricultural research in the country.78 Until 1991 the delivery of public extension was 
achieved through parallel extension services in different government ministerial 
departments (Bukenya, 2010). Extension was thus characterised by duplication, 
conflict and confusion (Semana, 2002). In order to address these shortcomings, a new 
government policy sought ‘unification’ of the service in 1990, leading to the creation 
of a new Agriculture Ministry (Semana, 2002). This involved a merger of two 
previous ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Animal Industry 
and Fisheries – a recommendation by the Group B-a Task Force on the improvement 
of agricultural extension in Uganda, with financial support from the World Bank. 
Specifically, unification of the service was intended to rationalise and integrate the 
use of scarce resources, while also being aimed at professionalising extension 
education through learning and teaching (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). 
 
As part of this effort, the World Bank funded the Agricultural Extension Project 
(AEP), which began in 1992 and was implemented until 1998 (MoAAIF, 1998a; 
1998b). The AEP aimed at improving the organisation and management of extension 
services in Uganda. According to Bukenya (2010), attempts were made to move from 
centralised planning of extension programmes towards a more bottom-up process; 
to ensure a single line of command, and regular staff and farmer training activities, 
                                                            
78 The National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) is the apex body for guidance and 
coordination of all agricultural research activities in the national agricultural research system in 
Uganda. NARO is a Public Institution established by an Act of Parliament enacted on 21 November 
2005. 
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with farmer training achieved via scheduled staff visits; and to emphasise 
strengthening the research-extension linkage through involving relevant 
stakeholders. Apart from a few adaptations, the AEP was modelled on the basic 
principles of the Training and Visit (T&V) extension system, which from 1987 
became the predominant mode of public extension in Uganda (see Bukenya, 2010). It 
was a variant of an approach that had already been widely criticised (Hall & 
Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001).  
 
The main distinguishing features of the AEP concerned the extension approach it 
adopted. In line with the mission of the newly-created Agriculture Ministry 
(MoAAIF), the AEP used a Unified Extension Approach (UEP). The unified 
approach to service provision was deemed to be best suited to addressing farmer 
extension needs in a more holistic manner. This approach required that a single Field 
Extension Worker (FEW) handled all aspects of three key agricultural sub-sectors 
under the mandate of the country’s Agriculture Ministry, namely crops, livestock 
and fisheries production (MoAAIF, 1998; Friis-Hansen & Kisauzi, 2004). According 
to Bukenya (2010), this was intended to avoid sending conflicting messages to 
farmers through different extension agents working separately on crops, livestock, 
and fisheries. 
 
The Field Extension Workers’ (FEW) area of jurisdiction (operationally, a parish) was 
re-defined and renamed a ‘circle’, and consisted of 250-500 farm families (Kidd, 
2001). In keeping with the principle of promoting partnership and participation 
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through dialogue, this approach embraced the systematic clientele consultation 
methodology of involving beneficiaries in problem identification (MoAAIF, 1998a; 
1998b). This was achieved through the group approach. The contact groups 
comprised selected farmers among those in direct contact with FEW (MoAAIF, 
1998a). These groups also served as a means for FEW to reach other farmers in their 
areas (Bukenya, 2010; Kidd, 2001). Together with pre-season planning workshops for 
agricultural activities, clientele consultation was intended as a bottom-up planning 
process, thereby improving the relevance of the services (Bukenya, 2010).  
 
Semana (2002) argues that this kind of ‘participatory’ approach was also seen as a 
way of tapping into farmers’ indigenous knowledge, in a process that apparently 
involved working closely with research. Also, this period saw a revival of the 
educational approach to extension, involving appropriate training methods 
(Semana, 2002). Efforts to improve extension at field level also included the 
introduction of the Graduate Specialist Scheme by Central Government, which 
required local governments to recruit a graduate agricultural officer in each sub-
county (Kidd, 2001). These officers were each provided with a motor-cycle for field 
operations. There was a new emphasis on Subject Matter Specialists (SMSs) in areas 
such as agronomy and crop protection. These SMSs were supposed to provide 
technical backup to the FEWs, hand in hand with research and technology 
development activities. The scheme was overtaken by events, since plans to 
transform the public extension service into a NAADS-type extension system via the 
Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) were already at an advanced stage. In 
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these new plans, agricultural extension was seen as a critical factor in modernising 
Ugandan agriculture, an aspiration now gaining increased policy emphasis 
(MoAAIF, 1998b).  
 
According to Bukenya (2010), policy attention shifted from increasing agricultural 
production (with no direct link to market trends) to a market-oriented approach, 
including emphasis on post-harvest handling of agricultural produce. The marketing 
objective was seen as a springboard for commercialising the agricultural sector. 
Extension was seen as a way of linking the researcher, the farmer, the input supplier 
and the policy-maker (Bukenya, 2010). By 1998, Uganda’s Agriculture Ministry 
(MoAAIF) had identified some of the cardinal roles extension could play towards 
efforts to modernise agriculture in the country. Bukenya (2010) reports that 
extension was tasked with participation in technology generation and transfer, and 
with programme development and implementation – albeit, this time, with specific 
emphasis on fostering stakeholder interactions in technology generation and transfer 
activities, bottom-up planning, and systematic monitoring and evaluation of 
extension activities (see also MoAAIF, 1998b). Besides these established tasks, 
extension was also now expected to provide advice and technical guidance on 
extension interventions and methodology, to steer human resource development 
and management efforts, and to initiate human and social capital development at 
farmer level (Bukenya, 2010).79 
                                                            
79 A mid-term evaluation of the AEP reported some visible achievements, especially regarding farmer 
awareness and adoption of recommended practices and technologies. It also revealed some 
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In order to ensure greater inclusion of beneficiaries in extension planning and 
implementation, Bukenya (2010) notes, the new approach of Village Level 
Participatory Approach (VLPA) was incorporated into the project in August 1997. 
Uganda’s version of VLPA was based on the Village Participation in Rural 
Development model seen to have been successful in a number of West African 
countries (see World Bank, 1998; Chabeauf et al, 2004). VLPA aimed to support 
bottom-up planning through stimulating self-development processes within 
communities, and improved delivery of extension services, with the overall objective 
of involving the rural population in planning and implementation of local activities 
(World Bank, 2000; MoAAIF, 1998b). Because of its bottom-up approach and self-
development aims it was anticipated that VLPA would provide the foundation for a 
demand-driven extension service (MoAAIF, 1998b). Unfortunately the VLPA 
initiative was short-lived, and World Bank funding for the AEP ceased towards the 
end of 1998 (Bukenya, 2010).  
 
Notwithstanding some achievements, chiefly related to mobilising communities and 
giving farmers the opportunity to determine the extension agenda, the overall 
objective of empowering the rural population for self-development was never 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
shortcomings in the systemic consultation strategy and the approach generally (see MAAIF, 1998a, 
1998b). The report noted: inadequate involvement of farmers in extension programme development 
(i.e. limited to problem identification only), limited coverage of the farming population (i.e. 
concentration on members of contact groups, while these groups failed fully to deliver a multiplier 
effect), and the narrow scope of farm-level problems addressed (i.e. primarily focused on production-
related problems). 
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realised (Bukenya, 2010; World Bank, 1998; 2000). A key issue – unresolved by the 
VLPA experience – was “how grassroots organisations can be empowered to gain 
effective control over their front line extension staff” (World Bank, 1998). Addressing 
this issue was seen as the key to a genuinely demand-driven extension. Nor was 
demand generated during the process ever accompanied by the development of 
appropriate systems to address farmers’ need for high-quality advisory services, 
inputs, and credit and marketing facilities, thereby leaving farmers’ expectations 
largely unmet, and resulting in widespread frustration (World Bank, 2000). This 
raised an important participatory intervention issue: the need to differentiate 
between the relevance of a service (associated with target-group involvement in 
needs identification, through the use of Participatory Rural Appraisal-type tools) 
and the responsiveness of a service to the needs of the target group (Bukenya, 2010). 
The VLPA experience also provided a litmus test for a multi-sectoral approach to 
agricultural and rural development planning, as coordinated by the district 
agricultural production department. Real difficulties became apparent regarding 
coordination and cooperation between the staff of the different sector line 
departments (World Bank, 2000; 1998). 
 
Ostensibly, the evaluation of the AEP pointed to several deficiencies in the service 
delivery performance of T&V-style public extension systems. Key areas of concern 
were the limited farmer coverage, the heavily centralised and bureaucratic 
administrative system, and the efficiency and sustainability of the funding 
(Byekwaso et al, 2004; MoAAIF, 1998a; 1998b), as well as inadequate technical 
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support to field staff, who also lacked the necessary facilitation skills to deliver 
training with practical impact (Bukenya 2010). AEP did not adequately put farmer 
demand at the centre of service provision, in part because of too narrow a focus on 
agriculture (MoAAIF, 1998b), and because of a lack of tangible new technologies 
resulting from research (Bukenya, 2010). Indeed, this was the time of mounting 
criticism from and disillusionment of donor agencies concerning the traditional 
public extension services, usually modelled around the T&V system (Bukenya, 2010). 
Committed to a policy of decentralisation, the government embraced proposals to 
break up the previously centrally-controlled agricultural extension service and 
reorganise it into a series of District Extension Services, in the hope of addressing 
existing shortcomings. 
 
Farrington et al (2002) and Kidd (2001) explain that decentralisation meant 
devolving decision-making power to lower levels, and a substantial transfer of 
political, financial and planning responsibility to local governments. The intention 
was to promote popular participation and the empowerment of local people in 
development planning and decision-making (Kidd, 2001). The process of 
decentralising the extension service was completed in 1997. Agricultural extension 
services increasingly became the responsibility of District Local Governments 
(DLGs). This implied that from then on, the decision to make (or not to make) a 
budget allocation to extension belonged to the District Councils; that is, to a group of 
representatives elected by the rural population in their respective districts (World 
Bank, 1998). Around this time, the GoU (with World Bank support) launched the 
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Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) to devolve budgets and test 
alternative ways to deliver rural services (World Bank, 2002). Besides increased 
participation of local stakeholders, it was hoped that decentralisation of extension 
services would lead to improvements in service management (World Bank, 1998). 
Bukenya (2010) notes that there were some achievements in these areas, particularly 
regarding stakeholder and beneficiary involvement (see also Najjingo-Mangheni et 
al, 1999). 
 
In fact, Uganda is recognised for having implemented the most radical 
experimentation in decentralised extension of all the countries surveyed in a recent 
study (Farrington et al, 2002). But decentralising extension was not without 
complications. At the local or community level, for instance, the government’s 
intention to promote popular participation was apparently often misunderstood, 
and seen as the abandonment of rural areas by the centre (Farrington et al, 2002). At 
the institutional and operational level, on the other hand, decentralisation of 
extension services had some negative impact on extension training and field 
performance (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). These negative impacts were linked to 
the undesirable effects of other radical policy reforms, such as liberalisation, 
privatisation, down-sizing and retrenchment (Bukenya, 2010). In most instances, 
districts lacked the capacity not only to steer extension, but also to develop staff and 
provide logistical support for field operations. Combined with reduced recognition 
and reward for staff performance, such difficulties led to a drastic downturn in staff 
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morale, and ultimately to reduction in contact between staff and farmers (Bukenya, 
2010). 
 
During the late 1990s there was growing formal involvement of NGOs with other 
players in the system (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001). Pluralism in agricultural 
extension became a reality (Kidd, 2001), as donor-funded NGO projects in 
agriculture and rural development mushroomed. The same period witnessed a 
closer working relationship between NGOs and local government departments – 
extension in particular (Bukenya 2010). There were several cases of NGOs 
contracting public extension agents to deliver services in their programme areas 
(Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Friis-Hansen & Kisauzi, 2004; Kidd, 2001; Anderson & Van 
Crowder, 2000). These arrangements added to the salaries of the extension agents 
involved, while also providing them with operational support (Anderson & Van 
Crowder, 2000).80  
 
This situation shows that such collaboration was not without challenges and/or 
constraints (Bukenya, 2010). These related to inadequate financial capacity on the 
part of the local government department, varying levels of staff facilitation and 
motivation, dissatisfaction with NGO project allowances, and differences in work 
ethic and attitudes to work (Najjingo-Mangheni et al, 1999). The period was 
characterised by a range of extension approaches, including the farmer field school, 
                                                            
80 A typical example was that between a CARE Agricultural Innovations Project and two Local 
Governments (Bushenyi and Ntungamo districts)  
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and various strategies of farmer involvement, especially through group-based 
approaches (Bukenya, 2010). The overview above shows that over the years there 
have been several attempts to improve the country’s public agricultural extension 
service. These involved a gradual shift, from conventional extension approaches – 
based on the diffusion of innovation and Transfer of Technology (ToT) models 
(typically of the T&V extension type) – to approaches that embrace pluralism and 
participation of local-level stakeholders and target beneficiaries of services 
(Bukenya, 2010). 
 
Decentralisation of national extension services has been a central element in this 
shift, albeit accompanied by challenges and/or constraints. In fact, Bahigwa et al 
(2005) have shown that (over-) confidence in decentralisation as a mechanism for 
poverty reduction is misplaced in the current political context of Uganda. In terms of 
objectives and in spite of the reforms embraced in the 1990s, the role of extension has 
continued to be viewed primarily as that of ‘technology transfer’, almost exclusively 
focused on improving farm-level production activities (see also Bukenya, 2010; 
Sulaiman & Hall, 2002; 2005). Institutionally, in spite of the reorganisation of both 
the research and the extension systems, the broad hierarchical features of both 
research (technology development and testing) and extension (technology transfer) 
have remained largely unaltered (see also Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Hall & Nahdy, 
1999; Bukenya, 2010). 
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The same can also be said of the relationship between extension and the farmer, in 
which accountability and relevance remained weakly developed (Yoganand, 2004; 
Hall & Nahdy, 1999). In the case of extension, for instance, T&V-based extension 
approaches were not particularly interactive with farmers, or responsive to their 
needs, being constrained by the largely one-way transfer of pre-designed extension 
messages and technology packages (Bukenya, 2010). Hence, farmers generally 
remained passive recipients of a service not particularly responsive to the needs of 
resource-constrained farmers such as women and the youth. The situation was 
exacerbated by existing marketing and physical infrastructural constraints (Opio-
odongo, 1996). In the context of research, on the other hand, there is a tendency to 
blame the extension service (unfairly) for having failed to ‘sell’ technologies, even 
when such technologies were irrelevant to the socioeconomic circumstances of 
potential users (Opio-odongo, 1996). In respect of future strategies to ‘modernise’ 
Uganda’s agriculture in order to address widespread rural poverty, Opio-odongo 
(1996) notes the need for the agricultural service agencies to understand why those 
who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods continue to live in poverty, as a 
point of departure for further policies and strategies (NAADS, 2000; MoFPED, 2000c; 
2002; Mijumbi & Okidi, 2001; Wright et al, 1999; Bukenya, 2010). 
 
In fact, increasing productivity, ensuring sustainable use of natural resources, and 
reducing poverty have remained key challenges (Benin et al, 2007). The high levels 
of poverty in rural areas have been attributed to (among other reasons): (i) poor 
access to markets, due to inadequate infrastructure; (ii) low levels of education, 
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which impairs rapid technological change; and (iii) the prevalence of small-scale 
farming on very small land holdings, coupled with inadequate access to advice, 
finance and modern farming equipment (Appleton, 2001; Brock et al, 2002; Di John & 
Putzel, 2005). Agricultural productivity has stagnated or declined for most farmers, 
and declining soil fertility is perceived to be one of the major causes (Nkonya et al, 
2004; 2005a; 2005b; Deininger & Okidi, 2001; MoAAIF and MoFPED, 2000). The 
sporadic occurrence of security incidents and unrest in some parts of Uganda (the 
North) left the government’s budget skewed more towards defence than to 
agriculture, the backbone of the economy (Appleton, 2001; Collier & Reinikka, 2001; 
GoU, 2001). This situation has lowered the government’s ability to facilitate 
investment in poor small households, since Uganda relies heavily on subsistence 
agriculture production (Wright et al, 1999). The government’s failure to devise 
means of engaging citizens effectively in meaningful economic activities, coupled 
with the increasing rate of urban migration and the general effect of ill health, 
particularly of HIV/AIDS, has further hindered economic productivity (Nkusu, 
2004; Putzel, 2003; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002).  
 
Recognizing the importance of a multi-sectoral approach to reducing mass poverty, 
the Government of Uganda developed policies; notably (among others) the Medium 
Term Competitive Strategy (MTCS), from which macro-economic policy in the form 
of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was developed. The major objective 
of PEAP was to assist in reducing mass poverty and in raising smallholder-farmer 
household incomes, thus improving the quality of life of the vast majority of the 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
population. The primary strategy was to increase earnings from productive 
employment (including self-employment), with active participation by all 
stakeholders in economic decision-making. The PEAP was strongly supported by the 
donor community, whose influence led to Uganda being selected as one of the first 
beneficiaries of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt 
forgiveness, with debt relief of some US$347 million in 1998 and US$656 million in 
2000 (MoFPED, 2000d; NAADS, 2000; IMF, 1999). Uganda began directing resources 
from debt relief through the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) for social development, 
with particular focus on rural transformation and modernisation of agriculture 
(MoFPED, 2004; NAADS, 2000). 
 
Given this boost to resources, agricultural growth in Uganda rose steadily (over 4% 
per annum), with increased expansion of areas under cultivation; and the gains from 
the government policy of liberalisation of the economy led to substantial growth for 
some farmers (NAADS, 2000). Though expansion was observed in the agriculture 
sector, the resulting challenge was that the sector’s expansion created greater 
scarcity of land for meeting the demands of the ever-increasing population (Benin et 
al, 2007). Therefore, Uganda had to look for other sources of growth for the 
agricultural sector if rural development was to be realised. Through various 
‘consultations’ in search of alternative strategies for meeting the challenges of rural 
poverty, in the agriculture sector in particular, two possible sources of growth 
attracted immediate consideration. Firstly, there was the need for an increase in land 
and labour productivity; and secondly, the need for a shift in production patterns, 
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from low-value staples to higher-value commodities. At the same time, developing 
countries of the South were exposed to an increasingly fashionable international 
policy discourse on modernising their economies (Sulaiman & Hall, 2002). As a 
result, the GoU formulated a Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the 
key objectives of which were directed at increasing agricultural productivity and 
profitability, and shifting from low-value staples to higher-valued commodities 
(Oleru et al, 2005). 
 
The PMA aimed to transform Uganda’s ‘low-input/low-output’ agriculture into a 
modern, science-based, market-oriented agriculture,81 capable of sustaining growth 
in the sector and raising the incomes of rural families (DANIDA, 2005). To achieve 
this required better access to improved technologies, modern inputs and knowledge, 
in order to shift production patterns from low-value staples to higher-value 
commodities (Pasipanodya, 2010a; 2010b; Sabiiti et al, 2010). The intention was 
expand upon the tradition of partial market-orientation, by helping farmers to 
produce a variety of products with higher value for commercialisation, so as to 
increase their household incomes and food security (Ngaka, 2006). Some of the 
measures necessary to pursue this strategy were similar or complementary to those 
required for raising productivity. The farmers were to acquire knowledge on how to 
produce and market higher-value crops through improving access to the required 
inputs, as well as through the provision of reliable outlets for such products (Ngaka, 
                                                            
81 See The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries Uganda. 2002. The impact of 
HIV/AIDS on agricultural production and mainstreaming HIV/AIDS messages into agricultural 
extension in Uganda. 
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2006). However, PMA recognised other interventions outside agriculture that were 
needed to catalyse the agricultural transformation process: (i) increasing the 
efficiency of service delivery by deepening decentralisation; (ii) promoting the 
private sector’s role as the main engine of economic growth; (iii) developing markets 
to address food security, as opposed to emphasising self-sufficiency; (iv) enhancing 
and strengthening public participation in development processes; (v) promoting 
gender equity; (vi) developing markets and distribution chains for modern inputs 
and farm products; (vii) improving rural and agricultural education; (viii) having 
clear property rights to land, in order to encourage investment and efficient use of 
natural resources; and lastly (ix) developing rural infrastructure (see Bukenya, 
2010:36; NAADS, 2001).82 
 
These interventions subsequently became government’s key obligations, over and 
above creating a conducive policy environment for all the multi-sectoral 
interventions that would lead to the realisation of development objectives. There 
was also an urgent need to incorporate the private sector into the implementation of 
these interventions, for robust efficacy (Ngaka, 2006; DANIDA, 2005; Pasipanodya, 
2010a; 2010b; Sabiiti et al, 2010). It is notable that the PMA demanded the private 
sector get involved in activities and programmes such as research and extension, 
previously exclusively in the public sector domain. In 2000/1, various government 
departments, ministries, academics and donors designed the National Agriculture 
Advisory Services (NAADS) programme.  
                                                            
82 See MoAAIF, 2010. 
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4.3 The NAADS Programme 
The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) programme of Uganda is an 
innovative public/private extension service delivery approach, with the goal of 
increasing market-oriented agricultural production by empowering farmers to 
demand and control agricultural advisory services (Benin et al, 2007; MoAAIF, 2000; 
MoFPED, 2000). NAADS became operational in 2001, promoting the development of 
farmer organisations and empowering them to procure advisory services, manage 
linkages with marketing partners, and conduct demand-driven monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E)83 of the advisory services and their impacts (Benin et al, 2007).84  
 
To achieve this goal, the programme ensured that farmers applied improved 
husbandry and management practices, and identified and solved their technical and 
marketing problems using appropriate and modern knowledge and technologies. 
Some of these principles are particularly relevant to the purpose of this 
dissertation.85 These include poverty targeting,86 participation and farmer 
                                                            
83 Under monitoring and evaluation, records on delivery were to be benchmarked against inputs and 
the resultant achievement of output. The basic measurement period would be a semester. The logical 
framework would be drawn up so as to set out the inputs, the expected outputs and the main 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) indicators that would be used. Monitoring would be concerned 
with programme performance in delivery of individual services and supplies; timing and co-
ordination of activities; and impact, as set out in the logical framework and cost tables (see NAADS, 
2000). 
84 The first phase of NAADS (2001/2 to 2007/8) cost US$108 million – 80% from donors and 20% from 
government and farmers. The cost of the second phase (2010/1) is projected at 120 billion Ush 
(Uganda shillings) – 77% from the government and 23% from donors (Rwakabamba, 2011). 
85These principles were geared to the transformation of long-established attitudes, structures and 
practices hitherto used in the public management of the agricultural sector.  
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empowerment. In particular, it was intended that the planning, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluation of advisory services would shift to farmers, with local 
governments playing a predominantly facilitatory role (MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 
2000; Benin et al, 2007; NAADS Secretariat, 2000).87 The following section discusses 
the principles of the NAADS programme. 
 
4.3.1  Poverty targeting  
The principle of poverty targeting recognizes that poor farmers (especially women) 
constitute the majority of the farming population (see for example Brock et al, 2003; 
Ngaka, 2006; Bugembe et al, 2005; Jean-Yves, 2006; Appleton, 2001; Kayiizi-
Mugerwa, 2002; Kyesimire,1996). Formulated specifically to address what is seen as 
one of the underlying causes of poverty in Uganda – lack of access to agricultural 
information, knowledge and technology – the agricultural services under NAADS 
were intended to target poor farmers primarily (Bukenya, 2010). The poverty-
targeting aims of NAADS (and government policy more generally) recognise the 
gender-based nature of poverty in Uganda, a recognition that is indicated in the 
intention of NAADS to make all its interventions gender-sensitive and gender-
focused. It also recognizes the need to uplift both men and women, though 
understandably, greater attention is paid to women.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
86 The NAADS programme targets the economically-active poor – those with limited physical and 
financial assets, skills and knowledge, rather than destitute or large-scale farmers – through farmers’ 
forums based on specific profitable enterprises. 
87 This intention was embedded in the NAADS strategic framework, anchored in the PMA. 
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In addition, other categories of the poor – notably the youth, and people with 
disabilities – were also acknowledged to be less socially connected, and more effort 
was required on the part of programme staff to reach them (see for example 
NAADS, 2001). For this reason, these groups (also including women) are commonly 
referred to as ‘special interest groups’. Overall, through this principle, NAADS seeks 
to ensure the inclusion of all of its target group within its processes and practices. 
Yet NAADS also recognises the difficulty it is likely to face in trying to involve (and 
directly benefit) people with few or no assets (notably, land for farming), and that 
these groups might therefore require some kind of ‘social safety-net’ intervention.  
 
In this respect, NAADS sees greater benefit in targeting and benefiting the 
‘economically-active poor’: poor farmers who have some limited assets, skills and 
knowledge with which to create a livelihood (Appleton, 2001; Bukenya, 2010). This is 
the category of farmers generally described as ‘subsistence farmers’, and considered 
by policy to constitute the majority of country’s largely rural-based farmers (Nkusa, 
2004; Ngaka, 2006). In its intention to target the poor, as promoted by Uganda’s 
current national development framework, PEAP-NAADS assumes a clear 
relationship between poverty and the social/gender position of its target group 
(MoAAIF, 2000). 
 
4.3.2  Fostering participation 
The core constraint to participation, especially for rural farmers, has been the 
communication gap between the farmers and the development workers (Ramírez, 
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2005; NAADS, 2000). Consequently, many approaches were developed and applied 
for bringing the disparate voices of farmers into the rural development process. For 
instance, the provision of agricultural extension and other agricultural support 
services became the responsibility of local governments in 1997, as per the Local 
Government (LG) Act (Livingstone & Charlton, 2001; Benin et al, 2007). Yet several 
challenges to all-inclusive participation remain. For example, the proportion of 
district budgets allocated to agricultural production and marketing in three districts 
studied by Francis and James (2003) was 3% or less; while at the sub-county level, 
the proportions are even smaller. Extension agents surveyed in Tororo district felt 
that decentralisation had negative impacts on their ability to provide extension 
services (Enyipu et al, 2002). More generally, lack of funds and equipment to 
facilitate the work of extension agents is a common complaint at local government 
level, as is the programme’s failure to involve beneficiaries as main stakeholders 
during its planning phase (Sserunkuuma et al, 2001) 
 
A host of authors have accepted the principle that if development initiatives are to 
lead to lasting results, they ought to involve beneficiaries actively in identifying 
needs and setting priorities, formulating plans, and monitoring and evaluating 
outputs and outcomes (Fung & Wright, 2003; Gaventa, 2001; IDS Bulletin, 2004; 
World Bank, 2000a; IMF, 2006). In addition, participatory processes offer learning 
platforms for all involved. In fact, those implementing such programmes acquire 
better understanding of and insights into the vast wealth of what farmers know; and 
farmers gain confidence in the collective power they can wield to steer development 
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process in the direction of their choice, through substantive processes of 
participation (Francis & James, 2003).  
 
While the NAADS programme was not intended to be prescriptive on approach and 
methodology for participation, it embodied the principle in all its processes (OPM, 
2005; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). This was aimed at creating an environment for 
the evolution of appropriate participatory approaches, given the unique and diverse 
conditions faced by farmers in Uganda. Hence, the principle of participation aimed 
to make sure that all stakeholders (with the emphasis on beneficiaries) were 
involved in the programme implementation processes.  
 
4.3.3  Farmer empowerment 
Through the principle of farmer empowerment, NAADS embraced participation – 
purportedly to empower the recipients of its services. In line with this intention, 
NAADS policy promises include a commitment to actively involve all categories of 
farmers in identifying agricultural advisory service needs, setting priorities, 
formulating plans, and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes. It is hoped 
that by this involvement, farmers will acquire the necessary skills and capacity to 
articulate demands and manage the NAADS process (Bukenya, 2010). The 
empowerment principle, on the other hand, intends that farmers are to be enabled to 
control structures and processes that transform their natural resource assets into 
desired outcomes. This is to be achieved by assisting farmers to organise and create 
institutions through which they can act collectively and have their voices heard 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
within a deepened, decentralised decision-making process (Bukenya, 2010). Besides 
increased responsibility for the planning of services to be delivered by NAADS, 
farmers and their respective local governments are expected to make financial 
contributions towards service delivery through a matching grant arrangement. 
Contributing to the cost of services, popularly referred to as ‘co-funding’, is intended 
to stimulate farmer and local ownership of the NAADS programme.  
 
According to the NAADS policy framework, farmers will no longer be seen as mere 
beneficiaries, but more as users and clients of a service. It is hoped that this will 
enhance the capacity of the farmers to demand research and agricultural advisory 
services, and to access information and resources to influence policies that affect 
them; and hence, have control over the services delivered through NAADS. Farmer 
participation and empowerment are at the core of a strategy to develop a farmer-
owned and demand-driven extension service process (see NAADS, 2001; MoAAIF, 
2000; MoFPED, 2000; Bukenya, 2010).  
 
Yet delivering a demand-driven service presents an important challenge for 
NAADS, as well as for farmers. Farmers must not only be able and willing to 
articulate their needs, but should be allowed to do so. Equally, NAADS should not 
only be able to provide for the needs expressed by the farmers, but must also 
exercise the necessary flexibility to remain responsive (and hence relevant) to the 
needs of its target group in general, and the needs of specific sub-groups within that 
target group. It is in this regard that this study concerns itself first and foremost with 
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what it is that NAADS provides to its clients and the material aspect of the NAADS 
extension package; in particular, bearing in mind the resource-constrained situation 
of rural Uganda. While noting the relevant principles, it is equally important to 
understand how the programme is organised, managed and coordinated practically. 
The following section fleshes out the details.  
 
4.4 The NAADS institutional structure 
In order for the programme to be implemented, NAADS was officially constituted as 
a semi-autonomous public agency within the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries, and created by an Act of Parliament: the NAADS Act 2001 
(GoU, 2007).88 This Act stipulates the major institutions within NAADS and their 
respective roles. At the national level, MoAAIF has the national oversight of NAADS 
(GoU, 2007). NAADS has a Board of Directors, an autonomous body constituted 
under the MoAAIF and charged with coordination and guiding programme policy 
and strategy, working together with other government bodies (GoU, 2007). In day-
to-day management of NAADS business the Board is supported by a NAADS 
Secretariat, which provides policy guidance and operational support as well as 
ongoing evaluation and national-level planning.  
 
                                                            
88 As provided for in the Act, NAADS was established to replace the old extension system and to 
spearhead the promotion of market-oriented agriculture, and to provide for other matters related or 
incidental to farming. Unlike the old extension systems, the NAADS approach is to provide market-
oriented services by contracting service providers based at sub-county level and controlled by 
farmers. 
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At the operational level, NAADS administrative and coordination structures are 
integrated into the local government system, in accordance with the existing 
decentralised administration and service delivery framework (GoU, 2007; Bukenya, 
2010). The respective Local Government Councils at district and sub-county level 
(LC5 and LC3 respectively) have the responsibility of political oversight for the 
programme (MoAAIF, 2000; Nahdy, 2004), especially with regard to the use of 
public funds. This is ordinarily achieved through joint stakeholder programme 
monitoring and reviews. Besides the political oversight role, the district and sub-
county local governments are also expected to contribute 5% towards their 
respective annual NAADS budgets. 
 
However, from a technical and administrative point of view the overall 
responsibility for programme management and coordination in the district falls to 
the offices of the heads of civil administration at the district and sub-county levels, 
namely the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Sub-county Administrative 
Officer (SAO) respectively (Rwakakamba, 2011; GoU, 2007). Within the NAADS set-
up, however, day-to-day programme coordination is the responsibility of the 
district-based District NAADS Coordinator (DNC) and the locally-based Sub-county 
NAADS Coordinator (SNC) (Bukenya, 2010). These two work hand-in-hand, on a 
day-to-day basis, with their respective heads of Civil Administration and the 
(district and sub-county) farmer forums, to coordinate the implementation of 
programme activities (NAADS, 2000). In executing day-to-day responsibilities the 
DNC reports directly to the CAO, while the SNC reports to the SAO (GoU, 2007). In 
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this regard they are expected to work closely with the farmer forums, as well as with 
the staff of the relevant departments at the respective levels. District-level staff 
especially are occasionally involved in technical audits of goods and services 
contracted under NAADS, and in monitoring and evaluation activities (MoAAIF, 
2000; NAADS, 2000).  
 
At the sub-county level, involvement of other technical staff besides the SAO and the 
sub-accountant varies according to availability and capacity. Often, however, 
community development officers or assistants have participated in farmer-
institution developmental activities, usually working together with the staff of the 
participating NGOs (GoU, 2007). As noted earlier, the NAADS Act provided for the 
creation of farmer institutions which are the core institutions in the NAADS, charged 
with the responsibility of implementing the NAADS programme (NAADS, 2000). At 
the time of the inception of NAADS, two farmer institutions were put in place, 
namely the Grassroots Farmer Groups (GFG) and the Sub-county Farmer Forums 
(SFF).  
 
The grassroots farmer groups are recognised as the basic farmer institutions under 
NAADS (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2000). Being avenues for farmer participation and 
empowerment, the farmer groups have a crucial responsibility to implement 
NAADS programmatic ideas. They are also primary clients of the advisory services 
(Nahdy, 2004; MoAAIF, 2000). To be registered under NAADS (and become 
NAADS-affiliated), a farmer group is required to meet a number of criteria. These 
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initially included (would-be) members sharing common farming interests to do with 
a particular enterprise; having an Executive and a Constitution (specifying, 
especially, the objectives of the group, and a clear leadership structure); and the 
payment of a registration fee (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2000).  
 
In addition, in the course of participation in NAADS, groups are required to make 
contributions towards the collective cofounding obligation of farmer groups of 2% of 
the total sub-county NAADS budget (Rwakabamba, 2011). The contribution by 
individual farmer groups averages 10 000 to 30 000 Ush (Uganda shillings) per 
group per annum, but the actual amount varies according to the amount of money 
the sub-county has received from NAADS, and the number of groups formed.89 The 
farmer forums, which represent farmer groups at sub-county, district and national 
level, hold most power under the NAADS Act. They are major points for interaction 
between farmers, service providers, government officials, and the wider stakeholder 
community. The way in which farmer forums relate to the various levels of 
government is seen as a core control mechanism for the NAADS programme 
(Farrington et al, 2002; Kidd, 2001).  
 
A SFF is (presently) made up of two representatives from each registered farmer 
group. These representatives should meet twice a year to plan and review progress 
in NAADS implementation (See Bukenya, 2010; NAADS, 2000). The forum should 
                                                            
89 Approximately US$6 to US$18; although there is no officially-recommended size for a NAADS-
affiliated farmer group, such a group usually consists of more than 10 and fewer than 30 members. 
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have an elected chairperson, and two committees (an Executive Committee and a 
Procurement Committee), whose members are elected in a general assembly of the 
SFF (NAADS, 2000). Most of the powers of the forum reside in these two 
committees, the specific and distinct roles of which are spelled out in the NAADS 
Act. Although the NAADS guidelines require that at least one-third of the positions 
on the two committees are to be filled by women, in practice this requirement seems 
to have been applied more strictly in respect of membership on the Procurement 
Committee (see Bukenya, 2010). Membership of this committee also requires a 
minimum educational attainment of Senior Four (an Ordinary Level secondary 
certificate). Although all elected positions are voluntary, members have since 
received a token allowance for attending scheduled meetings, and for participating 
in programme monitoring and other related work. With NAADS founded on an 
interface with farmer groups at sub-county level, the sub-county is (institutionally) 
the most critical level for implementation (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Ramirez, 
2005).  
 
4.5 NAADS programme components and activities 
Since the launch of NAADS in 2001, its activities have been implemented through 
earmarked programme components (Bukenya, 2010).90 Generally, NAADS activities 
                                                            
90 The components include: (i) Advisory and information services to farmers (initial allocation from 
total budget: 65%), with generic output: appropriate advice and information made available to 
differentiated categories of farmers, in a cost-effective manner; (ii) Technology development and 
linkages with the markets (initial allocation from total budget: 6%), with generic output: appropriate 
technologies available to meet identified farmer needs; (iii) Quality assurance – regulation and 
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focus mainly on organising and strengthening farmer institutions, contracting 
private service providers to implement group/community-level training and 
demonstration activities, provision of inputs through technology promotion and/or 
multiplication (‘technology development’), and planning, monitoring, regulation 
and capacity-building at various levels (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Bukenya, 
2010).  
 
This dissertation concentrates specifically on some of the activities of two NAADS 
components, namely the advisory and information services and technology 
development, and linkages with market components. These are, respectively, the 
components via which farmers’ needs for advisory and information services and 
needs for technology-related inputs are addressed, in line with farmer enterprise 
interests. The same components are also relevant to the overall objective of this 
dissertation, which deals with issues of citizen engagement. The relevant, activities 
under each of the selected components are discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
technical auditing of the service providers (initial allocation from total budget: 1%), with generic 
output: quality of advice and information provided by service providers assured; (iv) Private sector 
institutional development (initial allocation from total budget: 3%), with generic output: capacity of 
private sector service providers to meet the identified farmer advice and information needs, 
sustainably enhanced; and (v) Programme management and monitoring (initial allocation from total 
budget: 15%), with generic output: appropriate institutional structures and capacity developed at all 
implementation levels to operate NAADS effectively (see for example MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; 
Bukenya, 2010). 
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4.5.1 Advisory and information services component 
In this component, the NAADS facilitates activities related directly to provision of 
services to farmers. These activities include farmer orientation and mobilisation, 
farmer group and forum formation, participatory planning (for enterprise selection 
and needs identification), contracting advisory and technology-related services, and 
monitoring of NAADS activities (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; GoU, 2007; 
Bukenya, 2010). As noted earlier, the key principles behind these activities are farmer 
empowerment and participation. Farmers, in collaboration with their respective sub-
county administrations, contract agricultural advisors to deliver priority services 
using funds sourced through a matching intra-governmental fiscal transfer 
mechanism from the national and district governments (Kidd, 2001; GoU, 2007; 
Bukenya, 2010). 
 
4.5.1.1  Farmer group and farmer forum formation 
Often preceded by farmer orientation and mobilisation activities, the farmer group 
and farmer forum formation activities involve capacity building intended to assist 
farmers in organising themselves to demand agricultural advisory and other 
services, and to monitor their own performance and that of the service providers 
(MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). These activities, commonly referred to as ‘farmer 
institutional development’, are seen as providing mechanisms for mobilising farmers 
to acquire basic attitudes and capacities that will enable them to appreciate NAADS 
principles and procedures; and ultimately, effectively to control NAADS (MoAAIF, 
2000; NAADS, 2001). The main areas of capacity building in this regard include 
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training farmers in skills related to institutional development (group dynamics, 
leadership, conflict resolution, constitutionalism and democratic methods of work in 
the groups, and business and market orientation), as well as facilitating key 
programme activities such as participatory planning, as specified in periodically-
issued NAADS guidelines (see Bukenya, 2010; Rwakakamba, 2011; MoAAIF, 2000). 
 
The farmer institutional development activities are supposed to be facilitated by 
participating NGOs, who enter into collaboration with the sub-county NAADS 
administration on signing a memorandum of understanding specifying the terms of 
engagement (NAADS, 2001). In principle, it is preferred that for an NGO to qualify 
to participate in this arrangement, it must be operating in a given sub-county at the 
time it first shows interest. This requirement is based on thinking outlined in the 
NAADS master document (MoAAIF, 2000) justifying the involvement of NGOs in 
implementing NAADS activities, on the basis of (for example) their expertise in 
mobilising local communities and implementing participatory approaches. An NGO 
already operating in an area is presumed to be familiar with the situation in the local 
communities (see also Bukenya, 2010). 
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4.5.1.2 Participatory planning,91 enterprise selection92 and needs identification 
The selection of enterprises is a stepwise process in which farmers (in their 
respective parishes) are guided to choose enterprises that have a competitive 
advantage, including market potential and low risk. The NAADS philosophy is to 
incorporate the principle of participation in all its processes and activities at various 
levels, including planning. It is important to note that in line with its 
commercialisation strategy for modernising the country’s agriculture, NAADS 
adopted a commodity-focused or ‘enterprise’ approach as the basis for generating 
and meeting farmers’ advisory and technology services needs (see MoAAIF, 2000; 
NAADS, 2001). Since the enterprise approach is based on the idea of promoting 
‘farming as business’, directing advisory and technology services to priority 
enterprises in each sub-county is a key feature of NAADS operations (see also 
Byekwaso et al, 2004).  
 
After the capacity building activities (described above) farmers – as members of 
groups within their respective communities – engage in a participatory planning 
process, which is likewise facilitated by the staff of the participating NGO. 
Essentially, this process is a series of exercises, during which farmers collectively 
select priority enterprises and identify the related constraints (actual and/or 
                                                            
91 It is mandatory for planning processes to be participatory, and plans are generated through group 
discussions (PRA-led) as well as through consensus building and collaborative learning approaches. 
92 An enterprise here refers to any farming and/or production activity in the area of crop and 
livestock production (including related processing activities) which enables farmers to earn an income 
from their produce. 
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perceived). Enterprise selection describes the process through which the farmers (as 
farmer groups and farmer forums) prioritise enterprises based on guidelines issued 
by the NAAD Secretariat – the NAADS criteria for enterprise selection (see MoAAIF, 
2000; NAADS, 2001). The guidelines specify both the number of enterprises allowed 
and the relevant parameters to be considered in their selection. With the exception of 
the second year of NAADS implementation (2002/03), the maximum number of 
enterprises supported with NAADS funds in a sub-county has been three.  
 
These guidelines are meant to ensure that the participatory planning processes take 
NAADS principles and objectives into consideration at every level, and thus provide 
some kind of ‘standardisation’ for these processes. The enterprises identified by 
participants (usually through ‘majority vote’) are subjected to weighted criteria in a 
ranking exercise. On the basis of greater weight given to the ‘profitability’ and 
‘marketability’ of an enterprise, the NAADS criteria favour commercially viable 
enterprises; notwithstanding the attention still to be paid to the level of cost and risk 
involved. The participatory planning process begins in a community meeting, which 
brings together the farmer groups in the respective parishes to express their 
preferred choice of enterprises (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). The outcomes are 
carried forward and concluded at sub-county level. Here, in a meeting which brings 
together the farmer forum leadership (and often a cross-section of farmer forum 
representatives) and the technical and administrative staff of the sub-county, the 
participants come up with the final list of priority enterprises for the sub-county. In 
principle, qualification for a particular enterprise to remain on the final list depends 
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very much on its sub-county-wide rating, as per the outcome of the process at the 
parish level.93  
 
The farmers’ participatory planning activities follow the NAADS annual planning 
cycle and are in line with the broader local government, decentralised, bottom-up 
planning framework. With the enterprise selection process repeated on an annual 
basis, the sub-counties can choose the same or new enterprises each year. This 
potentially allows some flexibility, and the possibility of broadening the scope of the 
enterprises (and hence farmer groups) that would, over time, benefit from NAADS 
services (see Bukenya, 2010). 
 
4.5.2 Technology development and market linkages component  
Technology development and enhancing linkages with markets are key aspects of 
the commercialisation strategy for transforming the agricultural sector (MoAAIF, 
2000; NAADS, 2001). In this regard, NAADS emphasises the need for the increased 
availability and use of productivity-enhancing technologies by farmers. To realise 
this, NAADS has the intention of building the capacity of farmers, to enable them to 
                                                            
93 However, Bukenya (2010) notes that decisions in this regard would at times be influenced by 
certain administrative and practical considerations. The constraints identified earlier (at the parish 
level) in respect of enterprises selected from the sub-county priority list, are subjected to further 
scrutiny. It is here that such constraints are passed for translation into agricultural advisory and/or 
technology service needs, which form the basis for the advisory service contracts and related 
technology ‘development’ contracts. Although the earlier documents refer to technology-related 
activities as technology ‘development’, in practice these activities are meant to demonstrate an 
improvement based on existing practices. For example, this might involve the introduction of a new 
animal breed or crop variety, with related management and agronomic practices. 
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drive the process of technology generation and development based on their 
expressed needs (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). As noted earlier, the technology 
needs of farmers are identified (together with their advisory services needs) in 
respect of the priority enterprises. The technology development contracts are 
likewise developed by the sub-counties, and issued to qualifying service providers 
for implementation. 
 
NAADs policies envisage that meeting farmers’ technology needs may require 
technology development, or testing and adaptation of available options. Technology 
development involves creating awareness about a new technology, and increasing 
farmers’ access and capacity to use and adapt it (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; 
Bukenya, 2010). The aim is to create demand for and increase adoption of the 
promoted technologies. This aim is seen as best achieved if effective linkages are 
established between farmers, advisors, and researchers, as well as with relevant 
markets. Accordingly, under this component NAADS has allocated funds to support 
the establishment of Technology Development Sites (TDSs) at various levels, namely 
the farmer group, sub-county and district levels.  
 
Two kinds of technology development activities are identified in this regard: on-
farm, and strategic technology development.94 The on-farm TDSs, to be hosted 
within a farmer group, are considered focal points for technology multiplication 
                                                            
94 Technology Development Sites (TDSs) would also be focal points for technology multiplication, 
demonstrations, training and dissemination (see for example NAADS, 2000). 
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and/or demonstration, as well as serving as sites for practical training (Bukenya, 
2010; Gou, 2007; NAADS, 2001). In principle the TDSs are hosted within farmer 
groups and are deemed to belong to the groups. It is therefore the responsibility of 
members to maintain the TDS. However, a host farmer within the group (usually the 
land owner) is presumed to have overall responsibility for day-to-day management 
of the site. NAADS support for TDSs is limited to advice and basic technology 
packages, paid for through technology development contracts. Decisions regarding 
disposal of produce are also the responsibility of group members themselves 
(MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). 
 
4.5.3  Approach to funding95 and delivery of (agricultural) services 
Funding and delivery of agricultural services under NAADS is based on new 
mechanisms for financing and delivery of extension services, in which responsibility 
and involvement are gradually shifted from the public sector to the private sector. In 
NAADS this shift in funding is anticipated to be a gradual process, whereas the shift 
in service delivery is to be more immediate, albeit still phased (MoAAIF, 2000; 
                                                            
95 At the inception of the programme, several donors indicated their financial commitment to the 
programme for periods of one to seven years, with further commitments to be confirmed by 
December 2000. Some of the donors who showed commitment to funding the programme included 
DANIDA, DFID, EC and many others. The World Bank would finance US$45 million of the 
programme, and this funding would be included in the national government contribution to the 
programme. This accounted for approximately 46% of the total national government programme 
funding. In addition, a combination of World Bank contributions and an IFAD loan of US$17.5 
million implies that other donors would be contributing US$23.8 million (NAADS, 2000). Each year 
the programme secretariat would submit the annual work programme and financial plans for the 
following year to the World Bank, including commitments from the other stakeholders to ensure 
adequate and timely counterpart funding (NAADS, 2000). 
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MoFPED, 2000; Kidd, 2001; Bahigwa et al, 2005; Nahdy, 2004). The government will 
provide firm commitments on the feasibility of achieving the planned financing 
targets. Expenditure savings with NAADS from reduced recurrent wage costs at the 
district level will be used to assist in meeting these funding requirements.96 
Importantly, the level of contribution will vary depending on the type of farmer, 
with subsistence farmers making only a small contribution, while the market-
oriented and commercial farmers contribute a larger percentage (NAADS, 2000). 
 
4.5.3.1 Funding 
The NAADS design proposes a budget for the NAADS programme raised under a 
co-funding arrangement (Rwakakamba, 2011). The relevant funds are expected to 
come from central government, local government (at district and sub-county level) 
and via contributions from development partners and farmers (MoAAIF, 2000; 
Nahdy, 2004). Under the initial arrangements government and farmers are expected 
to provide 20% of the total NAADS budget, and development partners 80%. Central 
government agencies share 8%, and district and sub-county local governments will 
each contribute 5%. Farmers will contribute 2% (Rwakakamba, 2011). The donor 
funding is to be pooled and passed through the government’s general budget (the 
‘common basket’) in the Finance Ministry (MoFPED). It will then be periodically 
disbursed to districts and subsequently to sub-counties (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 
2001; Nahdy 2004; Bukenya 2010; Rwakakamba, 2011). NAADS envisages that 
                                                            
96 Assumptions derived from an econometric analysis indicate that farm households participating in 
NAADS activities would have increased farm returns, and the capacity to contribute to the cost of the 
services. 
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within a 25-year period, public financing for the advisory service will be reduced to 
50%, with the rest expected to come from contributions by farmers (MoAAIF, 2000). 
Up to 77% of NAADS money is earmarked for the sub-counties, the bulk of which is 
pay for advisory services to farmers (Nahdy, 2004; Rwakakamba, 2011). The high 
share of NAADS funding that goes to the sub-county administrations is intended to 
support implementation at lower levels, in line with government’s decentralisation 
policy (Nahdy, 2004). Moreover, allocation of NAADS funds to sub-county 
administrations, who work together with farmers for (and make contracts with) the 
private service agencies, reflects a partial reversal of the flow of funds, a mechanism 
that is considered to strengthen the accountability of the service agents to their 
clients (Bukenya, 2010; Kidd, 2001:21). 
 
4.5.3.2  Services delivery 
NAADS has adopted a radical approach to the development of advisory services 
that goes beyond ‘business as usual,’ particularly in regard to the type of advice 
sought and the role of different actors (Kidd, 2001:18). NAADS particularly intends 
to expand the content of the advice to beyond the ‘traditional advice on productivity 
enhancing technologies and soil conservation’, to include marketing, storage and 
agro-processing information (Kidd, 2001:18). This is in accordance with the aim of 
changing the mode and goal of farming from subsistence to a market orientation 
(NAADS, 2004a). As already noted, farmers are to gain increased responsibility for 
planning the services they need, including monitoring and evaluation of contracts. 
They are to become clients for a service, rather than mere beneficiaries of charity, 
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thus shaping a demand-driven and farmer-led advisory service (MoAAIF, 2000; 
MoFPED, 2000; NAADS, 2004c:7). The ability of farmers to articulate their needs and 
make effective demands for advisory services (and, implicitly, for government 
funds) will depend very much upon their ability to organise themselves in groups 
(NAADS 2004b; Bahigwa et al, 2005). 
 
Service provision is to be ensured mainly through contractual arrangements with 
private sector providers or agencies, a strategy intended to increase relevance, 
efficiency and effectiveness of service provision (see Bukenya, 2010; Nahdy, 2004). 
The awarding of service contracts is (in principle) by means of competitive 
mechanisms, based on needs expressed by farmers through their representatives in 
the farmer forums (NAADS, 2004c; Bukenya, 2010; MoAAIF, 2000; Kidd, 2001; 
Nahdy, 2004). Offering farmers a chance to buy advisory and research services from 
any organisations of their choosing is viewed as a key novelty of the NAADS 
approach (Hall & Yoganand, 2004). The (private) service providers may be 
individuals, small groups of advisors, professionals, professional companies, 
parastatals, academic institutions or commercial companies. They may also be 
companies or individuals active in agricultural trading, input supply, produce 
marketing, processing or manufacturing (Nahdy, 2004). Civil society organisations 
(CSOs) are also expected to play a strong role in NAADS activities, through 
partnerships and letters of agreement (Bukenya, 2010). 
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NAADS implementation started in certain selected, ‘trailblazing’ districts. At 
commencement in 2001/2 Uganda had 56 districts, with the NAADS trailblazing 
period planned to last for two years. Since then, NAADS has been rolled out to cover 
all 79 districts in the country at the end of the first phase (2007/8). This rapid 
expansion of coverage, often cited as an important indicator of NAADS progress, 
has at times raised concerns about the somewhat haphazard manner in which 
NAADS has grown – apparently contrary to the original plan. This has been 
attributed to political pressure as well as to adjustment in the initial criteria for 
district participation in NAADS. For example, Bukenya (2010) notes that the initial 
criteria for selection of NAADS trailblazing districts emphasised regional 
representation and compliance with the Local Government Development Plan. 
Besides political pressure from members of parliament to have their own 
constituencies benefit from NAADS, sections of the donor community were 
concerned about the possible exclusion of the poorer districts obviously 
disadvantaged by the Local Government Development Plan compliance 
requirement, which emphasised certain capacities largely absent in poorer districts. 
This reportedly led to some adjustment in the earlier criteria, and the inclusion of a 
poverty index. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the reader with an entry point to the NAADS programme. 
The chapter summarised AES history in relation to citizen participation, as these 
pertain to development-oriented reforms within the agricultural sector of the public 
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service in Uganda. It also discussed the circumstances under which the NAADS 
programme was adopted, and drew attention to relevant principles employed; and 
then described programme organisation, management and coordination. Thereafter, 
the chapter evaluated the programme components and activities. The components 
include (i) advisory services and information services (that is, farmer group and 
farmer forum formation and participatory planning, enterprise selection, and needs 
identification); (ii) technology development and market linkage; and lastly, (iii) the 
approach to funding and delivery of funds was also given attention.  
 
This chapter also emphasised that agricultural extension services (and NAADS in 
particular) are aimed at alleviating poverty among Ugandan farmers through the 
commercialisation of agriculture. The programme has been described in normative 
terms (that is, in terms of how it is organised and how it is supposed to work). In the 
following two chapters the actual utilisation of the NAADS prototype will be 
analysed, via its impact on a representative group of elites and some at grassroots 
level. As discussed in the introduction, the aim of this chapter was mainly to 
introduce the NAADS programme’s official status as an example of a participatory 
development programme aimed at alleviating poverty. The following chapter 
focuses on the elite’s perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme, 
and analyses the type of participation in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYZING THE PERCEPTIONS OF ELITES ON DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN THE NAADS PROGRAMME 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the historical and developmental context of NAADS 
and how this led to the structure of the NAADS programme. It commenced by 
historicising the Agricultural Extension Services (AES) in relation to citizen 
participation. The chapter examined why NAADS was adopted; and more 
importantly, how it was implemented in various districts of Uganda. The chapter 
that follows is a qualitative analysis of the views of elites97 on participation in the 
NAADS programme. The analysis is done in line with Objective Four of this thesis, 
which seeks to analyse the elite’s perceptions of democracy and citizen participation 
in relation to the purportedly democratic development initiative of NAADS in 
Uganda as an emerging democracy.  
 
As discussed previously, if development initiatives are to lead to lasting results, they 
ought to involve beneficiaries actively in identifying needs, formulating plans, 
setting priorities and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes (Fung & 
Wright, 2003; Gaventa, 2001; IDS, 2004; World Bank, 2000a; IMF, 2006). As a result, 
there is a need to analyse whether this impact has been achieved, since the history of 
Agriculture Extension Services (AES) in relation to participation reminds us that 
                                                            
97 Elite perceptions, in this case, resulted from interviewing respondents in a non-standardised, 
individualised manner which involved face-to-face questioning of the respondents, as suggested by 
Johnson and Reynolds (2005). 
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during colonialism, the AES served the interests of the British Protectorate (see for 
example Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). According to Bukenya (2010) the emergence 
of the Village Level Participatory Approach (VLPA) hardly stimulated bottom-up 
planning and self-development processes; they were short-lived, despite the VLPA. 
This chapter determines whether or not this is the case with NAADS. 
 
The adoption of the NAADS programme also came with the difficulty of involving 
and directly benefiting people with few or no assets. The programme preferred to 
involve those people considered ‘economically active poor’. According to Bukenya 
(2010) the economically active poor are farmers who have some limited assets, skills 
and knowledge to create a livelihood. The problem with this policy is that the 
majority are the ‘less economically active poor’ (see Appleton, 2001). This modus 
operandi of the NAADS programme has generated controversy concerning levels of 
engagement in programme implementation since its inception in the 2001/2 
financial year98 (Rwakakamba, 2011). Some sections of the public in Uganda 
expressed their concerns through the media, often asking whether the programme 
had achieved its participatory objectives, and if participation in the programme had 
translated into empowerment for the beneficiaries.99 Others state that NAADS has 
                                                            
98 See The Daily Monitor ‘25 December 2009Eight NAADS Officials Arrested’, also The New Vision 6 
October 2009 ‘Sh355m NAADS Funds Recovered’, also The Daily Monitor 2 June 2009. ‘Minister to 
Arrest NAADS Officials’,  
99 According to the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda for the 2011 General 
Elections, most NRM candidates use government projects such as NAADS and the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund (NUSAF) as tools to persuade voters to vote for the NRM, should they wish to 
benefit from such projects. 
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barely served its purpose; instead, they argue, it has empowered a few farmers 
whose farms are used as demonstration centres, but has neglected the masses, failing 
to embrace and deepen an all-inclusive approach (see for example Rwakakamba, 
2011).  
 
These popular sentiments, then, justify a core question asked by this dissertation; 
that is, whether an upsurge in advocacy for all-inclusiveness in development in 
countries of the South has a direct correlation to ‘recipients’ actually receiving such 
development prescriptions. Therefore, this chapter seeks to establish the 
perspectives of the elites to these apparent contradictions in NAADS. Before 
discussing these perceptions, it is necessary to revisit the methodology employed to 
gather and interpret information. Qualitatively, several formal elite100 interviews 
were carried out with members of parliament, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries (MoAAIF) officials, NAADS secretariat officials, 
representatives of major political parties (NRM and FDC), and lastly, district and 
sub-county officials (see Figure 3 below). It should be noted that this categorisation 
of elites for interviews was in line with the programme’s institutional structure,101 
with the exception of the political party representatives. The programme has been 
created and run through a semi-autonomous public agency within the Ministry of 
                                                            
100 Many studies refer to elites as persons who are powerful and with considerable influence on 
collective decisions of central importance (Woods, 1998). This dissertation borrows from Dahl 
(1958:2), who considers elites as individuals within a specific political system who exercise power or 
influence over other actors in the system to some degree.  
101 See Section 4.4 of this dissertation for the detailed institutional structure of the NAADS 
programme.  
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Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries. It was created by an act of parliament, 
developed at national level, and executed through a decentralised framework (see 
GoU, 2007). Some of the groups of interviewees102 selected contributed to the 
planning and eventual implementation of the programme. The other categories were 
incorporated to increase the credibility and validity of the results (see for example 
Altrichter et al, 1996; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000; Cohen & 
Manion, 1986; Davids et al, 2005; Denzin, 1978; Mouton, 2001; Wood, 2001b).  
 
Figure 3 Groups of elites interviewed 
 
 
A set of uniform questions (variables) were grouped into thematic categories and 
discursively posed to elites. These questions were aimed at establishing (i) whether 
the government of Uganda, in its pursuit for micro-economic development 
intervention, had constructed a programme that involved people in its making and 
                                                            
102 See Figure 5.1. 
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implementation;103 (ii) how government achieved clarity and transparency on the 
structure and functions of the NAADS programme; (iii) what course the government 
took to promote effective participation; and (iv) what the challenges and barriers are 
that hinder effective participation in the NAADS programme.104 These were the core 
variables used to analyse the elite’s perceptions of democracy and citizen 
participation in NAADS. Below the core variables was a set of dependencies that 
guided the interview sessions with the elites.105 Note that the controversy 
surrounding the overall functioning of the NAADS programmes does not allow the 
researcher to name the elites who participated in the interviews. For the purpose of 
confidentiality, their views are collectively discussed. Figure 4 below shows the data 
transformations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
103 ‘Participation’, used in this context, reflects the narrow conception found in Robinson (1994), as 
described in Chapter 2. Participation takes place when people get involved in policy decisions and 
activities that affect their daily lives. The focus here is more on formal practices (such as planning, 
implementation and attending village meetings) than on informal ones (such as protests and 
demonstrations). 
104 See Figure 5.2. 
105 See Appendix A 
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Figure 4 Data transformations 
VARIABLE TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION 
Consultation /Citizen 
Participation 
In pursuit of a micro-economic development intervention, 
did the government construct a programme that involved 
people (beneficiaries) in the making and implementation 
thereof?  
Government 
Transparency 
How did the government achieve clarity and transparency 
on the structure and functions of the NAADS programme?  
Government Strategy What course did the government take to promote effective 
participation? 
Challenges  What are the challenges and barriers that hinder effective 
participation in the NAADS programme? 
 
This concludes the section on the methodology employed. The structure of the rest 
of the chapter is as follows: the first data to be presented is the views of government 
officials who participated in the study. This is followed by the views of the political 
party representatives who were interviewed. The last section of the chapter 
discusses the views of the Bushenyi district leaders.  
 
Certain issues concerning the nature and scope of this chapter must be brought to 
the reader’s attention. Firstly, this chapter acknowledges NAADS as an example of a 
participatory development initiative aimed at alleviating poverty, and it assesses the 
elites’ popular perceptions in relation to participatory development. Secondly, for 
reasons of confidentiality the respondents’ details are not divulged; the chapter 
refers only to the type of official. Thirdly, the information attained from interviews 
is not fully representative of all the elites linked to the NAADS; however, the views 
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given may help us to understand the general perceptions of elites on participation in 
the programme, at both national and local levels. 
 
5.2 Views from government officials  
Government officials interviewed included two members of parliament from 
Bushenyi District (referred to as MP-01 and MP-02 in the dissertation), three officials 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries, and 10 officials 
from the NAADS secretariat in Kampala. Government officials were included in this 
dissertation for a number of reasons. All government programmes are centrally 
planned and implemented by the appropriate ministry in a decentralised manner 
(see GoU, 2007). The MPs in this case were included because they play a crucial role 
in planning for government development programmes through various 
development committees at national level. The Ministry of Agriculture officials, on 
the other hand, were interviewed mainly because NAADS is a sub-component of the 
Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture, which is an important branch of MoAAIF. 
Lastly, officials from the NAADS secretariat were included chiefly because they 
oversee the activities of the entire programme, at national level. All the selected 
officials’ roles are stipulated in the NAADS Act of 2001 (see for example Benin et al, 
2007; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000; GoU, 2007). The following section discusses 
findings relating to the perceptions of government officials concerning citizen 
participation in relation to NAADS. 
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5.2.1 Perceptions of the members of parliament (MPs)106 
The two MPs interviewed stated that the NAADS programme was one of many 
programmes that the government established for promoting development through 
participatory processes at grassroots level (see also NAADS, 2001). They explained 
that when the government created the new system of local government based on 
local councils (LCs), one of its main goals was to involve people in decision-making 
processes. Therefore, the existence of LCs was a landmark victory for participation 
The councillors would forward the proceedings of LC meetings to their MPs, who in 
turn take the people’s views to parliament. The MPs pointed out that there was wide 
consultation with people before the establishment of the NAADS programme (MP-
01,14/07/2009; MP-02, 20/07/2009). 
 
When asked whether the people had the opportunity to influence the plans and 
priorities of government, the MPs replied that people were responsive and 
enthusiastic during the consultation processes. In addition, they claimed that during 
the initial phases of the programme, they (the MPs) were tasked with going to their 
constituencies and sensitising people about the NAADS programme and what it 
stood for; and the people’s input during these sessions was were profound. One of 
the MPs observed:  
 
                                                            
106 For reasons of confidentiality, government officials who participated in this research are not 
identified; their responses will be edited, and expressed verbatim where possible.  
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“...the people influence government decisions to a relatively great extent... 
current Uganda is not like how it was between mid-1960s and early 1980s, 
when people barely influenced and participated in government programmes as 
stakeholders; therefore, the progress of NAADS is a clear experiment of 
peoples contribution towards national development.” (MP-01,14/07/2009)  
 
In response to the question of government transparency, the MPs were hesitant to 
answer; for two reasons. Firstly, they seemed uncertain of the extent of government 
transparency in the initial phases of the programme. Secondly, the programme 
began when they were not yet representatives in parliament. However, they argued 
that the government had been transparent, especially in their advocacy for citizen 
participation, and also in marketing the NAADS programme. They gave an example: 
the ‘Prosperity for All’ (PFA)107 process, also known as ‘Bonna-Bagagawale’. This was 
a government initiative aimed at deepening Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
interventions at community and household level. Such initiatives were adopted to 
address structural bottlenecks in production and marketing (see Nabbumba, 2008). 
The MPs stated that the government had made sure that the programme was 
implemented at the district level, and with sub-counties being implementation 
centres (see also NAADS Act, 2001). This was seen as a clear demonstration that the 
                                                            
107 Prosperity For All was about wealth creation for all through market-led production, as a means of 
improving human development. The initiative represented the operationalisation of the ruling party’s 
Presidential Manifesto of 2006, which had as its slogan ‘Prosperity for All’, and which focused on 
promoting agricultural modernisation, export growth and industrialisation. Implementation began in 
the 2006/7 financial year. 
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government had implemented the programme transparently, so as to realise its 
objectives. They state further that the President consistently carried out campaigns 
throughout the country to sensitise the population and encourage participation in 
the NAADS programme, and in some cases success had been achieved. Asked how 
the people felt towards the programme, the MPs had mixed opinions. For example, 
MP-01 observed: 
 
“The people at that grassroots complained that the officials at the district and 
Sub-county had allowed those already with resources to participate more, 
hence neglecting the poorest of the poor... even those who participated have 
complained that they were being offered low quality agricultural inputs; a 
contradiction to what NAADS was established to solve.” (MP-01, 14/07/2009)  
 
The other Member of Parliament (MP-02) noted: 
 
“...the people were satisfied, especially those who participated in the 
programme... the programme is constantly criticised;108 such is a clear 
indication that the people have the liberty to critique development 
programmes which in the long run would to translate into efficiency and 
development... the NAADS programme has been criticised because of 
                                                            
108 See The New Vision 15th July 2010: NAADS programme under review. The article highlights how 
President Yoweri Museveni halted the release of the NAADS funds over mismanagement.  
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mismanagement, corruption, elite-driven and the failure to deliver on its 
promised objectives on national level.”109 (MP-02, 20/07/2009)  
 
In addition, the MPs were optimistic about decentralisation policy and its emphasis 
on full citizen participation.  They pointed out that not only did the policy encourage 
participation in local government, it also made people stakeholders in development 
activities at local level (see also Anthony, 1995; 1998; Nsubuga, 2004; Rugambwa, 
2004; Sabiti, 1998; Soren, 1996; Tukahebwa, 1998). The MPs observations should 
perhaps be benchmarked against their impressions of previous dictatorial regimes, 
in which participation was totally absent. However, neither MP commented on 
whether participation was all-inclusive and whether everybody (regardless of their 
social and economic standing) participated equally (see Appendix A). However, 
both MPs agreed that there has been some distorted information disseminated about 
the programme; something they attributed to district technocrats’ failure to sensitise 
the masses about the programme’s objective (MP-01,14/07/2009; MP-02, 
20/07/2009). One of the MPs observed that: 
 
“Besides low levels of sensitisation, there are cultural issues that have proved a 
hindrance to participation; for instance, interested women are not supported by 
their husbands to participate in the programme.” (MP-02, 20/07/2009)110  
                                                            
109 See also The Daily Monitor 10th August 2010: President accuses Jinja NAADS officers of failing 
programme. The Daily Monitor 8th May 2011: Budaka farmers up against NAADS fraud. 
110 Though the MPs made such claims, evidence from the district analytical report indicates that 
women have been participating. 
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In light of these remarks, Rwakakamba (2011) and Oleru et al (2005) remind us that 
there are power struggles within families, and that society hinders equitable 
development across genders. Both MPs agreed that there was a need for more 
sensitisation about the benefits of the programme as described in the NAADS 
strategic framework (MP-01, 14/07/2009; MP-02, 20/07/2009).  
 
Overall, it was clear that the MPs were satisfied with the progress of citizen 
participation in the NAADS programme. Their views suggest that government did 
involve people in decision-making and implementation, thus enabling the 
promotion of people’s power. The MPs also endorsed the process of implementation 
and decentralisation, and further indicated that the rural communities they 
represented seemed satisfied with such developments. However, the MPs did not 
clearly highlight the extent of inclusiveness of participation, especially with regard 
to gender. For example, they were how asked to explain how the NAADS 
programme had addressed the issues of gender, whether there are social cultural 
barriers that hinder women’s participation, and whether the NAADS programme 
had achieved its objectives (if any) in terms of addressing gender issues (see 
Appendix A). Not only did the MPs fail to point out how gender issues would be 
incorporated effectively into development programmes, they did not suggest 
alternative strategies on how citizen participation would be strengthened.111  
                                                            
111 This is in line with negative publicity on how decentralisation programmes have been held hostage 
by district elites countrywide, neglecting the poor. 
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5.2.2 Perceptions of the officials from MoAAIF112 
The responses from the MoAAIF officials resonated with those made by the MPs to 
the same questions. The three MoAAIF officials interviewed explained that the entire 
programme design – up to its final implementation – was a collaborative effort with 
all the stakeholders, including the foreign stakeholders (donors) who co-funded the 
programme (see also NAADS Act, 2001; NAADS, 2001; GoU, 2007; MoAAIF, 2000; 
MoFPED, 2000). The MoAAIF officials stated that all the stakeholders were 
consulted as the donors had proposed; that is, with the emphasis on beneficiaries. 
The donors emphasised a participatory approach to development, and significant 
emphasis was laid on the programme being all-inclusive at both design and 
implementation stages (see also NAADS Report, 2001). The officials observed that 
the shift from subsistence production to commercialised agriculture was seen from a 
technist perspective as the only option for boosting rural growth, since Uganda relies 
heavily on agriculture (see also Oleru et al, 2005; NAADS Act, 2001; NAADS, 2000). 
Therefore, there was a need to change the general trend from producing for 
consumption and selling the surplus to a situation in which large farms would be 
established for commercial production. The MoAAIF officials noted that this 
necessitated a programme to incorporate all the stakeholders in the implementation 
– especially the beneficiaries – in order for all to have a sense of ownership in the 
programme (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 
10/07/2009). One official from the ministry observed that: 
                                                            
112 This category of respondents was selected because they oversee all the national practicalities of 
agricultural development in Uganda.  
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“stakeholders participation was imbedded in the strategic planning of the 
NAADS programme... grassroots inclusion in the programme was not merely a 
result of need for technical support but also a key strategic aspect for the 
establishment of the programme.” (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009).  
 
On the issue of transparency, the MoAAIF officials were also supportive of the 
government openness to the entire NAADS programme. The MoAAIF officials 
argued that as they were the leading stakeholders in the programme, it was their 
obligation to make sure that the beneficiaries became part of the programme, from 
initiation through to implementation (see NAADS Act, 2001). The MoAAIF also gave 
guidelines on how the programme should run at district level, a responsibility they 
claim to continue to carry out today (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 
08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009)113 (see also NAADS Report, 2001; NAADS, 
2004b; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). However, when asked to explain the degree 
of beneficiary participation during the design of the programme at the national level, 
the MoAAIF officials’ responses were not conclusive. They argued that more 
consultations were done, mainly with expert planners and technists. This suggests 
                                                            
113 They pointed out that all-inclusive engagement in a country like Uganda, where the majority of the 
people live in rural areas, services would be a solution to the current development challenges. The 
officials claimed that citizen engagement in NAADS was the only way through which rural 
development can be transformed. They did not refer to other dynamics such as low levels of 
education, as suggested by Ngaka (2006), or poverty, put forward by Brock et al (2003), Nkusa (2004) 
and Allen (2002). Their failure to realise that in some areas of the country district technocrats have 
usurped development expertise while beneficiaries remain mere recipients suggests a denial of extant 
realities (see Rwakakamba, 2011).  
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that they neglected indigenous knowledge, substituting with technocrats’ ideas 
instead (Rwakakamba, 2011). Indeed, one of the officials pointed out that: 
 
“...it was difficult to identify which farmer would be involved in the 
programme, since farmers at the local levels differ significantly in terms of their 
production output and experience... at the same time they had a problem with 
financing farmers’ representatives to attend meetings, as the exercise would 
put a burden on the already strained budget for the programme; and as a 
result, the quality of all-inclusive participation was compromised.” MoAAIF-
02, 08/07/2009)  
 
Regarding challenges in implementation, MoAAIF responses suggested that the 
NAADS programme was not without challenges (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; 
MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009). The MoAAIF officials observed 
that from a technist perspective an obstacle was the inefficiency of untrained 
personnel, who could not easily interpret and translate the objectives of the 
programme. This observation by MoAAIF is shared by Francis and James (2003), 
Enyipu et al (2002), Sserunkuuma et al (2001), Benin et al (2007), Rwakakamba (2011) 
and Bukenya (2010), who report that sub-counties lacked the funds to support 
Community-Based Facilitators (CBFs), whose role it is to mobilise and train farmers 
for monitoring Technology Development Sites (TDSs). The MoAAIF officials also 
said that the programme has suffered from negative publicity from some sections of 
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society, especially by way of opposition from development activists and media114 
who considered NAADS to be another failed government programme – citing a 
complete lack of monitoring, or evaluation of mechanisms for monitoring progress 
(MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009). One 
official stated:  
 
“...some opinion polls suggest that the programme was imported by the 
government without establishing whether it would be embraced by the 
beneficiaries of whom the majority are subsistence illiterates rendering 
difficulty in its embracement” (MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009)  
 
In summary, the interviews with MoAAIF officials suggest that in their view the 
government constructed a programme that involved all stakeholders in decision-
making and implementation. This was achieved through decentralising the 
programme to district and later sub-county level. The MoAAIF officials also viewed 
government as having a transparent decentralisation policy, and further indicated 
that the grassroots were satisfied with this situation. However, the MoAAIF officials 
also pointed out that some sections of the public, especially the media and 
development activists, were cynical about participation in the NAADS programme. 
For example, one official observed:  
 
                                                            
114 On two occasions NAADS has been suspended by the president, citing corruption and 
mismanagement of the NAADS fund. This has contributed to the negative publicity surrounding the 
programme. 
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“the cynicism from the public about the functionality of the NAADS is 
partly a result of reported cases of abuse of office and resources by NAADS 
officials in some districts... this, indeed, has actually made the NAADS 
programme appear like a failed programme.” (MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009).  
 
5.2.3 Perceptions of NAADS Secretariat Officials (NSOs)115  
As previously mentioned, the NAADS Secretariat was established for the day-to-day 
management of NAADS business, providing policy guidance and operational 
support. The NAADS Secretariat offices are located in Kampala, the capital of 
Uganda. With assistance from one senior official at the Secretariat, the researcher 
was able to identify four other officials who had sufficient knowledge about the 
programme. The NSOs’ observations of the government’s efforts to encourage 
citizen participation in the NAADS programme were more or less the same as those 
made by the MoAAIF officials. The NSOs were of the view that the entire 
programme, from design to final implementation, was an all-inclusive exercise with 
all the stakeholders, as required by the NAADS Act of 2001 (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; 
NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). The NSOS pointed out that they were 
tasked with identifying possible stakeholders from the district, so as to get their 
input. The district representatives would then assist them in selecting farmer 
representatives to attend national meetings, making the whole process all-inclusive 
(NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). 
                                                            
115 These were incorporated purposely because they co-ordinate and oversee all activities of NAADS 
Programmes on a national level (See, NAADS Act 2001).  
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When asked to comment on how the government achieved clarity and transparency 
on the structure and functions of the NAADS programme, the NSOs fully 
acknowledged the government’s transparency in terms of implementing the NAADS 
programme. Indeed, remarks were made (by officials at different levels) in support 
of government’s efforts to make the NAADS programme participatory (NSO-01, 
23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). For example, one official 
observed: 
 
“our commitment as major stakeholder was to be as much transparent as 
possible… that is, incorporating all stakeholders and mainly beneficiaries of 
the programme at all phases, vertically and horizontally... we were to offer 
strategic guidelines for the proper functioning of the entire programme 
nationally.” (NSO-01, 23/07/2009).  
 
In fact, the NSOs collectively observed that their aim was to incorporate local 
knowledge, as it had been proven (in theory) in other parts of the world that citizen 
participation reconciles all development aspects into one domain (see King et al, 
1998). The NSOs claimed that because of full government support and continuous 
publicity, the programme was made part of ordinary people’s lives. The NSOs also 
indicated that the programme was initially run in only seven districts, and attracted 
wide citizen participation in those pilot areas (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 
28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). According to the NSOs, the high levels of 
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participation paved the way for the programme to extend its coverage to other parts 
of the country. Indeed, Bukenya (2010) and Rwakakamba (2011) observe that by 2008 
the programme had extended its services to 79 districts.  
 
Furthermore, the NSOs pointed out that when the government adopted their 
decentralisation policy in 1997, it became mandatory that government micro-
economic development interventions be executed through decentralisation (Local 
Government Act, 1997). Services were to be brought closer to the people. The NSOs 
stated that it became a priority that the NAADS programme ensured that services 
were taken closer to the people, and in this case the districts were the main focus. 
Later, the sub-counties would be the sites where the programme would be 
implemented. The NSOs were entirely optimistic about the positive effects of 
decentralisation on people’s participation. One of the officials, when asked to 
comment on what people said about the course the government took in adopting 
and establishing the NAADS programmes, observed: “Not only did NAADS 
encourage and increased participation; …it also made people stakeholders in 
development activities at the local level” (NSO-02, 28/07/2009).  
 
The NSOs were also keen to put on record that participation will only be fully 
effective when there is all-inclusive participation by all the stakeholders, and enough 
resources to run the programme efficiently. Some NSOs cited the recent 
incongruities in some districts, where programme facilitators have acted in a 
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contrary manner to what the programme stipulates, ignoring the guidelines as 
spelled out in the NAADS Act (2001) and the NAADS Report of 2000.116  
 
When asked whether the NAADS programme had encountered challenges to all-
inclusive participation, the officials did not hesitate to point out some major 
problems, from technical to logistical issues. More emphasis was put on the technical 
challenges faced by the programme; though the NSOs acknowledged that the 
logistical challenges cannot be underestimated. For example, one official commented 
that:  
 
“…we are faced with problem of [a lack of] fully trained Community Based 
Facilitators (CBFs), as well as Parish Coordinator Committees (PCCs), in many 
districts where the programme is being implemented... there is also shortage of 
staff at some of the newly-created rural district headquarters, to oversee the 
programme implementation in sub-counties.” (NSO-03, 31/07/2009).  
 
The NSOs also noted that most districts where the programme was being 
implemented lacked the financial resources to facilitate the availability of 
Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator Committees to farmers (NSO-
01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). In addition, the money 
allocated to some districts was not enough to meet the requirements of the willing 
                                                            
116 For example in October 2007 the NAADS programme was suspended by the president following 
irregularities within the procurement of NAADS inputs and the rampant corruption at the district 
and Sub-county that had marred the whole programme in the many parts of the country.  
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participants in the programme, and funds allocated to some districts did not reach 
the beneficiaries, as a result of corruption and mismanagement. The NSOs pointed 
out that in some areas, most of the funds are spent on ensuring the meetings and 
training of Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator Committees.  
 
These views are supported by recent media reports that in some districts (such as 
Apac, Alero and Anaka), NAADS officials have been arrested because of 
mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, the NSOs reported that some people 
were awarded tenders to purchase high quality agricultural inputs for the 
programme, but purchased low quality inputs. In a nutshell, the NSOs 
acknowledged some degree of participation in the programme; however, they were 
keen to point out that corruption and mismanagement at local levels has hindered 
all-inclusive participation in the NAADS programme (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 
28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). 
 
5.3 Views from political representatives  
This section presents findings from interviews with representatives of two major 
political parties: the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and the National 
Resistance Movement. Ten officials from each party were interviewed, all serving in 
various capacities at their district offices, and they were included in order to 
understand how they relate democracy and citizen participation to the NAADS 
programme. In some cases the views presented were obtained through discussions 
with two or three representatives; in others they are the testimony of individuals.  
 
 
 
 
210 
 
It should be noted that there are various political parties in the country; the reason 
for choosing these two political parties in particular is that the FDC is the strongest 
opposition party, while the NRM is the ruling party. The selected parties offer a 
strong basis for comparison. As a reminder, when the current government (the 
NRM) came to power, it introduced a single party movement system, and the entire 
population was assumed to be in that movement (Carbone, 2004). Since the advent 
of the multiparty dispensation, various political parties have been recognised and 
allowed to contest various leadership positions.117 The inclusion of political party 
representatives was sparked by the fact the NRM claims credit for establishing the 
NAADS programme. Opposing this view, the FDC claims that the NRM is using a 
national programme to facilitate its own political agenda. The following sections 
present some of the responses of the political party representatives who participated 
in the interviews.  
 
5.3.1 Perceptions from the FDC 
Uganda’s history of political instability only changed after 1986, when the current 
government came to power118 (Hansen & Michael, 1988; Ingham, 1983; Mamdani, 
                                                            
117The National Resistance Movement (NRM) is a party like any other under the current multi-party 
system, but holds a dominant position in comparison to other parties. Some critics claim that its 
dominance is based on voter manipulation, use of state resources to entrench its agenda, and use of 
the military to suppress those in opposition. See for example the Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011 
118 It should be noted that political instability has surfaced in Uganda once more; for instance, police 
brutality against ‘Walk to Work’ protesters. In addition, there has been mismanagement of funds; for 
example, The Weekly Observer, 22 May 2008: ‘CHOGM Scandal’; The East African, 14 September 
2008: ‘Uganda NSSF Scandal threatens to split NRM’; The New Vision, 3 June 2007: ‘Idolising GAVI 
suspects is double scandal’; The New Vision, 5 May 2000: ‘Prosecute Valley Dam Culprits’. 
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1976). The NRM single-party movement gave way to multi-partyism. The FDC party 
was born of this development, and its aim was to bring change. In the preamble of 
their constitution, the FDC claims that: “whereas poverty, ignorance, disease has 
afflicted the people of Uganda… they are committed to eradicating conditions which 
give rise to political instability and building a social-economic and political order 
which benefits all the people of Uganda”. These impressive intentions were to be 
achieved through: (i) uniting and facilitating reconciliation among the people of 
Uganda;119 (ii) achieving sustainable peace, development, and a culture of dialogue, 
compromise, tolerance and good governance; (iii) eliminating inequalities created by 
mismanagement of public affairs by anyone;120 (iv) fighting poverty, ignorance, 
disease, and all forms of discrimination; (v) establishing and maintaining good 
relationships between Uganda and her neighbours, and promoting sub-regional and 
regional integration efforts; (vi) acting as a platform for promoting democracy, good 
governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law; (vii) enhancing integrity, 
transparency, and accountability in the management of public affairs; (viii) 
strengthening the institutions of government and promoting the principle of 
separation of powers and democracy; and lastly, (ix) pursuing constitutional, non-
partisan and professional management of the public service, the army, the 
prison service, the police and other security organs. 
                                                            
119 For example, for the past two decades the northern part of Uganda has faced political instability 
from the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group that has led to many people in the region ending up 
in Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs), and also caused the loss of many lives.  
120 The gap between rich and poor is very wide. See for example the Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011 ‘In 
Uganda, demonstrators, police, soldiers share same fate.’ 
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The FDC representatives were asked if the current government had constructed a 
programme (NAADS) that involved people in decision-making and implementation. 
Their responses were very different from the responses from the MPs, MoAAIF and 
the NSOs. The FDC representatives claimed that overall, the programme gives more 
support to NRM supporters, and encourages their participation more than it does 
that of opposition members (FDC-01, 06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009). The 
FDC representatives cited examples of the President conducting countrywide tours, 
visiting farmers who are participating in the programme – but, they said, in most 
cases the farms he visits are those of NRM supporters. The FDC representatives 
claimed that anyone wanting to benefit from and participate in the NAADS 
programme needs to support NRM. One of the respondents observed that:  
 
“NAADS programme has failed to meet the people’s demands at the 
grassroots, due to the poor design which only benefits the elites, who work as 
coordinators and end up mismanaging and abusing the entire project... the 
middle men and the few elite have positioned themselves to suffocate the poor 
farmers and the youth who need the services.” (FDC-01, 06/08/2009)  
 
These comments contradict the observations made by the government officials. 
When asked if the programme involved people in its creation and implementation, 
they acknowledged that participation in the programme had occurred, though they 
claimed it was selective. For instance, one respondent claimed that:  
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“…from the district to sub-counties, those in opposition are in many cases 
sidelined... there is a lot of intrigue and corrupt officials in the NAADS 
programme who have embezzled government resources meant for national 
development” (FDC-02, 05/08/ 2009).  
 
These views, if correct, discredit the claimed efficiency of the NAADS programme; 
they also call for further investigation, as this is a national programme meant to 
benefit all citizens, regardless of their political affiliation (see NAADS Act, 2001). 
 
When the FDC respondents were asked to comment on government transparency 
regarding the roll-out of the programme, and people’s perceptions of it, they claimed 
that the programme was implemented transparently, but was not open to all the 
rural farmers that had supposedly been targeted. They claimed that few who 
participated in the programme were impressed with the programme, but those who 
were not in the programme were dissatisfied, especially when excluded on the basis 
of their political affiliation.121 The FDC respondents were unanimous in stating that 
FDC supporters in rural areas are dissatisfied and often barred from participating in 
national programmes (FDC-01, 06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009).  
 
                                                            
121 NAADS has featured prominently on President Museveni's agenda, especially on his countrywide 
tours promoting Prosperity-for-All. In most of the areas visited people are critical of the programme, 
saying the funds have benefited only local government officials. 
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While some FDC representatives were supportive of government’s establishment of 
the programme and of the mechanisms through which the programme was to be 
implemented, they still had concerns over the logistics of how the extension services 
benefits are being transferred from local governments to beneficiaries. The FDC 
representatives proposed a depoliticisation of national development programmes 
such as NAADS from political party agendas. Some of the FDC officials also pointed 
out that effective participation cannot take place when there is a high level of 
illiteracy among the grassroots. The FDC representatives suggested that the 
government should first eliminate inequalities created by mismanagement of public 
affairs, and sensitise the people on how to hold their leaders accountable (FDC-
01,06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009)  
 
In the opinion of the FDC representatives, participation has been ‘captured’ by the 
elites. The FDC claim that the elite’s ideas are sold to the vulnerable poor, who end 
up supporting them vehemently without questioning their validity. This elite 
capture has been documented in the literature on participation, in Uganda and 
elsewhere, in the emerging democracies of the South (Francis & James, 2003; Ngaka, 
2006). For example, Uganda has failed to devise and develop effective means 
through which citizen participation can be intrinsically embedded in national 
development programmes at the micro level. One of the FDC respondents said: 
“...when we try to advocate for effective participation in national development 
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programme, we are labelled as saboteurs of development by the ruling party.” 
(FDC-03, 05/08/2009).122  
 
The FDC representatives also noted some complex issues hindering effective 
participation not only in the national development programmes, but also in actively 
partisan participation politics. From a national perspective, the most important are 
disunity between various ethnic tribes, and the current government’s failure to 
reconcile such development obstacles, juxtaposed with achieving sustainable 
peace123 and a culture of dialogue and good governance. The FDC representatives 
stated that the government has failed to eliminate the gross inequalities created by 
mismanagement of public affairs and corruption that has become commonplace in 
the public sphere. Furthermore, corruption has caused discontent, especially among 
those who feel the government has not done enough to assist the poor, and has 
instead created “haves and have-nots”. The ‘haves’ have praised the government, 
while the ‘have nots’ have remained voiceless on national matters – especially those 
living in the rural areas of the country, such as Bushenyi. 
 
                                                            
122 Indeed, the President has proposed a bill that would deny bail to those considered economic 
saboteurs. See The Sunday Vision, 2 August 2011 ‘What Does The Proposed Amendment To Scrap 
Bail Mean For Uganda?’ See also The New Vision, 22 September 2011 ‘Museveni re-assures Ugandans 
on state of economy. 
123 These observations were contextualised and linked to the political instability that has characterised 
the Northern part of Uganda for the past two decades (the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict); as well 
as some parts of Western Uganda, where the Allied Democratic Forces had staged their bases. 
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In summary, the FDC representatives’ opinion was that participation has been 
hindered by poverty, ignorance, and partisan politics on the part of government. 
They blamed the NRM government for failure to provide basic services (especially to 
rural communities where the majority still live below the poverty line), and argued 
that even in the NAADS programme there are elements of discrimination, especially 
in relation to political affiliation. The FDC officials further observed that the avenues 
of participation created by the current government have been held hostage by 
morally deficient leaders at the local level (often referred to as ‘elites’) who are not 
accountable for their decisions. They suggested that for effective participation aimed 
at national development, there is need for strengthening institutions of government 
and promoting the principle of separation of powers, and for pursuing 
constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of the national 
programmes. 
 
5.3.2 Perceptions from the NRM 
The NRM brands itself as a broad-based, inclusive, democratic, non-sectarian, multi-
ideological, multi-interest and progressive mass organisation Enshrined in their 
constitution is the NRM’s ideal of transforming Uganda from a poor peasant society 
into a modern, industrial, united and prosperous society (Ngaka, 2006). The NRM 
party liberated Uganda from cyclic misery orchestrated by tyrannical leaders after 
her independence.124 The party also restored constitutionalism and the rule of law in 
Uganda. When the movement came to power in 1986, it was believed that Uganda 
                                                            
124 http://www.nrm.ug/details.php?catId=3 [Accessed 23 February 2010]. 
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was not ready for multi-party politics (Carbone, 2004). However, because of internal 
and external pressure exerted on the government, multi-partyism became 
unavoidable. Voting was restored and the previously dis-enfranchised people of 
Uganda (such as women, youth, disabled and the workers)125 were empowered. In 
addition to empowering the masses through voting and decentralising the provision 
of services up to village level,126 the party also allowed opposition elements to 
engage in the activities of the state, generating dialogue which led to some sort of 
political maturity. However, the NRM has recently been criticised for harassing the 
opposition, and displaying politically intolerant behaviour which, in essence, has 
infringed on freedom of speech and left democracy hanging by a thread.127 
 
Firstly, the representatives of the NRM noted that the party seeks to transform 
Uganda from a poor peasant society into a modern, industrial, united and 
prosperous society. They claim that this can only be attained through full 
cooperation with all the stakeholders in the development arena, and this is the 
reason the NAADS programme was made all-inclusive. The NRM representatives 
acknowledged that citizen participation in NAADS programme was a cornerstone of 
development. However, their interpretation of who should participate was 
ambiguous and unclear. Unsurprisingly, when asked if the government had 
constructed a programme that involved people in creation and implementation of 
                                                            
125 http://www.nrm.ug/details.php?catId=3 [Accessed 23 February 2010]. 
126 See the Decentralization Policy and Resistance Councils which later turned to Local Councils.  
127 See The Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011, ‘In Uganda, Demonstrators, Police, and Soldiers share same 
fate’ 
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the programme, their responses were very supportive of the government’s strategy. 
They pointed out that citizen participation in all aspects of government had been 
reinstated by the NRM. Their ideas of citizen participation are supported by authors 
such as Museveni (1992), Mamdani (1997), Anthony (1998) and Apter (1995). Indeed, 
the NRM representatives said that people have influenced various policy 
enactments. They cited the decentralisation policy, established as a result of 
widespread consultation with the masses. They further pointed out that the 
decentralisation policy was to act as an engine that would propel participation at 
local level. Therefore, they claimed that citizen participation in the NAADS 
programme was only one instance among many in which citizen participation is a 
key priority. The belief held by the majority of the NRM respondents interviewed is 
that all the programmes established by the government have involved people in 
their creation and implementation, ultimately promoting people’s power (NRM-01, 
02, 03, 29/07/2009).  
 
To the question of government transparency, the NRM representatives responded 
that people were satisfied with what the government was doing in involving them in 
development activities (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). The respondents seem to have 
benchmarked the current government against previous, dictatorial regimes, under 
which participation was minimal, if not completely lacking.128 They state that 
through decentralisation, local councils have been able to draft plans and 
                                                            
128 The “invited” or “created” spaces of participation in previous regimes were not underutilized but 
also in many cases for symbolic purposes.  
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programmes for their local economic development. They also said that through local 
councils, grassroots views are easily represented at the district council assemblies 
(NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). They also stated that the government has been 
transparent in all its programmes; for example Entadikwa (Starting Capital), Bonna-
bagagawale (Prosperity for All), Universal Primary Education (UPE), Universal 
Secondary Education (USE) and the NAADS programme, to mention but a few.129 
However, they claimed that some of these well-intentioned programmes had been 
victims of negative media publicity, as some sections of society had failed to grasp 
their ideological nature. Nonetheless, in their opinion the majority of the people in 
the country were satisfied with the current government’s openness, in contrast with 
previous regimes. 
 
When asked what people say about the course that government took towards being 
transparent about decentralisation, the NRM representatives (unlike their opposition 
counterparts) said that their party is guided by the ideals enshrined in their 
constitution; that is, it is an inclusive, democratic, non-sectarian, multi-ideological, 
multi-interest and progressive mass organisation. The NRM representatives claimed 
that transparency and effective participation is encouraged and promoted in 
development activities (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). In an attempt to substantiate 
his views on the course the government took in terms of transparency, one NRM 
                                                            
129 Most of these programmes have encountered severe critics from the various section of the society. 
Some have pointed out that these programmes have not been all inclusive in terms of participation, 
while others mention they have been top-down disguised as bottom-up in their conceptualization 
and implementation. 
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representative gave an incisive analysis of how the NRM government created spaces 
for effective participation. He observed: 
 
“...when the current government was still in the bush fighting for the liberation 
of Uganda in the early 80s, they established Resistance Councils (RCs)… these 
councils later became the centres of people’s will... the representatives were 
elected by the people;130 the lower RCs were for solving simple issues at the 
grassroots {level], while the upper councils would handle development aspects 
in the area… however, with time, these were transformed into Local Councils 
(LCs), and with the adoption of decentralisation policy, the guidelines for 
participation were amended... this ultimately led to full participation as 
evidenced currently.” (NRM-01, 29/07/2009) 
 
These observations suggest that the NRM representatives are convinced that 
government-devised decentralisation as the only mechanism through which 
effective participation could be achieved.  
 
Fourthly, on the challenges to participation, the NRM representatives stated that 
participation in NAADS programmes has been crippled by a multiplicity of factors, 
most notably corruption (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). They pointed out that 
President suspended the programme in October 2007, under corruption-related 
                                                            
130 The voting process was that candidates were nominated, and people would show their support by 
queuing behind the candidate of their choice.  
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circumstances. Furthermore, the NAADS programme has faced the challenge of lack 
of sufficient technical staff to support and monitor the progress of participation and 
overall functioning of the programmes at local level (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). This 
has had immense impact on effective participation, as those in charge of the 
programme at local level have often abused government resources meant for local 
farmers – resulting in resentment, and abandonment of the programme and other 
development activities.131  
 
In agreement with the opposition (FDC) officials, the NRM representatives also 
claimed that participation has been hindered by poverty (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). 
They observed that the majority of people who occupy the rural parts of country are 
illiterate peasants, who cannot easily interpret the government information 
available. As a result, it is difficult for them to participate. In turn, they claimed that 
the opposition spreads biased propaganda about government programmes, taking 
advantage of an illiterate electorate who then refuse to participate in some of the 
national programmes (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009; NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). In 
summary, it is therefore evident that the respondents from the FDC and the NRM 
blame each other for ineffective participation in government programmes in certain 
respects. However, if their differences were reconciled, perhaps effective 
participation would result; and translate into socio-economic development, 
especially in the rural communities of Uganda. 
                                                            
131 Even worse, in some cases the local people have alleged that the list of beneficiaries includes 
deceased persons. This prompted the President to order security personnel to verify the authenticity 
of the list of beneficiaries of the NAADS programme. 
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5.4 Views from Bushenyi District Leaders (BDL)132  
This section makes up the last part of the qualitative analysis of interviews. The 
previous categories of interviews were positioned at the national level, with the 
exception of those of the political parties. However, some of the observations made 
by interviewees were directly linked to what is happening at the local level. This 
section presents the interviews carried out with elites, categorised as Bushenyi 
District Leaders (BDL). The BDL interviewed were asked questions linked to data 
transformations, as illustrated in Figure 4. The BDL interviewed at this level 
included three District Councillors (DCs), and four representatives from the sub-
counties (SCRs)133. The last set of interviews was with three Bushenyi District 
Technocrats (BDT) serving in various capacities at district headquarters. These 
leaders are partly responsible for overseeing the smooth implementation at the 
NAADS programme at the local level. 
 
5.4.1 Perceptions of District Councillors (DCs)  
The DCs were included in the interviews mainly because they participate in 
communal development activities and in lower local government councils, and 
monitor service delivery in national priority programme areas. Their views were 
deemed pertinent because they act as intermediaries between local governments and 
                                                            
132 This section was incorporated in the qualitative analysis mainly because of the specificity of this 
dissertation. The views herein are from councillors, sub-county chiefs, and district technocrats from 
Bushenyi District.  
133 Two of each were from the counties of Igara East (Bumbaire and Kyabugimbi) and Igara West 
(Kyamuhunga and Nyabubaare). 
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the grassroots. Moreover, they serve on various committees for local economic 
development within various sectors, as designed and prioritised by the district and 
the in-line ministry. Like the previous interviewees, the DCs were asked if the 
government, in pursuit of micro-economic development, had consulted all the 
stakeholders in designing the NAADS programme. The DCs’ view was that most of 
the government programmes are inclusive of all stakeholders (BDL-01, 02, 03, DC-01, 
02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs pointed out that their existence is a result of 
government endeavours to extend participation to local levels. The DCs stated that 
they represent people’s views at various district committees; and in the process, the 
views of ordinary citizens are represented. When asked if the government had 
constructed a programme that involved people in creation and implementation, they 
pointed out that they were a result of the government’s decentralisation policy 
(BDL-01, 02, 03, DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). When asked if citizen participation in 
programmes empowers rural farmers, the DCs were supportive of the government 
programmes. For example, one DC interviewed observed that participation in the 
NAADS programmes had transformed some subsistence farmers into commercial 
producers, and their incomes have increased dramatically (BDL/DC-01, 
04/08/2009). Another councillor said:  
 
“…a farmer from the area he represents has not only been economically 
empowered through participation in the NAADS programmes, he has created 
jobs for people who work on his farms... and ultimately, their standards of 
living have changed from abject poverty to a situation where they can afford 
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some of the basic essential needs such as food, shelter and clothing.”134 
(BDL/DC-01, 04/08/2009) 
 
Secondly, most of the DCs interviewed were admiring of the government’s 
transparency, and said that the people they represent were impressed by the current 
government’s efforts at responsiveness, in contrast to those of the previous 
government. The DCs observed that (unlike previous, autocratic governments) the 
current government has created spaces for participation, as clearly stipulated by the 
Constitution of Uganda and the Local Government Act. Indeed, all three DCs 
reminisced about the wide-ranging consultation that took place before the 
constitution was adopted. This was aimed at promoting ‘people’s power’ and rule of 
law (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs went further, saying that when the 
decentralisation policy was adopted, it was a turning point for the government; it 
was then that they began to relinquish power to the ordinary citizen. Initially the 
people were sceptical about government efforts, unsurprisingly considering that 
Uganda had a military government before creating the space for electing 
representatives (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs argued that acts such as 
the election of constituent assembly (CA) delegates back in 1995 restored confidence 
among the people, and they began to realise that the NRM government was far more 
                                                            
134 To be exact, these claims were recurring from various councillors and also collectively hinted on 
the need for sensitisation of the rural masses which was the main challenge to development. 
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transparent than the previous governments (see for example Anthony, 1995; 1998).135 
Though two of the DCs gave the government credit for transparency, one was 
sceptical about how the current multi-partyism trend is evolving. According to him, 
government effort is directed more at increasing political party support than on 
service delivery (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009).  
 
Thirdly, the DCs stated that the people they represent were satisfied with the course 
the government had taken in promoting transparency through decentralisation. The 
DCs believe the people had significant influence on policy decisions in local councils, 
especially on the particular issues affecting their welfare. In their opinion, the people 
had a strong influence on law and order, security and even education (BDL/DC-01, 
02, 03, 04/08/2009). The fact that the DCs concede that people significantly 
influenced policy decisions means that the current Ugandan government differs 
from previous governments. Indeed, the contrast emphasises the uniqueness of 
Uganda’s circumstances as an emerging democracy.  
 
However, these responses from the DCs should not lead the reader to believe that 
the government has been as transparent as has been claimed. Their observations 
seem to be located within the commonly held wisdom that individuals with access to 
a variety of resources – especially financial resources – are expected to engage more 
in political activities than those with fewer resources. Previous research in Uganda 
                                                            
135 However, it should be noted that recently the NRM government has been accused of being 
dictatorial, and President Museveni has been criticised for being autocratic. See for example The Daily 
Monitor, 3 September 2011, ‘Museveni is Autocratic – Nagenda. 
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has drawn attention to this. For example, Devas and Grant (2003) argue that it is 
mainly affluent citizens who participate, and consequently wield substantial 
influence. Therefore, as far as democratic openness is concerned, one must view it as 
at least problematic that certain minority groups of people in society have captured a 
larger share of political influence than others – possibly even the majority share.136 
 
Lastly, the DCs stated that in some cases, the NAADS guidelines have been flouted 
and resources have been misappropriated. For example, they observed that 
procurement exhibited the highest number of irregularities at district level 
(BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). These events have not only reduced the rate of 
participation in the programme, but have also created losses of money that could 
have been recycled to other farmers, and increased participation. The DCs pointed 
out that rampant corruption prevails in other government initiatives in Uganda, and 
the NAADS programme is no exception. One of the councillors observed  
 
“...in fact, we are looking at another government programme characterised by 
mismanagement and corruption ... nothing unusual about it; but what is 
striking about the NAADS programme is that government has taken too long 
to look into issues bogging down the performance of the programme, which is 
supposed to improve produce revenue; not forgetting that the economy is 
driven by the agriculture sector.” (BDL/DC-03, 04/08/2009). 
                                                            
136 For example, if it is mainly rich and highly educated men who take part in democratic processes, 
then one cannot claim a successful case of democratic citizen engagement. 
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The councillors also stated that recently the president publicly berated corrupt 
officials and commissioned an inquiry into the programme in different parts of the 
country, sending a signal that frustrating the programme will not be tolerated 
(BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009).137 These observations show that the NAADS 
programme is not effectively manned currently. If the challenges facing NAADS are 
not handled expeditiously, citizen participation will remain at the pre-take-off stage 
of development.  
 
5.4.2 Perceptions of the Sub-County Representatives (SCRs) 
As previously noted in the account of the NAADS institutional structure, the 
programme is implemented at the sub-county level (See NAADS, 2001b; 
Pasipanodya, 2010a; 2010b; Allen, 2002). At sub-county level, the NAADS 
programme establishes Sub-County Farmer Forums (SCFFs) and Farmer Field 
Schools (FFSs) through which it reaches its objectives. The SCFFs are created by 
programme beneficiaries. The Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator 
Committees (PCCs) assist the SCFF members with interpreting NAADS programme 
implementation guidelines. As the NAADS implementation is unfolding, it is 
                                                            
137 The Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU) state that though the first phase (2001/2 to 2007/8) 
had an estimated cost of US$108 million, there is hardly any tangible result to show for the period. 
Agriculture – the leading employing sector – is still bedevilled by subsistence production, causing the 
majority of the population to live impoverished lives. After seven years of implementation the 
programme is yet to show significant results; 31% of the population are living below the poverty line, 
and the majority are involved in subsistence farming. NAADS is still the most suitable and quickest 
antidote to this problem, if only it could be implemented properly. 
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essential to establish how the SCRs view this process, since they are part of lower 
local government councils through which national development priority 
programmes are implemented. The following sections discuss SCR perceptions on 
democracy and citizen participation in relation to the NAADS programme.  
 
Firstly, the SCRs were asked if there was consultation and participation by potential 
beneficiaries before the adoption and implementation of the NAADS programme. 
This was aimed at establishing the SCRs’ familiarity with the NAADS programme. 
Indeed, the SCRs demonstrated vast knowledge of the programme’s functionality. 
The SCRs noted that the FFSs create graduates who later became driving forces in 
establishing farmer forums. They pointed out that the establishment of the NAADS 
programme was strongly influenced by high levels of poverty in many rural areas of 
the country, including Bushenyi (see Appendix E; Brock et al, 2002; Nkusu, 2004). 
The SCRs also observed that the nationwide NAADS programme had been 
hurriedly formed, with an external impetus; and that mobilisation through local 
government leaders appealed to the progressive elites, while the poorer sections of 
the population (female-headed households, the disabled and the elderly, among 
others) were perceived to be excluded (by way of both social exclusion and self-
exclusion) (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009; Bugembe et 
al, 2005; Ngaka, 2006). 
 
From these claims one may hypothesise that together, the combination of farmer 
empowerment through experiential learning in FFS groups, and subsequent 
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enhanced opportunities for access to demand-driven advisory services in NAADS 
groups, would be instrumental in reversing the high levels of poverty. The responses 
from the SCRs suggest that farmers were able to shift out of their poverty-stricken 
condition through their membership of FFS/NAADS groups. The SCRs also claimed 
that the people were empowered, given that FFS/NAADS group members differed 
significantly from non-group members in terms of well-being. The SCRs pointed out 
that the government was keen on adopting programmes such as NAADS that would 
assist in elevating the rural communities from poverty, and empower them socio-
economically (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009). 
 
Secondly, the SCRs indicated that the government had been transparent, and that 
citizens were satisfied with how it had emphasised participation in implementing 
programmes such as NAADS. The SCRs cited examples such as the FFSs, where 
recruitment was done on the basis of interest in learning new skills – among a range 
of different types of farmers, including many poor farmers; and the response to these 
calls was significant. To the SCRs, that was a clear indication that the people were 
supportive and acknowledged the transparency of the government (BDL/SCR-01, 
02, 05/08/2009). In addition, the SCRs revealed that the FFS groups experienced 
high turnover of members initially, with up to half the members leaving the group 
within the first year. The members leaving the groups became farmers, and their 
participation was viewed as a process of empowerment for the poor, who otherwise 
would have been unemployed and unable to extricate themselves from the cycle of 
poverty (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009). To 
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substantiate their claims, the SCRs indicated that some farmers have remained 
members of FFSs out of an interest in learning and a willingness to invest time and 
effort in carrying out joint activities in programmes that the government has made 
available to them (BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009). 
 
Thirdly, the SCRs reported that the NAADS programme had been used as an 
example of government efforts to decentralise development programmes. Using the 
metaphor of an open market, one SCR whose analysis caught the researcher’s 
attention observed that:  
 
“…in an open market situation, farmers’ need articulations are expressions of 
what farmers perceive as important to improving their livelihood, while 
farmers’ effective demands are an expression of the needs that farmers are 
willing to pay for.” (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009). 
 
This SCR pointed out that the farmers’ needs articulations under the NAADS 
programme differ from those of the free market in at least two ways. The demand-
driven advisory services as implemented in NAADS are intended to separate the 
functions of demand articulation from those of finance Farmers who are members of 
NAADS groups are only required to pay a symbolic fee to participate in the needs 
articulation process and receive advisory services. The membership in Bushenyi 
District is Ush2000 per year (US$1.20). For the country as a whole, farmers’ 
contributions amount to some 2% of the NAADS programme’s total costs, while the 
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other 98% is financed by the state and external loans and grants (see also Bukenya, 
2010; Rwakakamba, 2011; NAADS Report, 2000). It is clear that the low user fee 
influences farmers’ engagement with identifying and articulating needs, which is a 
clear manifestation of responsiveness (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009).  
 
The SCR continued his analysis by explaining that the NAADS rules and procedures 
set limits, and direct how farmers’ perceived needs are expressed and translated into 
demands for advisory services. The NAADS operational manual seems to set the 
rules for how the priority process is carried out and which criteria are to be used. 
Neither the processes involved in farmers’ needs articulation nor how these needs 
are translated into service provision contracts under the NAADS is adequately 
understood. Initial studies in Bushenyi District indicate room for improvement and a 
need for change. This sort of information was made available to people; however, 
there was a concern that in many cases, those in deep rural areas do not get sufficient 
information (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009). 
 
The last observation from the SCRs relates to challenges. The SCRs were also asked if 
the NAADS programme had encountered any challenges. Their responses were 
similar to those of previous interviewees. The SCRs stated that the programme had 
indeed encountered challenges, most notably a lack of sufficient funds for facilitating 
farmer’s needs and training Community Based Facilitators (CBFs). In addition, they 
complained that the funds available are spent on facilitating technical and logistical 
aspects of the programme (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 
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06/08/2009). They stated that beneficiary needs end up not being met as a result of 
these financial constraints. Furthermore, they were of the opinion that a Farmer 
Forum is an organisational unit at which farmers ought to be comfortable in 
articulating their perceived needs; yet they had observed that some farmers seem to 
have little ownership over the process of transforming the perceived needs into a 
few selected enterprises (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 
06/08/2009). According to the SCRs, farmers in forums are frustrated over the 
lengthy enterprise priority process (the whole process of need identification and 
enterprise selection takes six months), especially as the enterprises for which they 
receive advisory services are only rarely similar to those for which they articulated 
needs. This has not only been a challenge to the programme but also a constraint to 
participation. Overall, the SCRs acknowledged that there had been participation in 
the NAADS programmes. However, they pointed out that for a programme to be 
effectively transformative, priority should be given to addressing farmers’ needs – 
especially in the selection of the enterprises that farmers get involved in. 
 
5.4.3 Perceptions from the Bushenyi District Technocrats (BDTs)138 
This section offers views from the Bushenyi District Technocrats (BDTs). The BDTs 
were interviewed together at the district headquarters, and were included in the 
study for two reasons. Firstly, the NAADS programme in the district falls under 
‘production’, so the insights of the district production officers were thought to be 
                                                            
138 In this section, technocrats refer to individuals of the district who were interviewed that is, the 
district production officer, district NAADS coordinator and district population officer.  
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relevant. Secondly, the coordinator of the NAADS oversees all the activities of the 
programmes at the district level; therefore, his ideas on the overall functionality of 
the programme were pertinent. The district population officer is part of the district 
planning committee and therefore takes part in development planning interventions 
in the district, which is the reason he was interviewed. These technocrats were asked 
for their insights on the extent of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. 
The following section presents their perceptions. 
 
Firstly, the BDTs believed strongly in the government’s effort to construct a 
programme that involved people in creation and implementation. They argued that 
most of the government’s micro-economic programmes were informed by the 
demands of the people. Making reference to the NAADS, they observed that the 
programme had empowered farmers in many respects. Notably, (i) the programme 
led to the establishment of Farmer Interest Groups at different levels; (ii) a number of 
advisory services were established to assist with problem analysis and enterprise 
selection, with contracts signed with private service providers;139 and lastly, (iii) the 
zoning strategy was launched as a complementary programme to NAADS. 
(BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). 
 
                                                            
139 Currently, 879 farmers are visiting the Technology Development Sites and accessing advisory 
services from them.  
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Unequivocally, the technocrats held strong opinions on the government’s efforts to 
create a programme that would promote people’s power. The district NAADS 
coordinator observed  
 
“…that after the collapse of the Agricultural Extension Service (AES) between 
the 1970s and the 1980s, there was a vacuum on who should provide advisory 
services to Uganda… (considering that fact that rural Uganda is characterised 
by subsistence farming) …with the emergence of NAADS, I have no doubt that 
at least the previous services offered by AES have resurfaced.” (BDL/BDT-01, 
03/08/2009).140  
 
Similar observations were made by the other technocrats, all in support of the 
government’s strategy and showing clearly that the programmes have contributed 
greatly to the alleviation of poverty. For instance, the district production officer 
commented that programme participants’ livelihoods had increased (BDL/BDT-02, 
03/08/2009). The above observation from the BDT – if not for the purpose of siding 
with the government and creating a good impression of their work – suggests that 
the NAADS programme was participatory.141  
 
When asked to elaborate on government transparency and what people say about 
the NAADS Programme, there was some controversy. The BDTs claimed that there 
                                                            
140 See also Bukenya (2010). 
141 However, these opinions should not be accepted without reservation, unless measured against 
those of the programme beneficiaries, presented in Chapter 6.  
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was limited teamwork between the technical people and the political leaders of 
Bushenyi District (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). This hampered all-inclusive 
participation in the NAADS programme. In addition, some underlying issues from 
the government’s side were mentioned: the challenges of getting farmers to match 
the grants given, mainly because they are still poor; a reduction in tax collected, 
since the government scrapped graduated tax; and lack of qualified service 
providers to undertake advisory services. As a result, all-inclusive participation was 
compromised (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). 
 
Furthermore, the BDTs reported that some PMA components have not been 
implemented, despite being critical to the success of the NAADS programmes, 
especially rural finance, agro-marketing, and processing. The BDTs pointed out that 
farmers lack the credit to acquire technologies necessary for improved agriculture 
productivity, which further compromises all-inclusive participation (BDL/BDT-01, 
02, 03, 03/08/2009). According to the BDTs this has not only led to frustration and 
hindered the participation of the farmers and local leaders, but has also stalled actual 
transformation in the lives of the poorest of the poor in the district. In short, the 
technocrats proposed that the government should speedily implement the remaining 
PMA components.142  
 
                                                            
142 See also Nabbumba (2008) for the other components of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP).  
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Thirdly, the BDT were satisfied by the steps the government took to establish and 
later support the NAADS programme. They observed that the NAADS programme 
is highly appreciated by the farmers and other stakeholders, especially in the rural 
areas of the district, where it has taken root (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). The 
BDTs also referred to the current statistics of farmer participation in the 
programmes, which they claimed were a clear indication that the NAADS 
programme is doing well in Bushenyi District, with lessons and good practices 
emerging. They saw this as a reflection of the good working relationship between all 
the key NAADS stakeholders, and of the significance of decentralisation to 
development (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). 
 
The BDTs further observed that there was a very good working relationship between 
the technical staff and the political leaders, especially when it came to promoting 
transparency through effective participation (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). The 
inference was made that the NAADS programme has had an impact on farmers, 
which is evidenced by improved farming practices and increased productivity. The 
BDTs also pointed out that the NAADS programme through decentralisation 
performed well across boundaries, especially with gender issues (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 
03, 03/08/2009). For example, women, who were previously excluded from 
development programmes, have become active members of the farmer forums 
(BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). This has provided them with opportunities for 
generating income. Overall, the BDTs seemed satisfied with the extent of 
participation in the NAADS programme. 
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Like the elites interviewed previously, the BDTs conceded that the NAADS 
programme is not without challenges. They offered details of a number of challenges 
facing the programme. Firstly, misunderstanding and lack of appreciation by the 
political leaders regarding the policy design of the NAADS programme. The BDTs 
say that political leaders strongly believe that the NAADS programme should go 
beyond the advisory, to the extent of giving support to the farmers in the form of 
funding or small grants in order to be able to apply the knowledge and skills 
acquired (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).143 Yet this is not in line with the 
NAADS programme design.144  
 
Secondly, the BDTs pointed out that there was no monitoring framework for 
measuring the impact of the NAADS programme. They felt that the monitoring of 
the NAADS programme was currently weak, without performance indicators and 
external supervision. In addition, there is a lack of sufficient funds to facilitate 
logistical and technical issues for the smooth running of the programme. The final 
challenge that the BDTs mentioned was the reluctance of political leaders in 
promoting participation and assisting in the monitoring of the NAADS programme 
(BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). 
 
                                                            
143Political leaders felt that the social economic impact of the programme is minimal compared to the 
resources that are allocated. 
144 Such is made even worse with the absence of other Plan for Modernization of Agriculture 
components. 
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In light of these challenges, the BDTs were supportive of government endeavours to 
establish a programme that would empower citizens. However, they were also 
critical of the government for their failure to implement the other components of the 
NAADS programme. The BDTs proposed that for effective promotion of 
participation in the NAADS programme, the stakeholders ought to: (i) provide clear 
guidelines for the involvement and participation of political leaders; (ii) release 
funds to the district timeously to prevent delays in the implementation of planned 
activities; and lastly (iii) promote continuous dialogue and interaction between all 
stakeholders on the democratic progress of the NAADS programme (BDL/BDT-01, 
02, 03, 03/08/2009). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a qualitative report of information obtained from various 
individuals categorised as elites, from national to local level. The opening section of 
the chapter offered a brief description of the methodological orientation that the 
chapter took in order to arrive at the findings discussed. A set of uniform variables 
were grouped into thematic categories and discursively posed to elites. The 
questions were aimed at analysing the elites’ perceptions of democracy and citizen 
participation in a purportedly democratic development initiative (NAADS) in 
Uganda, as an emerging democracy. The analysis in this chapter was done through 
engaging with the responses of three categories of respondent, who were assumed to 
have sufficient knowledge of the NAADS programme adoption and subsequent 
implementation: (i) Government officials (MPs from Bushenyi, MoAAIF officials and 
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NAADS secretariat officials); (ii) Political party (FDC and NRM) leaders and 
Bushenyi District leaders (district councillors, sub-county representatives and 
district technocrats). 
 
The responses from government officials (MPs, MoAAIF and NSOs) present a 
compelling picture. The government officials were satisfied with the progress of 
citizen participation in the NAADS programme. Their views suggest that the 
government did involve people in decision-making and implementation, thus 
promoting people’s power; they also supported the government transparency 
concerning participatory development, and indicated that the people were satisfied 
as well. However, the government officials failed to explain the extent of the 
programme’s inclusivity, and how marginal groups would be incorporated 
effectively in the development programmes. The government officials were reluctant 
to propose alternative strategies on how all-inclusive participation could be 
strengthened. From their views, two subjective opinions are made. The first is that 
most of the government officials did not want to be critical of the NAADS 
programme; they claimed to have supported it fully, from design to implementation. 
The second is that they seemed convinced that the government had encouraged 
participation in the programme and that this had contributed to socio-economic 
development. It must be noted that some government officials believe that the 
grassroots need to be sensitised to development programmes, though they never 
stated whose responsibility this would be. Finally, some government officials were 
keen to point out that although the programme had been rolled out effectively in 
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some districts, it is still faced with the challenge of mismanagement at the district 
level. In turn, this mismanagement has impacted negatively on all-inclusive 
participation.  
 
The political party representatives, on the other hand, presented mixed reactions to 
the questions posed. The FDC respondents were critical of NAADS, but the NRM 
respondents appeared to have fully embraced the NAADS programme ideology. In 
summary, the FDC representatives stated that participation has been hindered by 
poverty, ignorance, and politically partisan participation. They pointed out elements 
of discrimination to participation in the programme with regard to political 
affiliation. Some FDC respondents claimed that the avenues of participation created 
by the current government have been held hostage by morally deficient and non-
accountable leaders at the local level (councillors and other district officials), often 
referred to as elites. They suggested that for effective participation aimed at national 
development to take place, there is a need for strengthening the institutions of 
government and promoting the principle of separation of powers, as well as for 
constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of the national 
programmes. On the other hand, some of the NRM respondents blamed the 
opposition for spreading negative propaganda that sabotages government 
programmes by taking advantage of illiterate grassroots, who in the end refuse to 
participate in some of the national programmes. However, the representatives of 
each political party blamed the other party for ineffective participation in the 
NAADS programme. If their differences could be settled, perhaps effective 
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participation would translate into socio-economic development, especially in the 
rural communities of Uganda. 
 
The Bushenyi District leaders also presented multiple views. For instance, the 
district councillors declared that participation in the programmes had been 
obstructed by mismanagement and corruption, which has marred the NAADS 
programme. Recently the president publicly berated corrupt officials for frustrating 
the programme, and commissioned an inquiry into the programme in different parts 
of the country. This means that the NAADS programme is currently not effectively 
manned. The sub-county representatives stated that NAADS should be an 
organisational unit through which farmers can comfortably articulate their perceived 
needs, but they seem to have little ownership over the process of transforming 
perceived needs into a few selected enterprises. Some SCRs observed that the 
farmers were frustrated by the lengthy enterprise priority process by which they 
receive advisory services. This has not only been a challenge; it is also a constraint to 
participation. The Bushenyi District technocrats, on the other hand, were critical of 
the government’s failure to implement the other components of the NAADS 
programme. They suggested that for effective participation to take precedence, 
NAADS should provide clear guidelines for the participation of political leaders, 
release funds to the district timeously to enable the implementation of planned 
activities, and promote continuous dialogue and interactions between the NAADS 
secretariat and the district stakeholders. 
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In the final analysis, the overriding impression from the majority of the elites 
interviewed is that they acknowledge that there is citizen participation in the 
NAADS programme.145 However, their acknowledgment seems to be sieved through 
a range of predefined ideological categories, under the guise of efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability. They seemed to be more concerned with getting the 
NAADS programme right, as required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised 
in the NAADS Report (2000), rather than with creating ties with the grassroots or 
promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities. 
This would create an opportunity to engage with the grassroots and establish how 
they perceive democracy and citizen participation in the purportedly democratic 
development initiative of NAADS, specifically in the Bushenyi district of Uganda. 
The following chapter quantitatively explores this tentative finding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
145 Some of the elites pointed out that participation indicates elevated levels of ownership among the 
participants, and has also yielded development. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GRASSROOTS PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN THE NAADS PROGRAMME 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed elites’ perceptions of participation in the NAADS 
programme in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty. This chapter 
quantitatively analyses grassroots perceptions of democracy and participation, using 
NAADS as an example of a participatory development programme. In this chapter, 
the word ‘grassroots’ is used to refer to underprivileged respondents from each of 
the selected sub-counties of Bushenyi. Throughout the chapter these respondents are 
categorised as NAADS Participants (NPs) and Non-NAADS Participants (N-NPs). 
The beginning of the chapter explains why Bushenyi District was selected as a case 
study area, and why the NAADS programme in particular was chosen. Thereafter, 
the discussion focuses on the methodology employed, covering how: (i) the 
objectives of the chapter were formulated; (ii) the selection of the survey and sample 
were designed; and (iii) how the data was collected and analysed using SPSS®; and 
the results are presented using the analytical framework. The chapter ends with 
some concluding remarks.  
 
6.2 Description of Bushenyi  
Bushenyi district is located in the south-western part of Uganda, and comprises two 
counties – Igara East and Igara West – and seven sub-counties; that is, Kyabugimbi, 
Kakaju, Kyamuhunga, Nyabubaare, Bushenyi-Ishaka Town Council, Bumbeire and 
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Kyeizooba.146 The district has a total population of 246 400.147 It is fairly well 
endowed with natural resources, and has relatively low poverty levels among its 
residents in semi-urban areas, but high levels of poverty in rural areas.148 The 
economy of the district is based largely on subsistence agriculture, and provides 
direct employment to 86.7% of the population. Bushenyi district implemented the 
NAADS programme in the 2002/3 financial year, to assist the farming community in 
moving from low to high agricultural productivity. The empirical analysis of 
grassroots understandings of citizen participation was done using a survey 
instrument that was developed and deployed in five selected sub-counties of the 
district149.The following sections set the methodological orientation of the process.  
 
6.3 Survey methodology 
While it may appear that conducting a survey is a simple procedure of asking 
questions and then compiling the answers to produce statistics, there are procedures 
and formulas to be followed if the results are to yield accurate and meaningful 
information (Statistics Canada, 2003; Fink, 2009; Yin, 2009; Groves, 1989; Moser & 
Kalton, 1971; Lyberg et al, 1997; Walsh, 2009). According to Fink (2009:1), surveys are 
used to collect information from or about people, to describe, compare, or explain 
                                                            
146 See the map of Bushenyi for the geographical detail. 
147 Bushenyi’s population is anticipated to reach 251 400 by 2012 (see Appendix C). 
148 See Appendix E for causes and effects of poverty on the population of Bushenyi District.  
149 The selected sub-counties included Kyabugimbi, Kyamuhunga, Kyeizooba, Bumbeire and 
Nyabubaare. 
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their knowledge, feelings, values and behaviour. In this case, self-administered 
questionnaires were used. 
 
6.3.1 Formulation of the objective 
As previously noted, the broad objective of the chapter is to quantitatively analyse 
grassroots perceptions on democracy and participation. This analysis is done 
through interrogating grassroots communities (both NPs and N-NPs) on their 
perceptions of generic forms of democracy and participation; participation in 
relation to the NAADS programme; and lastly, the impact of NAADS on the socio-
economic realities of participants, in Bushenyi and in a broader context. The most 
important task in a survey is to formulate the statement of objectives (Statistics 
Canada, 2003). The objectives not only illustrate the survey’s broad information 
needs, but also the operational definitions to be used, the specific topics to be 
addressed and the analysis plan (Groves, 1989; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Lyberg et al, 
1997).  
6.3.2 Selection of a survey and sample design  
Sampling in a survey can be divided into two categories: random and non-random 
samples (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Särndal et al, 1992; 
Satin & Shastry, 1993; Lessler & Kalsbeek, 1992; Fuller, 1987; Gosselin et al, 1978; 
Fink, 2009). In this research, non-random sampling was preferred as a survey 
method because it provided a fast, easy and inexpensive way of selecting units from 
the population (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Statistics 
Canada, 2003) Figure 5 describes the sources of data. 
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Figure 5: Sources of data 
 
NPs = NAADS Participants  
N-NPs = Non-NAADS Participants  
 
The research is based on a sample size of 311 respondents from Bushenyi district, as 
illustrated in Figure 5 above. These respondents included both NPs and N-NPs. The 
respondents were selected from the two counties of Bushenyi, Igara East and Igara 
West. From the two counties, a choice was made to select three sub-counties from 
Igara East and two sub-counties from Igara West. An equal number of respondents 
was selected from each of the selected sub-counties. The actual sample size in each of 
the sub-counties ranges from 60 to 66 respondents. Half of the respondents in each 
sub-county were NPs while the other half were N-NPs. The inclusion of N-NPs was 
premised on the need to be able to analyse the impact of NAADS through a 
comparison of perceptions of NPs and N-NPs. In order to get results of sufficient 
depth to allow comparison of the categories of respondents’ perceptions, the 
Bushenyi District (311) 
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researcher thought it pertinent to include many questions on participation generally. 
This was done chiefly to establish NP and N-NP attitudes to generic forms of 
democracy and participation, as background to their involvement (or lack thereof) in 
NAADS.  
 
From the list of farmer forums in each of the selected sub-counties, the researcher 
selected five. In each forum (with the help of the forum chairperson), the researcher 
was able to identify five or six members (NPs) to whom self-administered 
questionnaires were given. The total number of respondents (NPs) from all the 
farmer forums was 155. N-NPs were selected by issuing the questionnaire to any 
persons above 18 years of age in each of the areas where farmer forums were 
selected. The total number of N-NPs was 156. During interviews, for questions that 
required clarification, NPs and N-NPs were assisted through personal contact with 
research assistants.  
 
6.3.3 Data collection, analysis and presentation of results 
For this research, data collection involved filling in the questionnaire. Data editing 
and imputation was purposely done to check for missing, invalid or inconsistent 
entries, pointing to data records that were potentially in error. Data was captured in 
SPSS® computer software. After resolving all the errors that emerged, the data was 
ready for analysis. Data analysis was carried out using the descriptive statistics 
function in SPSS® to derive frequency statistics relating to the target variables.  
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Many authors state that data analysis is one of the most crucial steps of a survey, 
since the quality of the analysis can substantially affect the usefulness of the whole 
survey (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Lessler & Kalsbeek, 
1992; Fuller, 1987; Gosselin et al, 1978). However, data analysis may be restricted to 
the survey data alone, or it may compare the survey’s estimates with results 
obtained from other surveys or data sources. The data in this research is summarised 
and illustrated in Figures and Tables in the chapter. As previously noted, the 
questionnaire (see Appendix B) was designed (among other reasons) to demonstrate 
grassroots understanding of democracy and citizen participation in using the 
NAADS programme. To that end, the data presented below relates to the following 
themes: (i) grassroots popular perceptions on generic forms of democracy and 
citizen participation; (iii) participation in relation to the NAADS programme; and 
lastly (iii) the impact of NAADS on material reality for NPs in Bushenyi and in a 
broader context. As a reminder, it should be noted that in some sections results are 
disaggregated to show the statistical differential effect among the NP and N-NP 
response intervals. 
 
 6.4 Grassroots popular perceptions on generic forms of participation 
This section covers grassroots popular perceptions of generic forms of democracy 
and participation. These forms of democracy and participation are measured by 
what people reveal about what they do and how they see themselves, their 
communities and their citizenship. The questions in this section were based on 
attitudes to democracy and rights, and the practice of these, which reflects notions of 
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citizenship. There are also questions about political agency, which refer to what 
people do as citizens. From this collation of questions it is possible to build a picture 
of political attitudes and practices which will tell us a lot about the grassroots and 
their understanding of citizenship.  
 
6.4.1 Exploring grassroots perceptions of citizenship  
In terms of citizenship, there are two questions that shed light on a respondent’s 
views, for both NPs and N-NPs. The first question concerns levels of political 
awareness or interest, testing whether respondents are interested in news about 
politics and more specifically their involvement in political party politics. The 
second question concerns attitudes towards political rights and democracy, and 
extracts what respondents say they do to advance their rights. Regarding levels of 
political awareness, it is clear from Figure 6 below that there are high levels of 
interest in political life generally, although there is also a marked difference between 
how various respondents get information. The results indicate that most of the 
respondents (N-NPs 96%; NPs 92%; average 94%) get news from a radio every day, 
as well as (N-NPs 99%; NPs 100%; average 99.5%) from newspapers, once or twice a 
week or on a daily basis. There is little variation between the NPs and N-NPs in 
terms of political awareness, based on their desire for access to information from 
radio and print media. 
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Figure 6: Frequency in following the news150  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
Regarding the respondents’ involvement in party politics, the results suggest that 
neither NPs (71%) nor N-NPs (65%) feel close to any political party (average 68%), as 
illustrated in Figure 7 below. However, a small fraction of the respondents (NPs 
20%; N-NPs 18%) claimed that they were close to a particular political party. In 
addition, fewer than 30% (both NPs and N-NPs) refused to answer. The overall 
impression from the respondent’s attitudes is of a population that doesn’t feel 
attached to political parties. 
 
                                                            
150 How often do you get news from the following sources?  
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Figure 7: Closeness to political parties151 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
Concerning attitudes towards political rights and agency (freedom), as illustrated in 
Figure 8, the vast majority of respondents believe that they don’t have these rights in 
Uganda – and ought to have them. Indeed, in terms of assessing the supply of rights 
– that is, whether they exist in society – the respondents make very similar 
assessments. However, differences begin to emerge with regard to the demand for 
rights – whether Ugandans ought to have these rights and to what extent. Here, the 
respondents “strongly agree” that citizens should be more active in questioning their 
leaders, as opposed to showing more respect for authority (see Figure 9). But the 
majority of respondents “strongly agree[d]” that the government should not allow 
the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of 
the majority. However, they also agreed that people should be able to speak their 
                                                            
151 Do you feel close to any political party?  
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minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their 
views might be. This suggests that the respondents believe in democracy.  
Figure 8: Perceptions of levels of freedom152 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
152 Are you free in terms of free expression, free association with others, and are you free to make a 
choice in voting? 
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Figure 9: Are we free versus should we be free153  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
In terms of respondents’ perceptions of agency, the levels of participation in the 
formal, invited spaces of local governance – such as religious groups, school 
governing bodies, and (more broadly) other community groups – was dramatically 
low (see Figure 10). The majority were inactive members or not active at all, and a 
minority were active members. A striking aspect is that participation in school 
governing bodies was slightly higher than for the other two groups.  
 
                                                            
153 Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in this country. Which of 
the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 2 (interviewer: probe for 
strength of opinion: do you agree or disagree strongly?) 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
Figure 10: Roles in a Community154  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
Regarding the ‘invented spaces’ of community meetings and protests, reported 
participation rates in community meetings were slightly higher than equal (Figure 
11), with over 60% of both NPs and N-NPs having attended a community meeting. 
Reported rates of participation in protest were extremely and consistently low across 
the board. The majority indicated that they had never attended a demonstration or 
protest march, but they would if they had a chance. An insignificant number (< 25% 
for both NPs and N-NPs) said they would never attend a demonstration or protest. 
It is possible that this result can be attributed to how the government has always 
reacted to protesters in the central region of Uganda. 
 
 
                                                            
154 Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell 
me whether you are an official leader, active member, inactive member, or not a member? 
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Figure 11: Attendance at community meetings or participation in protests155 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
In respect of participation in the 2006 national elections, the majority of the 
respondents in both cases participated (see Figure 12). However, a minor fraction (< 
25%) in each category did not vote, for various reasons: they decided not to, they 
could not find the polling station, they were prevented from voting, they did not 
have time to vote, they were not registered, they did not vote for some other reason, 
or they didn’t remember the reason. The picture that emerges is of a community that 
values the relevance of voting participation in a democratic process. 
                                                            
155 Here is a list of things that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me 
whether you personally have done this thing during the past year. If not, would you do it if you had a 
chance? 
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Figure 12: 2006 Elections156  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
Concerning collective participation in local government, the responses indicate that 
the majority of the respondents are not very likely to get together with other groups 
of people and make local councillors listen to matters of importance (see Figure 13). 
This seems to suggest a population that does not participate in public life. The 
results also suggest that councillors are not close to the electorate, and seldom 
engage with them on matters of importance. This signals either that the councillors 
have usurped power or that the electorate has lost faith in them when it comes to 
solving matters of importance at the local level. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
156 With regard to the most recent elections (2006), which statement is true for you? 
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Figure 13: Perceptions on collective participation157  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
6.5 Participation in relation to NAADS Programme 
This section of the chapter explores the grassroots perceptions of participation in 
relation to the NAADS programme. The section commences by exploring grassroots 
perceptions (of both NPs and N-NPs) of: (i) how interested the grassroots are in the 
NAADS programme; (ii) whether NAADS was popular at the local level; (iii) 
whether the NAADS programme has embraced its all-inclusive mandate; and (iv) 
the NAADS officials’ competency and efficacy. These sub-themes were selected to 
explore grassroots perceptions of participation in the NAADS programme. Note that 
in some sections data is disaggregated, to show the statistical variations between the 
response intervals of NPs and N-NPs. The researcher presents data from both 
categories unless a question pertains to one category only; for example, the specific 
                                                            
157 In your opinion, how likely is it that you and other groups of people could get together and make 
local councillors listen to matters of importance? 
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aspects of how NAADS affects farmers in the programme, which would not be 
applicable to N-NPs. However, this varies in terms of the nature of the questions and 
variables used to probe respondents’ views.  
 
6.5.1 Interest in the NAADS Programme 
One of the questionnaire questions asked respondents if they were interested in the 
NAADS programme. This was intended to establish whether N-NPs wanted to 
participate to any degree, and also to find out how much NPs valued the 
programme. As illustrated in Figure 14, the results indicate general willingness to 
participate in the NAADS programme by both NPs and N-NPs. Indeed, results show 
that 71% of N-NPs were “very interested”, compared to 67% of NPs. There was an 
average of 32 % of both NPs and N-NPs who were “somewhat interested” in the 
NAADS Programme. This result suggests that all the respondents were interested in 
the NAADS programme to a degree. What is also interesting is that again, the N-NPs 
were more interested than the NPs. At the same time, none of the respondents 
indicated that they had never been interested in the programme. This suggests a 
community willing to be part of a participatory development programme.  
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Figure 14: Interest in the NAADS Programme158 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
6.5.2 NAADs Programme’s popularity at local level 
After establishing a respondent’s interest in NAADS, the next step was to press for 
whether the NAADS programme was popular at local levels. The questions on 
popularity established how often (if ever) the respondent or any family member had 
talked about NAADS, seen a NAADS official or attended a NAADS Meeting. The 
results indicate a minor variation in responses between NPs and N-NPs. Figure 15 
below indicates that the majority of both N-NPs (72%) and NPs (70%) had “several 
times” heard a family member talk about the NAADS programme. Only 28% of N-
NPs and 30% of NPs reported that they had heard a family member talk about 
NAADS “just once or twice”, a slight variation. These results clearly indicate that the 
majority of respondents had at least heard of the NAADS programme. However, the 
                                                            
158 How interested would you say you are in the NAADS programme? 
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question did not capture whether the respondents were familiar with what the 
guiding principles and the overall objectives of the NAADS programme are, nor 
whether the programme is perceived predominantly negatively, or positively. 
 
Concerning the visibility of NAADS officials to communities, the results show little 
variation in terms of responses between N-NPs and NPs. The majority of the 
respondents (63% N-NPs, and 57% NPs) indicated that they had seen a NAADS 
official “just once or twice”. There is a slight variation; that is, 36% N-NPs and 42% 
NPs claimed to have seen NAADS officials “several times”, while 1% of each 
category claimed “never” to have seen NAADS officials. This result suggests that 
NAADS officials’ presence was felt at local levels to some extent. Responses (as 
illustrated in Figure 15 below) indicate that family members had attended NAADS 
meetings “several times” or “just once or twice”. Again, though it is clear that family 
members of both NPs and N-NPs had attended NAADS meetings, the question 
doesn’t capture whether those who attended meetings contributed to the 
deliberations or if they were there for representational purposes only.  
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Figure 15  Interaction with NAADS programmes159 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
6.5.3 NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate  
After establishing the grassroots perceptions on NAADS popularity the next step 
was to explore their perceptions on its all-inclusive participatory mandate. The 
questions in this category sought to establish the extent to which the NAADS 
programme embraces certain aspects relatable to participatory development 
practices. These practices included: (i) how the programme was made known to 
ordinary people; (ii) whether the people were consulted before decisions were made; 
(iii) if the programme provided effective ways on how to handle complaints; and (iv) 
if equal distribution of resources (see Figure 16). This section only probed the views 
of NPs, because the variables used were directly linked to participation in the 
                                                            
159 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family talked about NAADS, 
seen a NAADS official, or attended a NAADS meeting? 
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programme. Although the N-NPs were also interviewed using the same variables, 
their views are considered insignificant; and as a result, not reported on in this 
section. The research probed grassroots perceptions on how the NAADS programme 
was made known to ordinary people.  
 
The results presented in Figure 16 indicate that 58% of NPs felt that the programme 
was “very badly” made known to the ordinary person, while 33% claimed that the 
programme was “fairly badly” made known to ordinary people. Similar variables 
were also used to gauge whether NAADS programme had consulted members 
before making decisions. According to the results, 63% claimed that the programme 
consulted members “very badly” before making decisions on programme matters. 
Yet in the previous chapter the elites indicated that the programme was all-inclusive 
and consulted all members, including beneficiaries. Concerning the programme’s 
processes for handling the complaints of rural farmers, 68% claimed that the 
programme dealt with complaints “very or fairly badly”. Lastly, on whether or not 
the NAADS programme guaranteed equal distribution of resources, the respondents 
indicated dissatisfaction. The majority of NPs claimed that the programme was 
guaranteed equal distribution of resources “very or fairly badly”. 
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Figure 16 The NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate160  
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
6.5.5 Perceptions on NAADS officials’ competency and efficacy 
The ability to execute participatory developmental programmes is a key ingredient 
for socio-economic development. However, this exercise requires individuals well-
versed in contemporary developmental practices. As a result, it was imperative to 
ascertain the NPs’ opinions of the NAADS officials’ competency and efficiency at 
sub-county level. The conclusions reached were premised on whether the NPs had 
confidence in those who were in charge of the programme. The results (in Figure 17) 
show that 54% of NPs claimed that the NAADS officials at sub-county level were 
“fairly qualified”, while 16% of NPs claimed that they were “fairly unqualified”. In 
addition, 30% of NPs indicated that they were unfamiliar with the education levels 
of NAADS officials at sub-county level. In terms of NPs’ perceptions of NAADS 
officials’ experience of managing public services programmes, 10% thought officials 
                                                            
160 How well do you think the NAADS programme is practising the following procedures? Or haven’t 
you heard enough to have an opinion? 
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were “fairly qualified”, 36% claimed that they were “fairly unqualified”, and 34% 
said they didn’t know. Concerning perceptions of officials’ honesty in managing 
public funds, 28% of respondents claimed that officials were “fairly unqualified”, a 
significant number (51%) said they were “very unqualified”, and 8% claimed that 
they “did not know”.  
 
Figure 17 NAADS officials’ qualifications161 
 
Source: Own data, 18/07/2010 
 
6.6 Assessing the impact of participation in the NAADS Programme  
This section concludes the themes established to explore grassroots perceptions of 
democracy and citizen participation. It uses the data from the Bushenyi district 
NAADS quarterly reports, data from Benin et al (2007) on farmer groups, and a 
                                                            
161 Looking at the group of NAADS officials who are presently serving at district and sub-county 
level, how qualified do you think they are to do their jobs? Please rate them according to the 
following types of qualifications. Or haven’t you heard enough to have an opinion? 
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household survey. The intention was to establish whether participation in NAADS 
has improved the socio-economic reality of participants, in Bushenyi and elsewhere 
in Uganda. This section discusses what NAADS in Bushenyi has achieved, in terms 
of procurement of equipment and supplies for the sub-counties. Thereafter, the 
discussion focuses on the wider achievements of NAADS, using data from Benin et 
al (2007) to illustrate the impact of NAADS in terms of effective inclusion of 
stakeholders. Changes in crop yield, household income, assets, and food and 
nutritional security are examined, between the time of NAADS’ commencement in 
2000, and 2004, after implementation in some districts. The following section 
discusses how the NAADS programme has strengthened farmer forums 
(participating groups), mobilised resources, and procured equipment and supplies 
for farmers in all the sub-counties of the district.  
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Table 1 Procurement of equipment and supplies in sub-counties 
 Sub-
county 
Equipment and supplies  Farmers
’ 
Forums  
Progre
ss  
1 Kyeizooba  3 houses, 2 drenching syringes, 1 spray 
pump, 16 female goats, 600 chicks, 2 100 kg 
poultry feed, 24 drinkers, 24 feeding troughs, 
500 kg pig feed, 400 kg poultry drugs, 50 kg 
NPK fertilizers.  
36 Items 
suppli
ed. 
2 Kyamuhu
nga  
140 Goats worth, 4 200 Coffee seedlings, 1 605 
Chicks,  2 000 tea seedlings, Poultry feed 70 
kgs NUVITA, 50 Piglets (large white breed), 
NPK fertilisers 19 bags, Herbicides Round Up 
brand 55 l, Honey refract meter, Settling tank 
100 kg capacity worth, Packing jars and seals 
500 g, 120 g, 60 g, worth, 50 Air-tight buckets 
and 5 000 labels.  
85 Items 
suppli
ed. 
3 Bushenyi 
– Ishaka 
4,970kgs of Piggery sow, Supported 6 Piggery 
demo farmers, 9 goat demo farmers, 9 banana 
demo farmers.  
15 Items 
suppli
ed. 
4 Nyabubaa
re 
Mulch and Manure, poultry feeds for 700 1-
month-old chicks, 56 Bags of feeds for grower 
and layers worth, 28 Water vessels, 28 
Feeding troughs, 10 Goats, 14 Forked hoes, 7 
and Spray pumps.  
18  Items 
suppli
ed. 
3 Bumbaire Pig housing 5 units worth, 78.5 Bags of pig 
feeds, 35 Tags for pig identification, Large 
white pigs, 14 Bottles of acaricides and 
dewormers, 4 Units for goats housing worth, 
Goats’ identification, 14 Bottles of acaricides 
 Items 
suppli
ed. 
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and dewormers, Goat feeds, 35 Local goats, 
28 Bags of banana fertilizers, 14 Forked, 
42,000 Bundles of mulches, and 14 Harvesting 
gears.  
6 Kakanju 12 demo farms of coffee, 12 demo farms of 
goats, 12 demo farms of banana. 
 Items 
suppli
ed. 
7 Kyabugim
bi 
Coffee demonstration farmers were 
supported with 16 lorries of mulch, 16 lorries 
of Farm Yard Manure, 16 bags of fertilizers, 
16 wheel barrows, 16 pruning saw, 16 
Secateurs, 16 spades, 400 coffee seedlings, 112 
goats given to 16 farmers, Banana farmers 
were supported with 16 lorries of mulch, 16 
lorries of Farm Yard Manure, 16 bags of 
fertilizers, 16 wheel barrows.  
 Items 
suppli
ed. 
Adapted from: NAADS (2009) 
 
Table 1 above contains evidence that equipment and supplies distributed to farmers may 
perhaps increase production, and as such would improve the material (socio-economic) 
reality of NPs as opposed to those who are N-NPs. Secondly, appropriate advice and 
information has been made available to different categories of farmers. The selection of the 
demo farmers162 has been completed in all the sub-counties (see NAADS, 2009). There has 
been provision of a research interface and provision of market information, which certainly 
acts as a catalyst in improving the material reality of a farmer’s existence. In addition, 
                                                            
162 Demo farmers are those members, at the local level, who allow their farms to be used as 
demonstration centres, for the rest of the members to copy and learn how to implement the 
technologies that they receive from the NAADS programme. 
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farmers have been sensitised to form higher-level farmer organisations that can market their 
produce effectively (NAADS, 2009). 
 
This support given to the NPs has enabled them to determine how much to produce, and 
also how to avoid the losses that come with price fluctuation and the vagaries of the 
weather. In addition, farmer-prioritised enterprises have been developed and linked to the 
market. Priority-training needs on selected enterprises have also been met by extension 
workers. For example, enterprise development and market linkages at district and sub-
county level have resulted in NAADS support for a fishing enterprise started by the sub-
counties of Kakanju, Kyeizooba and Bumbaire using the district budget for technology 
development (See NAADS, 2009). One way or another, all this suggests that NAADS has 
improved the socio-economic reality of selected farmers. 
 
While there is evidence of improved socio-economic reality for NPs in the Bushenyi district, 
it is also relevant to examine how the NAADS programme has performed elsewhere in 
Uganda (see the Map of Uganda and NAADS-participating districts). The impact in terms of 
performance is illustrated using data from Benin et al (2007). Among other things, the data 
illustrates how participation in NAADS has contributed to changes in crop yield, household 
income, assets, and food and nutrition. This data is taken from farmer groups and a 
household survey, which the researchers carried out using a two-stage stratified random 
sampling. The data from Benin et al (2007) is based on the NAADS rollout phases, namely 
the 2001/2 and 2002/3 financial years.  
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6.6.1  Change in crop yields 
Table 2 shows the change in reported yields of major crops between 2000 and 2004. In most 
cases there were no significant differences in the yields or changes in yield between the three 
groups. The exceptions were the sorghum yield, which was significantly higher in NAADS 
sub-counties in 2002/3 than in non-NAADS sub-counties in 2004, and the change in yield of 
Irish potatoes – yields were significantly greater in the 2001/2 NAADS and non-NAADS 
sub-counties than in the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. Yields of most crops reported had 
increased in 2004 from their levels in 2000 (see Benin et al, 2007). The exception is coffee, the 
yield of which dropped in the NAADS sub-counties but increased in the non-NAADS sub-
counties. This drop in coffee yield is probably due in part to the sharp decline in coffee’s 
international and domestic price, which reduced farmers’ incentive to invest labour and 
inputs in coffee production. From the data, it is evident that participation did improve the 
socio-economic reality of farmers somewhat, although it is interesting to note how well non-
NAADS farmers did in the same time period. 
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Table 2 Change in crop yields  
Change between 2000 and 
2004 
NAADS Sub-counties Non-NAADS  
Sub-counties  2001/2 2002/3 
Groundnuts (n=288)    
% change  425.77 402.16 433.11 
Test of Change 57.00 7.90 -5.7 
Maize(n=478)    
% change  699.18 551.87 835.17 
Test of Change 33.80 24.30 27.30 
Banana(n=424)    
% change  5942.19 3689.34 3323.03 
Test of Change -4.70 500.30 55.30 
Sorghum(n=212)    
% change  448.77 442.53 388.92 
Test of Change 76.80 5.20 34.80 
Sweet Potato (n=409)    
% change  1760.86 1609.04 1391.88 
Test of Change 18.00 -4.90 7.30 
Cassava (n=525)    
% change  1243.61 1550.68 4340.43 
Test of Change 45.90 1.0 -9.40 
Beans (n=562)    
% change  572.22 386.71 721.01 
Test of Change 66.10 12.90 17.20 
Coffee (n=121)    
% change  515.45 1357.23 2090.45 
Test of Change -27.80 -28.60 81.30 
Irish Potatoes (n=112)    
% change  1003.28 606.57 1368.51 
Test of Change 260.00 29.40 285.40 
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample. Test (at 5% level) mean 
significant difference between 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties and 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties 
Adapted from Benin et al (2007:37) 
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6.6.2 Change in incomes 
Concerning change in incomes, from the data in Table 3, roughly one-fourth to one-
third of the households tested perceived that their farm income had increased 
between 2000 and 2004 (either moderately or significantly), a quarter of the farmers 
perceived that their farm incomes had decreased, and the rest felt there was no 
significant change in their income. The non-NAADS sub-counties reported the 
largest share of households that felt their farm income either did not change or 
decreased, while the 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties reported the largest share of 
households that felt their farm income had increased (Benin et al, 2007). These 
perceptions are consistent with the high rate of adoption of new equipment and 
supplies among NAADS farmers, all of which is expected to cause higher farm 
income if other factors are kept constant. Non-farm income was perceived to have 
increased for about one-third of the households, while about half of the households 
reported no significant change, and about 12% reported slight to significant 
reduction. There was little difference in the changes in non-farm income across the 
three sub-groups. 
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Table 3 Change in crop, livestock and non-farm income, and wealth 
Income NAADS Sub-Counties Non-NAADS 
Sub-Counties 2001/2 2002/3 
Crop income    
Increased significantly 13.6 9.6 13.1 
Increased moderately 17.2 19.0 9.0 
No change 44.1 46.3 48.9 
Decreased moderately 6.3 14.2 17.2 
Decreased significantly 18.8 10.9 11.8 
Livestock Income    
Increased significantly 6.4 4.0 9.2 
Increased moderately 21.7 21.1 15.1 
No change 59.8 58.2 63.1 
Decreased moderately 2.8 8.1 7.7 
Decreased significantly 9.3 8.7 5.0 
Non-farm Income    
Increased significantly 11.2 15.0 15.0 
Increased moderately 25.4 22.6 24.2 
No change 46.0 51.4 53.9 
Decreased moderately 6.3 1.6 1.0 
Decreased significantly 11.2 9.3 6.2 
Wealth    
Increased significantly 7.9 9.9 4.8 
Increased moderately 36.6 3.6 27.7 
No change 17.4 12.0 12.1 
Decreased moderately 12.1 17.5 25.3 
Decreased significantly 26.0 25.1 30.1 
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample 
Adapted from Benin et al (2007:39) 
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According to Benin et al (2007), perceptions of farm income were verified by 
estimating the actual household farm income, which accounts for the largest share of 
household income (Benin et al, 2007; Nkonya et al, 2004; UBOS, 2003). There was a 
significant decrease in estimated farm income between 2000 and 2004 in the non-
NAADS and 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties, with the declines averaging 32% in the 
non-NAADS sub-counties and 28% in the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. According 
to data from Benin et al (2007), the average decline in the 2001/2 NAADS sub-
counties was 15%, but was not statistically significant. Statistical tests show that the 
decline in farm income was greatest in the non-NAADS sub-counties, followed by 
the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. The 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties performed best 
in terms of changes in both crop and livestock income. Benin et al (2007) point out 
that the presence of NAADS (especially in the trailblazing districts) and the adoption 
of the new enterprises and technologies that it promoted apparently helped farm 
households in NAADS sub-counties to avoid the severe income decline that affected 
most rural areas after 2000. 
 
6.6.3 Change in assets 
According to Benin et al (2007), despite declining farm incomes, households in all 
groups increased their ownership of assets on average between 2000 and 2004, and 
the differences across sub-groups in asset accumulation were not statistically 
significant. Benin et al (2007:38) point out that over 42% of households reported that 
their wealth had increased, and only 15% reported no change in wealth since 2000. 
The group that reported the greatest share of households perceiving an increase in 
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wealth was the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. The non-NAADS sub-counties 
reported the smallest share of households who perceived that the value of their 
assets had increased (Benin et al, 2007:38). Given that farm incomes reportedly 
declined among most groups between 2000 and 2004, it is surprising that households 
in all groups were able to increase their ownership of assets (Benin et al, 2007:38). 
Perhaps increasing non-farm incomes among many households helped to offset 
declining farm incomes, and allowed them to invest in asset accumulation (Benin et 
al, 2007). Whether and how households were able to invest in assets if their farm 
incomes were declining cannot definitively be explained, since information on levels 
of non-farm income was not collected; this would require further study using other 
data. 
 
6.6.4 Change in food and nutrition security 
According to Benin et al (2007:42), the pattern of perceptions of change in food 
security (access to food) and nutrition (quantity and quality of food) are similar. 
About 38% of all households felt that their food security and nutrition in 2004 had 
improved since 2000, but about a quarter did not perceive any change in food 
security (Benin et al, 2007). As is the case with perception of change in income (and 
perhaps for the same reasons), the non-NAADS households reported the lowest 
percentage of households perceiving an improvement in food security and nutrition. 
Therefore, there is some evidence to show that participation in the NAADS 
programme did improve the material reality of farmers in other districts, and also in 
Bushenyi. 
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Table 4 Food and nutrition security  
Income  NAADS Sub-counties Non-NAADS 
Sub-counties 2001/2 2002/3 
Food security     
Improved 
significantly  
7.7 12.4 4.6 
Improved moderately  30.5 32.8 20.4 
No change  15.1 8.8 9.3 
Worsened moderately  10.7 17.6 23.9 
Worsened 
significantly  
36.0 28.4 41.8 
Human nutrition     
Improved 
significantly  
6.6 8.2 4.8 
Improved moderately  33.0 32.9 25.5 
No change  24.4 24.3 22.8 
Worsened moderately  9.4 1.6 23.1 
Worsened 
significantly  
26.6 18.2 24.1 
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample 
Adapted from Benin et al (2007:42) 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
From the above discussion, a picture can be drawn of grassroots popular perceptions 
on generic forms of democracy and citizen participation, their perception on 
participation in relation to the NAADS programme, and the impact of NAADS on 
the material reality of NPs in Bushenyi and elsewhere in Uganda. Concerning 
generic forms of democracy and participation, the results show communities that 
share similar views in terms of political awareness, based on elevated levels of 
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interest in political life generally.163 The majority of the NPs and N-NPs agreed that 
they did not feel close to any political party.164 When it came to political rights and 
agency (freedom to choose or act), the majority of the respondents (NPs and N-NPs) 
claimed that they did not have full rights,165 and that they ought to have them.166 In 
terms of respondents’ perceptions of agency, the levels of participation in both the 
formal, invited spaces of local governance were low. The majority of both NPs and 
N-NPS were either not members or inactive members, while a small fraction were 
elected officials.167  
 
With reference to participation in the invented spaces of community meetings and 
protests, the responses were slightly higher,168 with both NPs and N-NPs claiming 
they had “never attended” a demonstration or protest march, but would if they had 
a chance. Another significant proportion claimed that they had attended meetings. 
This suggests that both NPs and N-NPs had engaged in community activities. In 
respect of the 2006 Uganda general elections, the majority of the respondents (both 
NPs and N-NPs) had participated169. Only a small fraction did not vote. This result 
suggests a population that values voting as a form of democratic participation. Yet 
when it came to collective participation, the majority of respondents (both NPs and 
                                                            
163 See Figure 6. 
164 See Figure 7. 
165 See Figure 8. 
166 See Figure 9. 
167 See Figure 10. 
168 See Figure 11. 
169 See Figure 12. 
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N-NPs) said that they were “not likely” to mobilise with others and make councillors 
listen to matters of national importance170. This result suggests a population that 
selectively engages in participatory processes.  
 
With regard to participation in relation to the NAADS programme, most of the 
respondents were “very interested” in the programme.171 In addition, a small 
proportion were “somewhat interested” in the programme. On whether respondents 
were familiar with the NAADS programme at local level, the results indicate minor 
variations in responses between NPs and N-NPs. The majority of both N-NPs and 
NPs (or family members) had talked “several times” about the NAADS programme. 
The same response ratings occurred when the respondents were asked to point out 
whether they had seen any NAADS officials. The majority in this case indicated that 
they had seen a NAADS official “just once or twice”. This shows that the NAADS 
officials were present, but were not that visible at local level. Concerning family 
members attending NAADS meetings, the responses show high percentages of 
respondents (or family members of respondents) having attended meetings “several 
times” or “once or twice”. This shows that even N-NPs do attend NAADS meetings. 
The picture that emerges is of a grassroots that is “very interested” and familiar with 
the NAADS programme.172 
 
                                                            
170 See Figure 13 
171 See Figure 14. 
172 See Figure 15. 
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Regarding the NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate, the 
responses reported on were only from NPs. The results (presented in Figure 12) 
show that 58% of NPs felt that the programme was “very badly” made known to the 
ordinary person, while 33% claimed that the programme was “fairly badly” made 
known. On whether the NAADS programme had consulted members before making 
decisions, 63% of NPs claimed that the programme consulted members “very badly” 
before making decisions on NAADS matters. Yet the elites (in the previous chapter) 
had indicated that programme was all-inclusive and consulted all members, 
including beneficiaries. As to the programme’s efforts to provide ways to handle the 
complaints of rural farmers, 68% of NPs claimed that the programme handled 
complaints from rural farmers “very or fairly badly”. The same was true in terms of 
NAADS attempting to guarantee equal distribution of resources. The majority of the 
NPs were dissatisfied in this regard; most felt that NAADS has not embraced its all-
inclusive participatory mandate at the local level in terms of the distribution of 
resources. 
 
Regarding grassroots participants’ perceptions of NAADS officials’ competency and 
efficacy, 54% of NPs claimed that NAADS officials were “fairly qualified”, while 
16% of NPs claimed that NAADS officials at the sub-county level were “fairly 
unqualified”. In addition, 30% of NPs indicated that they were unfamiliar with 
NAADS officials at the sub-county level of education. In terms of the NPs 
perceptions of NAADS officials’ experience in managing public services 
programmes, the results indicate 10% thought officials were “fairly qualified”, while 
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36% claimed they were “fairly unqualified”, and 34% said they didn’t know. 
Concerning perceptions of officials’ honesty in managing public funds, 28% of 
respondents claimed that officials were “fairly unqualified”, a significant number 
(51%) said they were “very unqualified”, and 8% claimed that they “did not know”. 
The picture that emerges suggests that NPs doubt the competency and efficacy of 
NAADS officials to deliver on their mandate. 
 
The last section of the chapter dealt with the impact of the NAADS programme in 
terms of increasing the socio-economic prosperity of participants. The results show 
that there has been procurement of equipment and supplies by farmers in various 
sub-counties in the Bushenyi district.173 Similarly, there are significant differences 
between NPs and N-NPs in terms of crop yield, household income, assets, and food 
and nutrition. It appears that participation in the NAADS programme had 
substantial positive impact on those who participated. For instance, the provision of 
advisory services to farmers has enabled NPs to adopt new crops (vanilla, 
groundnuts, maize, and beans) and livestock enterprises (goats and pigs). In 
addition, there has been the adoption and use of modern agricultural production 
practices such as improved crop and livestock varieties, fertilisers, and disease and 
pest control measures. This has substantially increased farmers’ income, increased 
their assets and caused change in their food and nutrition; hence, improving NPs’ 
material reality.174  
                                                            
173 See Table 1. 
174 See Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
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In conclusion, the analysis expands on the theme of the chapter: “Grassroots 
perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in the NAADS programme”. The 
picture that emerges from the data is of grassroots communities that share similar 
basic patterns of understanding citizenship. Firstly, there is evidence of willingness 
to participate in the NAADS programme, but also a perception that the programme 
has been top-down, disguised as bottom-up. This can be partly attributed to a failure 
to popularise the programme at local level. Secondly, there is also evidence to show 
that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, and there are no substantive 
official mechanisms or processes for handling the complaints of participating 
farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to participatory development. Thirdly, 
though there is evidence of improvement in the material reality of farmers after 
participating in the NAADs programme elsewhere, based on the data of Benin et al 
(2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly in attitudinal terms. 
The NPs’ belief in NAADS efficacy in Bushenyi was low. In fact, the majority of the 
NPs believed that NAADS officials were only “fairly qualified” and “very 
unqualified” in terms of their competency and efficacy. Yet despite this 
doubtfulness, the NPs participated in anticipation of the programme improving their 
material reality. Therefore, participatory development as officially described by 
NAADS remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has been implemented in 
Bushenyi. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
While the number of studies on democracy and citizen participation has been on the 
increase over the years in the developing countries of the south, the exact meanings 
of these concepts remain fraught with ambiguity. Citizen mobilisation has been 
described as an active process of ongoing engagement and action that is important 
not only for articulating citizens’ “voices”, but also for citizen agency and influence 
(see Gaventa, 2004; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). This understanding of democracy 
and citizen participation points to a process of active involvement of the people in 
the planning process, the communication of their preferences, demands, interests 
and needs, and collective addressing of problems and aspirations in relation to those 
in charge of democratic development policies (Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 
1998; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 
2000; Zotti, 1991). Yet for many – and particularly in the rural areas – citizen 
participation has proved problematic, as it is often tied to the implementation of 
development projects conceptualised and spearheaded by outsiders, rather than 
being spontaneous and indigenous. The research presented here shows that in 
Uganda, the advocates of participatory extension approaches have provided little 
insight as to how to go about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that 
participation reveals when introduced into systems with long histories of rigid, top-
down decision-making.  
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Uganda’s experience has been dominated largely by officials who avoid being held 
to account; elite capture of the decentralisation process; and lack of information 
being made available to the constituents; despite often concerted (though sometimes 
indifferent) efforts by the post-1986 regime, which has endeavoured to promote 
participatory democracy and democratic development policies. As an example of the 
latter, the NRM government introduced the NAADS participatory development 
programme to expand coverage and improve agricultural performance in rural 
areas. The government aimed to boost citizen participation by introducing 
Agricultural Extension Services (AES). Yet citizen participation in the AES (through 
NAADS) remains barely visible – especially in Bushenyi – despite the huge sums of 
money pumped into the NAADS programme for citizen engagement. The manner in 
which democratic development can be understood in the light of the research 
presented in the empirical chapters is discussed below, in relation to the objectives of 
the dissertation as set out in the first chapter. 
 
7.2 Exploring citizen participation in democratic development 
This dissertation set out to investigate a central premise; namely, that citizen 
participation in Uganda – aside from the process of voting, and (in some rare 
instances) protests – has thus far remained relatively indiscernible in relation to 
development policies. In participatory development programmes such NAADS, the 
objectives of which prioritise inclusiveness in rural communities, there is a 
formalistic constitutional enactment that calls for all-inclusive citizen engagement. 
The research objectives were to generate information on how the elites and 
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grassroots understand democracy and participation in participatory development 
programmes. The concluding findings are measured against the major objective of 
this dissertation, which is to analyse elite and grassroots understandings of citizen 
participation within prescribed democratic development mechanisms (such as the 
agricultural extension service prototype) which formed part of the NAADS 
programme in Uganda. To achieve the above objectives, the dissertation:  
 
1) develops an analytical framework, using selected discussions on the 
liberal perspectives of democracy and citizen participation as these are 
incorporated into development strategies designed by government;  
 
2) analyses the literature on democracy and citizen participation in Uganda 
as an emerging democracy; 
 
3) introduces NAADS, an agricultural extension service prototype, as a 
national programme born in an emerging democracy where citizen 
participation is ostensibly a key priority; 
 
4) and finally, analyses both elite and grassroots perceptions of democracy 
and citizen participation in purportedly democratic development initiatives, 
drawing on case study research incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative interviews. 
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7.3  Evidence and inferences  
The results derived from pursuing the above objectives are summarised below. 
Before drawing inferences from these objectives, there are three clarifications 
relating to this dissertation that must be spelled out. Firstly, there are various, 
differing intellectual debates in contemporary academia on democracy and citizen 
participation, although the concepts are conceptually intertwined, and resonate 
profoundly with the issues of accountability and good governance (Saul, 1994; Dahl 
1956; 1989). Secondly, the ethos of participatory development policies calls for a new 
working relationship between local governments and communities (see Robino, 
2009). The ability of local government to deliver satisfactorily to communities 
requires competent, efficient, transparent and accountable planning. Thirdly, 
borrowing from international experience, a culture of participation and a 
participative environment ought to be canonised, especially at local government 
level; and all stakeholders must play a leading role (Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips 
& Edwards, 2000). This requires the capacity to assist in deepening participation in 
rural areas, often neglected in development matters. The following sections present 
further findings linked to the major objectives of the dissertation. 
 
7.3.1 Overview of democracy and citizen participation  
Chapter two of this dissertation discussed democracy and citizen participation, and 
their relationship with development. The chapter reviewed their definitions, stated 
advantages and objectives, and assessed their utility as operational and policy tools. 
In a sea of conceptual uncertainty, it nevertheless became apparent that the concepts 
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have been embraced in legislation – and, to some extent, in practice – in the 
developing countries of the South.  
 
The literature cited in the discussion on democracy defines democracy as a political 
concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of 
a group, association or society (Beetham, 1994). It distinguishes between democracy 
in various situations: where there are free and fair elections; where basic civil 
liberties are respected and protected; and where the cabinet has effective power to 
govern (see Dahl, 1956; Storm, 2008; Koelble & Lipuma, 2008; Houtzager et al, 2007; 
Collier & Levitsky, 1997). 
 
In an attempt to operationalise the concepts of democracy and citizen participation 
and assess the extent to which they are understood and implemented, emphasis was 
laid on deliberative democracy, participation and participatory governance, and 
empowered participatory governance as the major strands within liberal notions of 
democracy (Beetham, 1994; Dryzek, 1990; Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The idea of 
deliberative democracy encapsulates decision-making by discussion among free and 
equal citizens (Elster, 1998:1). Participation and participatory governance calls for 
equal engagement with citizens in the process of governance with the state, so as to 
deepen democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15). Empowered participatory governance (EPG) 
relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens to make sensible 
decisions through reasoned deliberation (Fung & Wright, 2003, as alluded to by 
Gaventa, 2006). 
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Chapter two also investigated how such democratic development practices have 
been idealised in Africa. For example, democracy in Africa has been equated with a 
trophy handed to the Africans after attaining their independence in the 1960s, and its 
conceptualisation has not properly entered popular discourse (Ake, 2000). However, 
democratic sympathisers have argued that Africa is in fact democratic (Bratton & 
Mattes, 2001). Democracy in Africa has been weighed against standards of good 
governance promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF (Pratchett & 
Wilson, 1996; Hyden, 1992; Stoker, 1998:34). The good governance template (as 
linked to democracy) contained aspects of decision-making – who should be 
involved in decision-making, and in what capacity; in other words, the conscious 
management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the 
public realm (Hyden, 1992). The underlying justification was that any 
developmental sector linked to grassroots communities should direct their efforts at 
establishing institutional mechanisms that would accelerate participatory 
governance; which, in turn, would promote development (see Luyt, 2008; Eyasu, 
2006; Balogun, 1998; Dunn, 1986).  
 
Indeed, during the 1990s, participatory development took centre stage (Robino, 
2009). This period witnessed the emergence of ‘people-centred development’, which 
filtered into major development institutions and governments’ development policy 
documents (Robino, 2009). Debates were constituted and reproduced within a set of 
material relationships and activities at social, cultural and geopolitical level. For 
example, the necessity for greater citizen participation was established through the 
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creation of new, decentralised institutions, so as to harness a variety of participatory 
and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations (Gaventa, 
2004; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004). Regardless of the existence of ‘invited’ spaces 
created by institutions of government, and invented spaces created by citizens 
themselves, all-inclusive participation has barely been encouraged; especially for 
marginalised community groups (Friedman, 2006; Millestein, 2008; 2011). However, 
Sinwell (2009; 2010) argues that simply reforming the system will not lead to a 
qualitative or fundamental shift in the way these structures operate, and that reform 
is unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or transform the 
power dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces. Sithole et al 
(2007) point out that in under-resourced communities, the struggle for bread-and-
butter issues takes precedence over equitable representation. 
 
Adversaries of participation point out that participatory rhetoric has been used as a 
tool by global elites to continue to extend their hegemonic influences to the less 
developed countries of the South (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & Speer, 2006). 
Furthermore, they state that efforts at embracing participation are largely for 
maintaining existing power relationships, and are merely masked in the rhetoric and 
techniques of participation. They argue that the task of entering developing 
countries of the South and working with people to develop a country economically, 
politically, and socially is inherently fraught with complexities (Cooke & Kothari, 
2001:3). In fact, some participatory development advocates justify these processes by 
noting the efficiency and productivity with which participatory methods advance, 
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such as in saving ‘transaction costs’, in corporate parlance (Christens & Speer, 2006). 
Many of them seem to be usurped bureaucratic elites who, according to Williams 
(2005), have imposed their own truncated version and understanding of 
participation on particular communities. 
 
The relationship between democracy, participation and democratisation is not clear. 
For some, democracy is regarded as a necessary condition for local development and 
citizen participation. For others, some degree of participation is required for 
democracy to achieve its intended objectives of more efficient and responsive local 
government. Therefore democracy and participation have a symbiotic relationship, 
but the conception, definition and objectives of democracy are critical to this 
relationship. The widespread engagement with issues of participation and local 
governance that occurs creates enormous opportunity for re-defining and deepening 
the meanings of democracy, and for extending the rights of inclusive citizenship. At 
the same time, there are critical challenges in ensuring that the work done promotes 
pro-poor outcomes and social justice. 
 
Democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader issues of 
political economy that contextualise the possibilities of transformative participatory 
development (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). The consequence is that any assessment of the 
relationship between democracy and citizen participation requires an examination of 
political economy dynamics. With greater recognition of civil society and increasing 
discussion about good governance, the concept of participation is shifting; from 
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beneficiary participation in state-delivered programmes, to an understanding of 
participation as a means of holding the state accountable through new forms of 
governance that involve more direct state/civil society relations, under a partnership 
model.  
 
However, the question that Pieterse (2002) poses is: what is the nature of this blend – 
what is gained and what is lost in this act of hybridisation? Uganda’s transformation 
path is characterised by an innovative combination of both strands of democratic 
development thinking, in the wake of neo-liberalism’s demise as a hegemonic 
ideology. These approaches have become increasingly controversial: celebrated by 
optimists as the most empowering way forward for marginal citizens, on one hand, 
and derided as an abrogation of responsibility by sceptics on the other (Golooba-
Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). While these approaches remain controversial on the 
international scene, the following section demonstrates how such democratic 
controversies have been dealt with in Uganda.  
 
7.3.2 Democracy and citizen participation in Uganda  
Chapter three provides an overview of democracy and citizen participation in 
Uganda, from pre-colonial to post-independence times. It demonstrates how 
nebulous colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen participation during 
the rule of pre- and post-independence governments, alongside structural factors 
such as poverty and illiteracy among the majority (Mamdani, 1997). The formation 
of a public sphere with a national character has been made difficult; first by the 
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nature and philosophy of indirect rule, and later by the factionalism and chaos that 
characterised post-independence governments (Golloba-Mutebi, 2008). Yet with the 
rebirth of participatory politics, and even after the multi-party dispensation, certain 
elements continue to impede citizen participation. These elements include citizen 
trepidation (a hangover from past governments); political patronage and impunity; 
corruption and electoral commission misconduct; repetitive local government 
disagreements; elite capture; insufficient pecuniary aptitude; lack of accountability 
and transparency; and lastly, uneven social stratification (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; 
Francis & James, 2003; Olum, 2004). It is notable that the average Ugandan citizen’s 
power and influence over the government improved under the NRM. Yet the 
mechanisms for holding local leaders accountable remained weak, largely due to the 
centralisation of power by government.  
 
As an illustration of this last point, critics have pointed to how egocentric elites have 
weakened the central government budget reserves in the process of facilitating the 
creation of new districts (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). There are conflicts in local 
government between politicians and district administrators (Kakumba, 2003). The 
elites at district level have usurped other powers, thus suffocating the actual 
participatory development that the decentralisation policy calls for. Lastly, political 
patronage resulting from multi-party politics – in which local government put party 
issues above the national cause, and diverted resources meant for development 
towards facilitating party activities – has impaired the whole notion of democracy 
and citizen participation (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). 
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While it is evident that colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen 
participation in pre- and post-independence Uganda, the rebirth of participatory 
politics and the multi-party dispensation paved the way for participatory 
development initiatives. Participatory democracy is built in to the legislative 
provisions of government in Uganda. These provisions are part of the requirements 
of multinational organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF for deepening 
democracy (Collier & Reinikka, 2001; World Bank, 1998; 2000a; 2004). Yet according 
to Sabiti (1998) and Kakumba and Nsingo (2008), there are elements that continue to 
deter democracy and citizen participation. Consequently, it is not clear whether the 
democratic development policies espoused by the government of Uganda match 
elite and grassroots understanding and conceptualisation of democracy and citizen 
participation. Such ambiguity requires ongoing investigation, and the analysis of the 
impact of NAADS further adds to empirical investigations to establish the links 
between policies espousing better development through participation, and the daily 
socio-economic realities of communities.  
 
7.3.3 The NAADS prototype  
Chapter four gave an overview of the NAADS programme. The chapter shows that 
the NAADS programme is an innovative public/private extension service (AES) 
delivery programme that was established by the GoU to boost citizen participation. 
Participation was aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, so as to liberate rural 
citizens from the shackles of poverty. On paper, the programme is participatory in 
nature and embraces liberal democratic ideals. The chapter covered AES history in 
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relation to citizen participation and the circumstances under which the NAADS 
programme was adopted. The discussion further drew attention to relevant 
principles, and programme organisation, management and coordination. Thereafter, 
the chapter evaluated the programme components and activities.  
 
The components include: (i) advisory services and information services (that is, 
farmer group and farmer forum formation and participatory planning, enterprise 
selection and needs identification); (ii) technology development and market linkage; 
and lastly (iii) the approach to funding and delivery of funds was also given 
attention. The programme is described in normative terms (that is, in terms of how it 
is organised and is supposed to work). The discussion aimed to provide a 
background to the interview material on elite perceptions of citizen participation in 
the NAADS programme, and their assessment of the type of participation employed 
in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty.  
 
7.3.4 Elite conceptions of democracy and citizen participation  
Chapter five discussed the qualitative narrative of information obtained from 
various individuals categorised as elites, from national down to local level. The 
chapter listed questions constructed around a set of uniform variables that were 
grouped into thematic categories and discursively posed to elites. These questions 
were aimed at analysing the elites’ perceptions of democracy and citizen 
participation in the purportedly democratic NAADS development initiative. The 
results presented in the chapter were from three categories of respondent who were 
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assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the NAADS programme, namely (i) 
government officials (two MPs from Bushenyi, three MoAAIF officials and five 
NAADS secretariat officials); (ii) political party representatives (five FDC and five 
NRM); and (iii) Bushenyi district leaders (three district councillors, four sub-county 
representatives and three district technocrats). 
 
The responses from government officials present a compelling picture. The 
government officials were satisfied with the progress of citizen participation in the 
NAADS programme. Their views suggest that the government involved people in 
decision-making and implementation, thus enabling the promotion of people’s 
power. Government officials also supported the notion of government transparency 
in participatory development; and further, were of the opinion that the communities 
involved were satisfied. However, the government officials failed to highlight the 
extent of the inclusivity (or the lack of it), and could not say how marginal groups 
would be effectively incorporated in the development programmes. The government 
officials were reluctant to propose alternative strategies on how all-inclusive 
participation would be strengthened.  
 
From their views, two deductions are made. The first is that most of the government 
officials were not critical of the NAADS programme; they seemed to have been 
firmly in support of it from design to implementation. Secondly, government 
officials are convinced that government had encouraged participation in the 
programme, and that it has contributed to socio-economic development. While these 
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opinions remain subjective, it must be noted that some government officials believed 
that the grassroots needed to be sensitised about development programmes. Some 
government officials did note that although the NAADS programme had been rolled 
out effectively in some districts, it is faced with the challenge of mismanagement, at 
district level, that has impacted negatively on all-inclusive participation. Gaventa 
(2001) reminds us that there is renewed need for relating people and institutions, 
building conditions for success, and contesting the local in an era of globalisation.  
 
Political party representatives had mixed reactions to NAADS, with the FDC being 
critical, while the NRM respondents were more sympathetic, and embraced the 
NAADS programme ideology. The FDC representatives stated that participation has 
been hindered by poverty, ignorance, and politically partisan participation. They 
also pointed to elements of discrimination with regard to political affiliation 
affecting participation in the programme. Some FDC respondents observed that the 
avenues of participation created by the current government have been held hostage 
by morally deficient and non-accountable leaders at the local level. They suggested 
that for effective participation aimed at national development, there is a need for 
strengthening institutions of government and promoting the principle of separation 
of powers, and for pursuing constitutional, non-partisan and professional 
management of national programmes. The NRM respondents, on the other hand, 
blamed the opposition for spreading negative propaganda that sabotages 
government programmes by taking advantage of illiterate grassroots, who in the end 
refuse to participate. Both political parties’ representatives placed culpability on each 
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other for ineffective participation in the NAADS programme. Yet if their differences 
were reconciled, perhaps effective participation would translate into socio-economic 
development, especially in the rural communities of Uganda. 
 
The Bushenyi district leaders presented multiple divergent views. For instance, the 
District Councillors stated that participation in the NAADS programmes has been 
obstructed by mismanagement and corruption. Some sub-county representatives 
observed that farmers are frustrated by the lengthy enterprise priority process by 
which they receive advisory services. This has not only been a challenge to NAADS, 
but also a constraint to participation. The Bushenyi district technocrats were critical 
of the government’s failure to implement the other components of the NAADS 
programme. They suggested that for effective participation to take precedence, 
NAADS should provide clear guidelines for the participation of political leaders; 
timely release of funds to the district, to enable timely implementation of planned 
activities; and lastly, continuous dialogue and interaction between the NAADS 
secretariat and district stakeholders. 
 
The overriding impression from the majority of the elites interviewed was their 
acceptance that there had been citizen participation in the NAADS programme. 
However, their acknowledgment seemed to be filtered through a range of pre-
defined ideological lenses, under the guise of efficiency, effectiveness and 
sustainability. The elites seemed to be more concerned with getting the NAADS 
programme right, as required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised in the 
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NAADS Report (2000), rather than creating ties with the grassroots with a view to 
promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities. 
This created an opportunity to engage with the grassroots, and to establish how they 
perceive democracy and citizen participation in the purportedly democratic 
development initiatives of NAADS. 
 
7.3.5 Grassroots perceptions on democracy and citizen participation  
Chapter six provided a background to grassroots (underprivileged respondents) 
perceptions on democracy and participation, and linked this to an evaluation of 
NAADS as an example of a participatory development programme. The grassroots 
interviewees comprised of 155 NAADS Participants (NPs) and 156 Non-NAADS 
Participants (N-NPs). The results are presented in terms of grassroots’ popular 
perceptions of generic forms of democracy and citizen participation, and their 
perceptions on participation in relation to the NAADS programme and the impact of 
NAADS on the material (socio-economic) realities of NPs in Bushenyi and elsewhere 
in Uganda. Concerning generic forms of democracy and participation, the results 
show a community that shares similar views in terms of political awareness, based 
on elevated levels of interests in political life generally. The majority of the NPs and 
N-NPs agreed that they did not feel close to any political party. When it came to 
political rights and agency (freedom), the majority of the respondents (NPs and N-
NPs) claimed that they had never had full rights, but that they ought to have them. 
In terms of respondents’ perceptions of agency, more broadly, the levels of 
participation in both the formal, invited spaces of local governance was low. The 
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majority of NPs and N-NPS were either not members of NAADS, or were inactive 
members; only a small fraction were active members. 
 
With reference to participation in invented spaces of community meeting and 
protests, the responses were slightly higher, with both NPs-and N-NPs claiming 
they had “never” attended a demonstration or protest march, but would if they had 
a chance. Another significant proportion claimed that they had attended community 
meetings. This signals that both NPs and N-NPs had engaged in community 
activities. In respect of the 2006 Ugandan general elections, the majority of both NP 
and N-NP respondents had participated, while only small fraction did not vote. This 
indicates a population that values voting as a form of participation. Yet when it came 
to collective participation, most respondents (both NP and N-NP) said that they are 
‘not likely’ to mobilise with others and make councillors listen to matters of national 
importance. This suggests a population that engages selectively in participatory 
process.  
 
Concerning participation in relation to the NAADS programme, most respondents 
were not only “very interested” in the programme, but also familiar with it, and 
knew who the NAADS officials were. Furthermore, the respondents (including N-
NPs) indicated that they or their family members had attended NAADS meetings. 
This suggests willingness to participate and familiarity with the NAADS 
programme. Regarding the NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory 
mandate, the responses reported on were only from NPs. Most of the NPs felt that 
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the programme was “very badly” made known to the ordinary person. On 
consultation by the NAADS programme, the majority also indicated that the 
programme consulted members “very badly” before making decisions on 
programme matters. Yet the elites (described in the previous chapter) had indicated 
that the programme was all-inclusive and consulted all members, including 
beneficiaries. Regarding the programme’s efforts at providing ways for handling 
complaints, the majority also indicated that the programme “very or fairly badly” 
provided ways of dealing with the complaints of participating rural farmers. The 
same was true of programme efforts at guaranteeing equal distribution of resources. 
These results suggest that the NPs were dissatisfied, and that the NAADS 
programme had not embraced its all-inclusive participatory mandate at the local 
level.  
 
As to grassroots (mainly NP) perceptions of NAADS officials’ competency and 
efficacy, the majority stated that the officials are either “fairly unqualified” or “very 
unqualified” in terms of levels of education, experience at managing public services 
programmes, and honesty in managing public funds. The picture that emerges from 
the above results suggests that the NPs doubted the competency and efficacy of the 
NAADS officials to deliver on their mandate. Yet the literature cited calls for 
collaboration with institutions that mediate between communities, service providers 
and policymakers (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004).  
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On the impact of participation in the NAADS programme, the results show that 
there has been procurement of equipment and supplies for farmers in various sub-
counties of the Bushenyi district. There are also significant differences between NPs 
and N-NPs in terms of crop yield, household income, assets, and food and nutrition. 
These results suggest that participation in the NAADS programme has substantial 
positive impact on those who participate. The provision of advisory services to 
farmers has enabled NPs to adopt new crops and livestock enterprises. The adoption 
and use of modern agricultural production practices such as improved crop and 
livestock varieties, fertilisers, and disease and pest control measures substantially 
increased the farmers’ income, grown their assets and changed their food and 
nutrition; hence, improving the NPs’ material reality.  
 
The situation that emerges from this data is of grassroots communities that share 
similar basic understandings of citizenship, and who value participatory spaces. 
There is evidence of willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, but also a 
perception that the programme has been top-down, but disguised as bottom-up. 
This can be partly attributed to a failure to popularise the programme at local level. 
There is also evidence to show that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, 
and there are no substantive official mechanisms or processes for handling the 
complaints of participating farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to 
participatory development. Though there is evidence of improvement in the material 
reality of farmers after participating in the NAADs programme elsewhere, based on 
data from Benin et al (2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly 
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in attitudinal terms. Therefore, the creation of new, decentralised institutions, with 
the aim of boosting participatory and consultative processes, has not necessarily 
translated to all-inclusive participation in democratic development arenas, as the 
literature suggests (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; 
Ziegenfuss, 2000). Hence, participatory development as applied in the NAADS 
programme remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has been officially 
implemented in Bushenyi. 
 
7.4 Concluding discussion 
While the current consensus on citizens' participation entails the active involvement 
of the people in the planning process, and the communication of collective problems 
to those in charge of democratic development policies, the evidence from this 
research regarding this issue in Uganda remains inconclusive. However, 
participatory politics and representative democracy have become topical, and the 
developing countries of the South have attempted to encourage inclusivity in 
democratic development policies such as that of NAADS, especially in rural poor 
communities such as those of the Bushenyi district. But these developments have not 
necessarily resulted in meaningful participation by the poor. Exclusionary 
tendencies linked to political party affiliation, the elites’ failure to sensitise the rural 
communities about development programmes, poverty, insufficient knowledge of 
constitutional entitlements, fear emanating from a long history of dictatorship, and 
corruption at institutional level have proved detrimental to democracy and citizen 
participation.  
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Indeed, the majority who occupy rural areas are in many cases not active 
participants; rather they are mere recipients of government’s pre-designed 
programmes, and their presence in some cases is for symbolic purposes. Friedman 
(2006:3) reminds us that citizen participation in government is not when 
governments create formal mechanisms to ensure it, but when they develop 
attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen action. Friedman (2006:14) further 
observes that the lack of participation of the poor in formal structures is not due to 
the inability of the poor to represent themselves on these platforms; in fact, inability 
to participate lies in the capacities expected of participants in structured 
participation exercises. Their inability to engage with technical issues makes the 
forums in which the voices of the poor are to be heard even more difficult, even if 
their issues do get to the table. Friedman (2006:14) points out that if policy is to 
reflect grassroots preferences, their voices need to be heard, in conversation with 
each other, in open, democratic processes with those who command power and 
wealth. In conclusion: democracy and citizen participation have been acclaimed for 
bringing participatory development policies to an end. However, just as other bold 
claims have been discounted in the past, so too it must be realised that democratic 
development and citizen participation, like many other discourses, contain within 
them their own limits. 
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Appendix A Elite questionnaire  
An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic 
Development Policies: A Case Study of the  National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda 
(June-August 2009) 
 
Dear Participant 
This questionnaire forms part of research being undertaken 
towards award of degree Doctoral of Philosophy (PhD) in Public 
Administration at the University of the Western Cape located in 
Bellville Cape Town, Republic of South Africa. The title of the 
thesis is “An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and 
Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the  National Agricultural 
Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda”. This study 
does not represent the government or any political party. The dissertation aims at 
assessing the views of individuals considered by the researcher as elites on their 
perception of democracy and citizen participation with emphasis on the NAADS 
Programme. The information obtained will be used to ascertain the extent citizen 
participation in the programme. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERED AS ELITES IN THIS 
STUDY  
Please note that your insightful response is crucial to my efforts in understanding 
the extent of participation within the NAADS programme especially how it offers 
opportunity by creating an environment that will help low income earners in 
particular rural farmers in improving their social economic conditions   
Thank you in advance for your effort. 
 
1) Can you briefly highlight why the government established the NAADS 
programme?  
2) Were people (beneficiaries) consulted before the programme was 
established? 
3) Which groups of people were consulted before establishment of the 
programme? 
4) How has the programme faired in terms of citizen involvement  
5) What course did the government take to promote effective participation 
6) Does the participation in NAADS programme improve their quality of life?  
7) What impact does NAADS Programme have on the lives of rural farmers? 
Give full details. 
8) The NAADS Programme seems to have been a subject of severe criticism 
(that it has not addressed the concerns of the poorest of the poor) What is 
your view?  
 
 
 
 
362 
 
9) Does participation in the NAADS programme reduce vulnerability to 
poverty? If yes; how? 
10) What are the strengths and weaknesses of NAADS Programme so far?  
11) What are the biggest obstacles to rural farmers benefiting from NAADS 
Programme initiatives? 
12) How has the NAADS programme addressed the issues of Gender in relation 
to participation 
13) What are the social and cultural barriers to women participation in NAADS 
Programme?  
14) Have NAADS programme achieved it’s her objectives if so how in terms of 
addressing gender issues if any? 
15) What lessons and experiences have so far been learnt ever since the inception 
of the NAADS programme?  
16) To what extent has NAADS Programme empowered the poor people in rural 
areas?  
17) What has been the response of none participants towards the NAADS 
programme?  
18) What are the major factors that prevent rural people from participating in the 
NAADS Programme?  
19)  In which way has the NAADS Programme led to economic empowerment of 
rural people? 
20) Do you think that having citizen participate in the programme design would 
have a positive impact? 
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21) What are the challenges facing NAADS Programme in Uganda? 
22) Is there any other important information about the programme that you 
think can be a contribution to my research that I should know? 
 
End  
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Appendix B: Grassroots questionnaire 
An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic 
Development Policies: A Case Study of the  National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda 
 (June-August 2010) 
 
Dear Participant 
This questionnaire forms part of research being undertaken towards 
award of degree Doctoral of Philosophy (PhD) in Public 
Administration at the University of the Western Cape. The title of the 
thesis is “An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen 
Participation and Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda”. This 
study does not represent the government or any political party. The study aims at 
establishing grassroots (NAADS participants) understanding of democracy and citizen 
participation. The target are any adults (18 years and above) participating in any NAADS 
Farmer Forums Participants must be residents in the selected sub-counties of Kyabugimbi, 
Kyamuhunga, Kyeizooba, Bumbeire and Nyabubaare in Bushenyi District. Personal 
information will be kept confidential.  
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*The Person Must Give Their Consent. If Consent Is Secured, Proceed As Follows: 
 
 
Respondent No.    
Interviewer No.    
Data Entry No.    
 
 County  Sub-County  Code  
1 Igara East Kyeizooba 100 
2 Igara West Kyamuhunga 101 
3 Igara West Nyabubare 102 
4 Igara East Bumbaire 103 
5 Igara East Kyabugimbi 104 
 
 
BEGIN INTERVIEW 
DEMOGRAPHIC/ AREA DATA 
Lets begin by recording a few facts about yourself 
1. How old are you    
 
2. Respondents Gender  
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
 No Yes Don’t 
know 
 
3. Are you the head of household? 
 
0 
 
1 
 
9 
 
 No Yes Don’t 
know 
 
4. Are you a member of the NAADS programme? 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
9 
 
5. Which Ugandan language do you speak at home? 
Runyankore 101 
Rukiiga 102 
Rutoro 103 
Luganda 104 
Other  (Specify) 
 
6. What is your highest standard of education completed [Code from answer. Do not read 
options] 
No formal education 1 
Informal schooling 2 
Some Primary schooling 3 
Primary completed 4 
Some secondary schooling 5 
Secondary/high School Completed 6 
Some University 7 
University Completed 8 
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Post graduate 9 
Don’t Know 99 
 
7. How often do you use; [Read out options] 
 Daily  A few 
times 
a 
week 
 A few 
times 
a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never Don’t 
know 
A. Mobile phone 4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. A computer 4 3 2 1 0 9 
C. The internet 4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
8. Which of the following do you personally own? 
 No yes Don’t 
know 
A. Radio 0 1 9 
B. Television 0 1 9 
C. Motor Vehicle, car motor cycle 0 1 9 
 
9. How often do you get news from the following sources [Read out options] 
 Never Less than 
once a 
month 
A few 
times a 
month 
A few 
times a 
week 
Everyday Don’t 
know 
A. Radio 0 1 2 3 4 9 
B. Television 0 1 2 3 4 9 
C. Newspapers 0 1 2 3 4 9 
 
 
10. Do you feel close to any political party? 
No  (does NOT feel close to ANY party  
Yes (feels close to a party)  
Refused to answer  
Does not know [Don’t read]  
  
 
11. In this country, how free are you : [Read out options] 
 Not at all 
free 
Not very 
free 
Somewh
at free  
Complete
ly free 
Don’t 
know 
A. To say what you think 1 2 3 4 9 
B. To join any organisation you 
want 
1 2 3 4 9 
C. To choose who you vote for 
without feeling pressured 
1 2 3 4 9 
 
12. Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full time or part time? Are you presently 
looking for a job (even if you are presently working)? 
No (not looking) 1 
No (looking) 2 
Yes part time (not looking) 3 
Yes part time (looking) 4 
Yes full time (not looking) 5 
Yes full time (looking) 6 
Don’t know 9 
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13. Which of the following type’s best describes the main dwelling unit that this 
household occupies? 
 
Permanent house (Brick /cement structure) 1 
Semi-permanent house  2 
Temporary House (Mud & wattle house) 3 
Informal dwelling  not in back yard e.g. informal settlement 4 
Other-specify Post 
code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMY & PARTICIPATION  
Let’s discuss economic conditions. 
14. In general how would you describe: (Read out response) 
 Very 
Good 
Fairly 
Good 
Neither 
Bad or 
Good  
Fairly 
Bad 
Very 
Bad 
Don’t 
know 
A. The present economic conditions of this 
country 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
B. Your living conditions 5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
15. In general, how would you compare your living conditions with those of other 
Ugandans  
Much Worse 1 
Worse 2 
Same 3 
Better 4 
Much Better 5 
Don’t know [Do not read]  
 
16. When you are together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss 
development  matters: [Read out options] 
Frequently 2 
Occasionally 1 
Never 0 
Don’t know [Do not read] 9 
 
 
Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in this country. 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 2 
[interviewer: probe for strength of opinion: do you agree or agree strongly?] 
16.  
Statement 1:  Citizens should be more active 
in questioning actions of leaders 
Statement 2: In our country, citizens should 
show more respect for authority 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 
1 
Agree with statement 
1 
 
2 
Agree with statement 
2 
 
3 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 2  
4  
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Agree with neither 5 
Don’t  know [do not read] 9 
 
17 
Statement 1: Government should not allow 
the expression of political views that re 
fundamentally different from the views of 
the majority 
Statement 2: People should be able to speak 
their minds about politics free of 
government influence, no matter how 
unpopular their views may be. 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 
1 
Agree with statement 
1 
 
2 
Agree with statement 
2 
 
3 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 2  
4  
Agree with neither 5 
Don’t  know [do not read] 9 
 
Let’s turn to your role in the community. 
18. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, 
could you tell me whether you are an official leader, active member, inactive member, or 
not a member?  
 Official Active 
member  
Inactive 
member 
Not a 
member 
Don’t 
Know 
A. religious group (e.g. church, 
mosque) 
3 2 1 0 9 
B. School Governing Body 3 2 1 0 9 
C. Some other community 
association or community group 
3 2 1 0 9 
 
 
19. Here is a list of things that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please 
tell me whether you personally, have done any of these things during the past year. [If yes 
read options 2-4].  If not would you do this if you had a chance?[for no  read options 0 and 
1]  
 Yes  No Don’t 
know  Often Several 
times 
Once 
or 
twice 
Would 
do if 
had a 
chance 
Would 
never 
do this 
A. Attended community 
meeting 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. Attended demonstration or 
protest march  
4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
20. With regard to the most recent, 2006 elections, which statement is true for you? [read out 
options] 
You voted in last election 1 
You decided not to vote 2 
You could not find the polling station 3 
You were prevented from voting 4 
You did not have time to vote 5 
You did not vote for some other reason 6 
You were not registered  7 
Don’t know/Can’t remember 9 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make  [read 
out options] 
 Not at all Not very 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Don’t 
Know 
A. Your ward councillor listen to 
your concerns about a matter of 
importance to the community  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
9 
 
22. The last time you contacted the ward councillor, did you go:  
 Alone with a 
group 
Not 
applicable 
(did   not 
contact 
ward 
councillor 
Don’t 
know 
Alone or in a group 1 2 7 9 
 
 Never Only 
once 
A few times 
Often  
Don’t 
know 
To discuss personal or community problems 1 2 7 9 
 
Let’s talk for a moment about the role of political parties and media in monitoring 
government. Choose statement 1 or 2 [interviewer: probe for strength of opinion: do you 
agree or agree strongly?] 
23.  
Statement 1:  opposition parties should 
regularly examine and criticise government 
policies and actions 
Statement 2opposition parties should 
concentrate on cooperating with 
government and helping it develop the 
country 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 
1 
Agree with statement 
1 
 
2 
Agree with statement 
2 
 
3 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 2  
4  
Agree with neither 5 
Don’t  know [do not read] 9 
 
24 
Statement 1: The media should constantly 
investigate and report on corruption and the 
mistakes of government.  
Statement 2: Too much reporting of 
negative things like corruption only harms 
the country. 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 
1 
Agree with statement 
1 
 
2 
Agree with statement 
2 
 
3 
Agree very strongly 
with statement 2  
4  
Agree with neither 5 
Don’t  know [do not read] 9 
 
25. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree? 
[interviewer: probe strength of opinion] 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don’t 
Know 
A. The courts have the right to 
make decisions that people 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
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always abide by. 
B. The police always have the 
right to make people obey the 
law 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
 
26. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you had enough about them to 
say? [read out options] 
 Not at 
all 
Just a 
little 
Somewhat A lot Don’t 
Know 
The President 0 1 2 3 9 
National Assembly (MP’s) 0 1 2 3 9 
NRM 0 1 2 3 9 
Opposition Political Parties 0 1 2 3 9 
The Police 0 1 2 3 9 
The Courts of Law 0 1 2 3 9 
Ward Committees  0 1 2 3 9 
School Governing Boards 0 1 2 3 9 
 
27. How many of the following are involved in corruption? read out options] 
 None Some 
of them 
Most of 
them 
All of 
them 
Don’t 
Know 
President and officials in his office 0 1 2 3 9 
National Assembly 0 1 2 3 9 
NAADS officials at sub-county  0 1 2 3 9 
District officials 0 1 2 3 9 
Police 0 1 2 3 9 
Judges and Magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 
 
28. In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a 
favour to district or NAADS officials  in order to: 
 No 
experienc
e 
Never Once 
or 
twice 
A few 
times 
Often  Don’t 
know 
A. To be part of the 
government programme such 
as NAADS? 
7 0 1 2 3 9 
C. To be given a contract to 
supply agriculture products to 
farmers? 
7 0 1 2 3 9 
 
 
 
29. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that 
government should address? [Do not read options. Code from response. Accept up to 3 
answers. If respondent offers more than three ask ‘which three of these are the most 
important?’ if respondent offers one or two answers ask ‘Anything else?’  
 1st  response 2nd 
response 
3rd response 
Economics     
Management of the economy 1 1 1 
Wages, incomes, and salaries 2 2 2 
Unemployment 3 3 3 
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Poverty / destitutions 4 4 4 
Rates and taxes 5 5 5 
Loans / credit 6 6 6 
Food / Agriculture    
Farming / Agriculture 7 7 7 
Agricultural Marketing 8 8 8 
Food shortages & famine 9 9 9 
Drought 10 10 10 
Land  11 11 11 
Infrastructure    
Transport  12 12 12 
Communications 13 13 13 
Roads 14 14 14 
Government services     
Education  15 15 15 
Housing 16 16 16 
Electricity 17 17 17 
Water Supply 18 18 18 
Orphans / Street Children 19 19 19 
Services other 20 20 20 
Health    
Health 21 21 21 
HIV/Aids 22 22 22 
Sickness or Disease 23 23 23 
Lack of medicine 24 24 24 
Governance     
Crime and Security 25 25 25 
Corruption 26 26 26 
Political Violence 27 27 27 
Discrimination /inequality  28 28 28 
Gender & Women’s issues 29 29 29 
Democracy/political rights 30 30 30 
Other responses    
Other (i.e. some other problem) 31 31 31 
Nothing /no problems 32 32 32 
No further reply 33 33 33 
Don’t know 34 34 34 
    
 
30. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say?  
 Very 
badly 
Fairly 
badly 
Fairly 
well 
Very 
well 
Don’t 
know 
A. Developing programmes to help the 
poor 
1 2 3 4 9 
B. Improving living standards of the 
poor 
1 2 3 4 9 
C. Creating jobs  1 2 3 4 9 
D. Narrowing gap between rich and 
poor 
1 2 3 4 9 
E. Assisting rural subsistence farmers 1 2 3 4 9 
F. Improving basic Health services 1 2 3 4 9 
G. Addressing Educational needs 1 2 3 4 9 
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H. Providing water and sanitation 
services 
1 2 3 4 9 
I. Fighting corruption in government 1 2 3 4 9 
J. Combating HIV/AIDS 1 2 3 4 9 
K. Maintaining roads and bridges  1 2 3 4 9 
L. Providing a reliable supply of 
electricity 
1 2 3 4 9 
M. empowering women 1 2 3 4 9 
 
 
NAADS PROGRAMME 
31. How interested would you say you are in NAADS programme [Read out options] 
Very interested  3 
Somewhat interested  2 
Not very interested  1 
Not at all interested 0 
Don’t know [Do not read] 9 
 
32. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family [Read out 
options] 
 Never Just once 
or twice 
Several 
times  
Many 
times 
Always Don’t 
know 
A. Talked about NAADS 
programme? 
0 1 2 3 4 9 
B. Seen officials from NAADS? 0 1 2 3 4 9 
C. Attended NAADS meeting  0 1 2 3 4 9 
 
33. How much time does NAADS representatives spend time meeting people in this sub-
county? [read out options] 
 Almost 
all the 
time 
At 
least 
weekly 
At 
least 
once a 
month  
At 
least 
once a 
year 
Never Don’t 
know 
 4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
34. How well do you think NAADS programme is practising the following procedures? Or 
haven’t you heard enough to have an opinion? [interviewer: probe strength of opinion] 
 Very 
badly 
Fairly 
badly 
Fairly 
well 
Very 
well 
Don’t 
know 
A. Making the programmes of work known 
to ordinary people 
1 2 3 4 9 
B. Providing citizens with information about 
the NAADS budget and expenditures 
1 2 3 4 9 
C. Allowing citizens like yourself to 
participate  
1 2 3 4 9 
D. Consulting others about NAADS  before 
making decisions    
1 2 3 4 9 
E. Providing effective  ways of to handle 
complaints of rural farmers 
1 2 3 4 9 
F. Guaranteeing  equal distribution of 
NAADS resources  
1 2 3 4 9 
 
35. When there are problems with how NAADS Programme is run in  your community, 
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how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation [read out options] 
Nothing  A small amount Some   A great deal  Don’t know 
[don’t read] 
1 2 3 4 9 
 
36. If you yourself have seen problems in how NAADS Programme is run in you 
community, how often, if at all, did you do any of the following: [read out options] [If 
respondents saw no problems, use code 7 =not applicable  
 Never  Once 
or 
twice 
Severa
l times 
Many 
times 
Not  seen 
problems 
Don’t 
know/ 
A. Discuss the problem with other 
people in your community 
0 1 2 3 7 9 
B. Join  with others   in your 
community  to address a problem 
0 1 2 3 7 9 
C. Discuss problems  with other 
community or religious leaders 
0 1 2 3 7 9 
D. Write a letter to a newspaper or 
call a radio show? 
0 1 2 3 7 9 
E. Make a complaint to local 
government officials, for example 
by going in person 
0 1 2 3 7 9 
 
37. Looking at the group of NAADS Officials who are presently serving on district and sub-
county, how qualified do you think they are to do their jobs? Please rate them according to the 
following types of qualifications. Or haven’t you heard enough to have an opinion? 
[interviewer: read out option] 
 Very 
qualified 
Fairly 
qualified 
Fairly 
unqualified 
Very 
unqualified 
Don’t 
know 
A. Their level of education 4 3 2 1 9 
B. The extent that they care 
about the community 
4 3 2 1 9 
C. Their experience at 
managing  public service 
programs 
4 3 2 1 9 
D. Their honesty in handling 
public funds 
4 3 2 1 9 
 
38. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their 
jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
[Interviewer probe strength of answer] 
 Strongly 
disapprove 
Disapprove approve Strongly 
approve 
Don’t 
know 
A. NAADS District representatives  1 2 3 4 9 
B. NAADS sub-county 
representatives  
1 2 3 4 9 
C Local council councillors  1 2 3 4 9 
 
39. How easy or difficult  is it for an ordinary person to have their voice heard by NAADS 
officials  
Very easy 4 
Somewhat easy 3 
Somewhat difficult 2 
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Very difficult 1 
Don’t know [Don’t read]  9 
 
Lets turn to your views on NAADS Programme 
40. How much do you trust each of the following people? [Read out options] 
 Not at 
all 
Just a 
little 
I trust 
them 
somewhat 
I trust 
them a 
lot 
Don’t 
know 
A. NAADS Programme facilitators  1 2 3 4 9 
B. District officials and councilors  1 2 3 4 9 
C. Other Ugandans  1 2 3 4 9 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH; YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL 
 
END INTERVIEW 
 
DON’T FORGET TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION 
 
THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY INTERVIEWER AFTER THE 
INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED 
 
 
What was the respondents’ attitude toward you during the interview? 
S/he was  friendly In between hostile 
S/he was  Interested In between Bored 
S/he was  Cooperative In between Uncooperative 
S/he was  Patient In between Impatient 
S/he was  At ease In between Suspicious 
S/he was  honest In between misleading 
 
 
Interviewers comments if any: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________ 
 
Interviewer: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions 
received during training. All respondents recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen 
by the appropriate selection method. 
 
 
Interviewer Signature______________________ 
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Appendix C: Bushenyi District administrative units updated on 14th June 2010 
 
sn  County Name  sn Sub County Name No. of 
Parishes 
No. 
of  
Villa
ges 
      
1 Igara County East  Bumbaire  4 51 
 BITC 
[i]Central Division  
6 31 
[ii]Ishaka Division 5 20 
 [iii]Nyakabirizi Division  4 23 
 Ibaare [from Bumbaire] 4 33 
 Kyabugimbi  4 44 
 Kyeizooba  8 85 
 Ruhumuro [from Kyabugimbi] 5 41 
Total    40 328 
2 Igara County West  Bitooma [from Kyamuhunga] 6 34 
 Kakanju  5 49 
 Kyamuhunga  7 73 
 Nyabubare  6 81 
Total    24 237 
Total Bushenyi   64 565 
 
Sn  Item  2010 
 No. of Counties  2 
 No. of Sub-Counties  7 
 No. of Town Councils  1 
 No. of parishes [+wards] 64 
 No. of villages [+ cells] 565 
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Appendix D: Bushenyi District population projections for 2010-2012 
Sub-county/ 
Parish  2010 2011 2012 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Bumbaire  16,800 19,000 35,800 17,100 19,400 36,500 17,500 19,700 37,200 
Bumbaire 2,400 2,600 5,000 2,400 2,700 5,100 2,500 2,700 5,200 
                    
 Bushenyi 
Town Council 13,100 13,200 26,300 13,400 13,400 26,800 13,700 13,700 27,400 
Ward I 3,600 3,500 7,100 3,600 3,600 7,200 3,700 3,700 7,400 
Ward II 2,800 2,900 5,700 2,900 2,900 5,800 3,000 3,000 6,000 
Ward III 4,500 4,500 9,000 4,600 4,500 9,100 4,700 4,600 9,300 
Ward IV 2,200 2,300 4,500 2,300 2,400 4,700 2,300 2,400 4,700 
                    
 Kakanju  13,300 14,000 27,300 13,600 14,200 27,800 13,900 14,500 28,400 
Kabaare 2,400 2,500 4,900 2,400 2,600 5,000 2,500 2,600 5,100 
Kakanju 2,500 2,600 5,100 2,500 2,600 5,100 2,600 2,600 5,200 
Katunga 2,800 3,100 5,900 2,900 3,100 6,000 3,000 3,200 6,200 
Kitojo 1,300 1,400 2,700 1,300 1,400 2,700 1,300 1,500 2,800 
Mazinga 2,200 2,200 4,400 2,300 2,200 4,500 2,300 2,300 4,600 
Rushinya 2,100 2,200 4,300 2,200 2,300 4,500 2,200 2,300 4,500 
                    
Kyabugimbi 17,300 18,700 36,000 17,700 19,000 36,700 18,100 19,300 37,400 
Bijengye 1,800 1,800 3,600 1,800 1,800 3,600 1,800 1,800 3,600 
Bugaara 2,300 2,500 4,800 2,300 2,500 4,800 2,400 2,600 5,000 
Kajunju 3,200 3,700 6,900 3,300 3,800 7,100 3,400 3,900 7,300 
Katikamwe 2,600 2,800 5,400 2,600 2,800 5,400 2,700 2,900 5,600 
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Kyeigombe 1,600 1,800 3,400 1,700 1,900 3,600 1,700 1,900 3,600 
Nyeibingo 2,100 2,300 4,400 2,200 2,300 4,500 2,200 2,300 4,500 
Buhumuro 2,600 2,700 5,300 2,700 2,800 5,500 2,800 2,800 5,600 
Rwenjeru 1,000 1,100 2,100 1,100 1,100 2,200 1,100 1,100 2,200 
                    
Kyamuhunga  22,400 23,300 45,700 22,900 23,800 46,700 23,400 24,200 47,600 
Bitooma 3,500 3,700 7,200 3,600 3,800 7,400 3,700 3,900 7,600 
Kabingo 4,000 4,200 8,200 4,000 4,300 8,300 4,100 4,400 8,500 
Kyamuhunga 2,700 2,900 5,600 2,800 2,900 5,700 2,800 3,000 5,800 
 Mashonga 4,800 4,800 9,600 4,900 4,900 9,800 5,100 4,900 10,000 
Nshumi 2,300 2,400 4,700 2,400 2,400 4,800 2,400 2,400 4,800 
Nyanga 2,900 3,100 6,000 3,000 3,200 6,200 3,000 3,300 6,300 
Swazi 2,200 2,200 4,400 2,200 2,300 4,500 2,300 2,300 4,600 
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Appendix E: Bushenyi district poverty analysis  
Poverty Issues Underlying Cause (s) Effect(s) 
Small land 
holdings 
Culture of land inheritance 
Population pressure 
Polygamy 
Large family sizes  
Decline in soil fertility  
Low productivity 
Low production and low 
incomes 
Land disputes 
Low access to 
public goods 
Cultural beliefs and apathy 
Negative attitudes towards 
service providers  
Un equitable distribution 
Poor road network 
High cost of access 
Low Levels of education 
Inadequate information and 
ignorance  
High morbidity and mortality 
rates 
Under utilisation of available 
services 
Low productivity 
High illiteracy levels  
High population 
growth rate 
High total fertility  
Polygamy 
Low levels of education 
Early marriages and teenage 
pregnancies  
Low contraceptive use [Low 
CPR] 
Cultural and religious beliefs 
Sex preference  
Un employment and under 
employment 
Unequal distribution of assets 
Domestic violence 
High maternal and infant 
mortality rates. 
Low savings, low investments 
and low incomes  
High dependency rate 
Low productivity and low 
production 
Child labour 
Cultural bias 
about ownership 
of social capital 
Lack of gender awareness 
Low levels of education  
Culture and tradition 
Ignorance on importance of 
social capital 
External influence eroding 
extended family support 
systems [People more 
individualistic and centred on 
nuclear families] 
Domestic violence  
Child labour 
Un even distribution of 
resources 
Delayed decision making and 
interventions 
Poor access to 
credit and savings 
Lack of collateral security 
Inaccessible financial system 
Poor information system 
High interest rates for credit 
and high costs of saving 
Poor saving culture 
Poor capital formation 
Low investment opportunity 
People remain  poor 
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Selective financing by 
Financial institutions 
Dominance of 
subsistence means 
of production 
[77.1% of the 
households] 
Inappropriate skills 
Land fragmentation 
Inadequate  of capital 
Culture and tradition 
Low productivity and low 
production  
Low household incomes 
Low savings and investments  
Soil exhaustion 
Poor tax base 
Inappropriate 
education career 
Colonial mode of training 
Limited career guidance 
Inappropriate education 
curriculum  
 
Lack of competitiveness in 
global labour market 
More Job seekers than Job 
makers 
Environmental 
degradation  
Unsustainable farming 
practices  
Population pressure 
Deforestation  
High demand for wood fuel  
and charcoal for cooking 
[98.5%] 
Poor enforcement of bye-laws 
Limited awareness 
Natural resource 
degradation/depletion 
Low land productivity 
Poor quality and reduced 
quantity of water 
Unpredictable climatic 
patterns 
Reduced agricultural 
production 
Corruption and 
moral 
degeneration 
Greed/moral decay 
Imbalance between earnings 
and cost of living 
Limited to fighting corruption 
Poor service delivery 
Failure to meet planned targets  
Increased crime rate  
Poor governance 
/leadership 
Limited exposure and 
experience 
Limited patriotism at all 
levels 
Inadequate knowledge and 
skills  
Corruption 
Inconsistent government 
policies 
Political pressure 
Communities limited 
participation in development 
initiatives 
Loss of opportunities 
Poor progress follow up 
Inequitable distribution of 
resources 
Sources: Bushenyi District Participatory Poverty Assessment Process Report 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
